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AN EVALUATION OF JOSEPH EMERSON BROWN'S INVENTION, 18$7-1880
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
Background and Subject of the Study 
Ernest J. Wrage has written that public speaking courses 
require a body of speech material idiich should include not only the 
speaking careers and skills of individual speakers, but a collection 
of their ideas that serves as "solid intellectual residual.Dickey 
further amplifies Wrage's thesis and singles out Southern oratory as 
being an area overlooked by public address scholars. . He not only 
believed that more public address data should be gathered, but 
specifically material describing careers, skills, and ideas of 
Southern speakers.^ The purpose of this study is to contribute to 
the goals of both Dickey and Wrage by evaluating a representative 
selection of Joseph Emerson Bfown's rhetorical effort from 1857 
through 1880. The justification for selecting Brow's rhetoric for 
investigation can perhaps be explained by reviewing the role this
^Ernest J. Wi-age, "Public Address: A Study in Social and 
Intellectual History," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIII (December, 
19U7), U56. ------  ------------ --
^Dallas C. Dickey, "Southern Oratory: A Field for Research," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIII (December, 191*7), U58-U63.
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Southern speaker played in the major historical events during this 
period.
The years 1857 through i860 might very well be divided into
r
three periods as a basis for describing the major historical events 
that transpired and the role attributed to Brown concerning these 
events: The first period extending from 1857 to 1865, included the 
events contributing to the South *s secession from the Union and the 
resulting Civil War. The second period, extending from 1865 to 1872, 
included the Civil War's end and the reconstruction program forced 
upon the South. The third period, extending from 1872 to 1880, 
included restoration of home-rule and the Democratic Party's return to 
power in Georgia. One major theme was prevalent in all three periods: 
the relationship of the states to the Union.
Many Southern historians advance the thesis that Georgia 
played a dramatic and important role in the many events leading up 
to the Southern States' secession from the Ihion. These historians 
theorize that a majority of Southern leaders believed that no con­
federation or independent government in the South could hope to 
achieve success without Georgia's active support. Louise B. Hill 
referred to North Carolina's Governor Zebulon Vance's speeches and 
writings, as recorded in the Confederate Records of Georgia, for 
evidence to support this claim.3 Avery wrote that no state played a 
more vital role in secession and war than did Georgia.^
3liOuise B. Hill, Joseph E. Brown and the Confederacy (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 19^9), p« 36.
Ul. W. Avery, The ffiLstory of the State of Georgia (New York: 
Brown and Derby, 1881), p. U*
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In the state of Georgia, one man, Joseph Bmerson Brown, 
played an important role in all three of these periods of that state's 
history. Thompson offered the following summary describing Brown's 
role through the periods being studied: ,
No enumeration of the influential leaders who determined 
the. work of reconstruction can be coiq>lete without fürther mention 
of the most signifieent of them all, the power behind thé throne, 
ex-Govemor Brown. Of all public men in Georgia in this period 
he was the most astute and the most powerful. He was first in 
secession, first in reconstruction, and very nearly first in the 
restoration of Democratic home rule.^
In the period preceding the Civil War Joe Brown was governor of Georgia.
In the fight to determine whether the South would secede from the %ion
Brown joined forces with Toombs, persuading Georgia to secede imned-
iately.^ Historians credit Brown's speeches and letters with playing
a vital role in making the secession movement a success. Governor
Vance wrote that Brown's speeches provided North Carolina with the
initiative to secede from the Union.?
Georgia not only played an inçxnrtant role in the Southern 
state's revolt from the Union, but became one of the first seceded 
states to be readmitted to the Union. Joe Brown again played an 
important role in persuading Georgia to accept the Radicals' recon­
struction program. He was forced to resign as governor at the close 
of the Civil War, but as private citizen he began an active campaign 
to gain passage of the Presidential and later Radicals' program.
^Mildred C. Thompson, "Reconstruction in Georgia," Studies in 
History, Economics and Public Law (New York: Columbis University
Press, LUV, 2B6.
^HLU, op. cit., p. 36.
?Cited in ibid.
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These successful ca)q)algns, and the support he gave to the Republican 
presidential candidate in 1868, aided in making him the most hated 
man in the state* Brown published a letter in 1866 advising the 
state to adopt the Radicals' program.8 He joined the Republican Party 
and became the major voice in dictating the new state constitution 
required by the federal government*^ After the constitution was 
written. General Meade submitted it to the state for ratification.
Brown retained this leadership role in the Republican Party and 
conducted an active speaking campaign for the adoption of the 
constitution*^^ The success of the campaign was evidenced by the fact 
that the constitution was ratified with an 18,000 vote majority*
The newly elected Republican governor, Rufus B. Bullock, 
attempted to repay Brown by nominating him for the office of United 
States Senator* As might be predicted, old enemies from the Whig and 
Democratic Parties joined forces to prevent this selection. The 
coalition was successful and the state legislature failed to elect 
Brown by only a few votes. The defeat served as the only political 
loss Brown ever suffered in his political career. Shortly after the 
defeat Bullock appointed Brown Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court* 
In 1870 Governor Bullock was forced to resign as governor and 
the Democratic Party regained control of Georgia's government* Some­
time before I87O (the exact date is not known) Brown split with the
QAtlanta Daily New Era* February 26, 1867.
^Thompson, op. cit., 196-198*
^PRobert Fielder, A Sketch of the Life and Times and Speeches 
of Joseph E* Brown (SpringPield, Mass: N.P., 188j), pp. h36-U37.
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Republican Party and resigned from the Supreme C o u r t . H e  deserted
the Republican Party as increasing graft appeared more and more in the
new regime. The Democrats nominated James M. Smith for the vacated
governor's office, and Brown's support for Smith assured the party of ^
its victory.^ Brown remained a Democrat after 1872, but was rather
inactive in politics until i860. In this year United States Senator
John 6. Gordon resigned his office a few weeks before Congress adjourned,
and Brown was appointed to fill out the interim term. In the I88O
election Brown ran as a candidate for the Senate and won the election by
a large majority vote. Thereafter, Brown remained a leading political
figure in the state, as well as the nation, until his death in 189U«
Georgia played an important part in major historical events in
the South and in the nation between the years 185? to I88O, and Brown
stood out as the most inportant figure in the state's activities during
this period. Brown's role in the affairs of the state between these
years has been described by Avery thus:
Looking at the large number of able and influential men 
of Georgia who have figured and led in this important and dramatic 
period, the man above all others who has been more closely identi­
fied with the great events of this memorable epoch in Georgia and 
whose masterful individuality has been the most conspicuously 
impressed upon these events, is the calm face and slender figure 
of Joseph E. Brown. His public career for a quarter of a century 
has been the history of his state. There is no year in this long 
episode of thrilling events that his instrumentality could be
^-^he actual date of Brown's split with the Republican Par^ 
is not known, rather, it was a gradual disassociation of himself with 
the party as graft among Republican leaders increased, culminating 
with his resignation in 1870 and his support of the Democratic 
nominee for governor in I87I.
^HiU, op. cit., p. 30$.
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dropped out without creating an inqwrtant blank in the picture, 
while no incident of the romantic record could be properly nar­
rated that lacked the recounting of his powerful agency.^
Fielder wrote that the history of Georgia blended with Brown's personal
history, that he exerted great influence over the people of Georgia,
and that his speeches and letters exercised a very powerful influence
on the people throughout the slaveholding states.
Brown's life is also significant in another manner. For a 
number of years the state government had been in the hands of cultured 
and wealthy men. Brown's election to governor in 1857 brought the 
aristocratic control to an end and placed more power in the hands of . 
the people. Not only did the wealthy class lose control of the govern­
ment, but all the costly display and court entertainment by the chief . 
executive disappeared. Brown now stood as the true representative of 
the people, removing all the "courtly" social display.Coulter wrote 
that the aristocratic element in Georgia looked upon the selection of 
this North Georgia mountaineer almost with consternation, and Toombs 
was said to have exclaimed on hearing of the nomination, "Who in the 
hell is Joe Brown%"^°
Brown served not only as the people's representative but as 
their speaker. From the very beginning of his political career he
13Avery, op. cit., p. 5.
l^Fielder, op. cit., pp. 26l and Ii86-U8?.
I5lbid., pp. U7-50.
16e, Merton Coulter, Georgia, A Short History (Chapel Hills 
University of North Carolina Press, 19hl), p. 312.
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spoke in the direct, sinç>le language used by the common people in 
Georgia.!?
In review, the purpose of this study is to discuss the man 
Brown— the voice of the people, the voice of Georgia, the voice of the 
South. More specifically, the purpose of this study is to analyze 
representative speeches of Joseph Emerson Brown in each of three 
periods of Southern history extending from 1857 through ISBO.
The Purpose and Method of the Study 
Ihe Purpose
Earlier, Wrage was quoted as desiring a body of speech 
material which included a collection of speakers' ideas to supplement 
the information describing the speakers' career and skills. Dickey 
stressed that such materials were especially needed about Southern 
speakers. This study will therefore propose to conteibute information 
concerning a Southern speaker's ideas as well as data concerning his 
rhetorical career and skills.
The Value of Describing Brown's Ideas. %rage wrote that 
"speeches serve as useful indices to the popular sdnd."!^ Assuming 
that Wage's thesis is true, then Brown's speeches should contribute 
to the history of ideas in the South. Brown was elected governor for 
four successive terms from 1857 to 1865 by large popular votes. 
Historians credit him with representing the popular will in the state.
!?Avery, op. cit., p. 39. 
!®Wirage, op. cit., p. U57.
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thus serving as the popular voice during these years*19 After the war 
he took a stand on reconstruction that proved to be very unpopular 
with the people he represented before 186$. Yet, during the recon­
struction years ftom 1866 to 18?0, the Radical Republicans looked to 
him for advice in writing the new constitution and conducting the 
campaign that successfully established their reconstruction program 
in the state. Brown once again exercised influence over the people, 
although not necessarily the group he represented earlier. In 1880, 
Brown regained the Democratic Party's confidence and exercised control 
over state politics until his death. He utilized numerous speeches 
and letters to achieve his objectives in each period being considered 
in this study. The ideas he expressed in these speeches and letters 
should provide an excellent index to the people's thoughts during 
these years and should contribute possible new insights into Southern 
history. q
In still another way Brown's speeches may contribute to the 
history of ideas in the South. Brown's motives for defending the 
reconstruction acts from 1866 through 1869, and then deserting the. 
Radicals to rejoin the Democratic Party in 1871, have provided 
numerous controversies among Southern historians.20 Many historians 
advance the argument that Brown joined the Republican Party and defended 
the reconstruction acts to avoid punishment by the North. 21 These
l?Fielder, Hill, Avery, and Thompson all attribute Brown with 
exercising great influence over the people in Georgia during these years.
20Rill, op. cit., pp. 321-323»
2lThese historians include Coulter, Hay, Hill, and Thomson.
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historians reason that Brown rejoined the Democratic Party to advance 
his political career after the threat of punishment had passed. Other 
historians reject the idea that Brown had any selfish reasons for 
defending the reconstruction acts.22 They argue that he believed 
rejecting the acts would bring additional punishment to Georgia. It 
seems clear, they say, that Brown reasoned that Georgia would benefit 
more by rejoining the Union thus returning her more capable leaders to 
governing positions.23 The body of information contained in Brown's 
rhetoric may contribute new insight on this historical controversy.
The Value of Studying Brown's Rhetoric. Although Wrage wrote 
that the public address curriculum needed a collection of speakers' 
ideas, he did not suggest that information describing the speakers' 
careers and skills was no longer needed, ihrage's second objective may 
be met since Brown's speaking career and skills are described. Brown's 
ideas should prove more meaningful to the student of public address 
after they are described, analyzed, and evaluated.
Dickey wrote that inadequate rhetorical information was avail­
able on Southern speakers. His observation can be verified at least 
regarding one Southern speaker— Joe Brown. Numerous Southern 
historians give only passing mention to this Southern speaker, and 
numerous public address historians fail to discuss him at all. Yet 
a few historians credit Brown with playing a very vital role in the
22Avery, Brooks, Fielder, Knight, and Pearce defend Brown's 
policy toward reconstruction.
23Brown reasoned that idien Georgia was readmitted to the Union 
her old leaders would be allowed to participate in governmental 
activities.
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history of Georgia and of the South.2h This study, therefore, proposes 
to provide information concerning his career, rhetorical skill, and 
ideas.
Thonssen and Baird wrote that "practice, theory, and criticism 
are, in the broadest sense, indivisible elements of an art. Each 
influences the other, with the result that all are modified by the 
circular action."25 They go on to explain that these three elements 
follow a certain chronology. Speech theory probably originated from 
the speaking habits enç)loyed by individuals during a specific period. 
Once the theory was systematized, speakers may have relied upon that 
body of information to guide their future speechmaking. To rely upon 
this system without change suggests that speech theory is a closed 
body and cannot be inproved. Critical inquiry can reveal idiether 
speakers vary in practice from a closed body of theory, or if new 
innovations are enployed. The critical evaluation of Brown's rhetoric 
should reveal idiether he relied upon present-day theory or if he 
varied Arom that closed body.
Method
Thonnsen and Baird list three stages in the critical process: 
(1) a searching examination of the facts relating to the particular 
speech; (2) the formulation of the principles, or criteria, by which 
the speech is to be appraised; and (3) the critical evaluation of the
2UTheae historians include Thonroson, Stephens, Fielder, Avery, 
and Pearce.
2$Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 19U8), p. 16.
data. This three-step process provides the evaluative method for 
this study. In the first place, background information describing the 
issues, audience attitudes, and speakers' purposes must be known to 
allow rhetorical judgment.^^ In the next place, the reader must be 
acquainted with what phase of the speech a critic proposes to evaluate 
and the tools the critic will employ in the evaluating process. And 
last, the speech is evaluated in light of the findings in the two 
foregoing stages.
The purpose this study proposes to accomplish requires careful 
discrimination in selecting the speeches to be evaluated. Several 
criteria should govern the choice. An adequate sampling of speeches 
should be taken from each period. The selected speeches should treat 
the major issues being studied in that specific period. The selected 
speeches must present an accurate picture of Brown's philosophy 
concerning the existing issues. The speeches used in this study 
qualify under these criteria. Three speeches are selected to present 
Brown's philosophy concerning secession. These speeches, delivered 
in 1857, 1859, and i860, picture Brown's ideas concerning the relation­
ship between tne states and the Union and present a progressive growth 
of ill-will toward the North until it builds to the explosive secession 
by the Southern states.
Two speeches are selected to represent Brown's lAilosophy during 
reconstruction. These two speeches are his resignation address
26ibid., p. 9.
27ibid. Thonssen and Baird conclude that rhetorical judgment 
is a coBQKJsTEe of data and interpretation that is intended to reveal the 
effect of a given speech upon a particular group of listeners.
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delivered in 1866 and his "Replies to the Notes on the Situation" in 
1867. Both selections were published in newspapers throughout the 
state and have been referred to by some historians as letters.
Although they might justly be entitled letters, they take the form 
and contain the organizational pattern of speeches. Since both 
selections were so important to the speaker, he published the speeches, 
one may logically conclude, so more people would receive the content. 
These two rhetorical efforts have been selected because they best 
present Brown's ideas during critical periods. The speech in 1866 
represents the only expression of Brown's views concerning the action 
people should take regarding President Johnson's reconstruction 
program. The "Replies to the Notes on the Situation," seven articles 
published in 1867, is the most comprehensive and important presentation 
of his case for adopting the Radicals' reconstruction program, as well 
as his refutation of Ben Hill's opposition to those acts. In both 
the secession and reconstruction periods the major issue was the 
states' relationship to the Union. The issue would seem to have been 
settled following the Civil War and Georgia's re-admittance to the 
Union. Before Brown regained his political power in the Democratic 
Party after 1872, however, he had to argue the issue again.
Two speeches present his views concerning the state's relation­
ship to the Union in l880. The first speech was the "Mexican War 
Pension Bill," in which Brown presented his views before the United 
States Senate. The second address, presented to the people of 
Georgia on the eve of election, defended the position he had held on 
states' rights since 1866. These two speeches have been selected to 
describe his philosophy for the period 1872 to 1880.
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Among the five classical canons, this study focuses upon 
invention. Wilson and Arnold wote that invention includes the 
speaker's subject, proof, and reinforcement of ideas.They describe 
a good subject as one that meets the demands imposed by the speaker's 
capacities, the readiness of the audience, and the conventions of the 
situation in uhich the speaker will appear.29 Proof is often defined 
simply as evidence plus reasoning. Wilson and Arnold expand their 
definition to insist that proof must justify the audience's personal 
interest as well as appeal to their logic.^® They view reinforcement 
as including the various amplification devices needed to assure that 
the audience will accurately perceive the message.31
The following organizational pattern will be employed to serve 
as the guide for examining and evaluating Brown's invention: First, 
background information relating to the particular speech or speeches 
will be presented. Second, the general speech text will be summarized 
to present the speaker's ideas on the various issues. Third, the 
invention Brown employed in his rhetoric will be analyzed and evaluated.
Sources of the Study 
Previous Research 
An examination of the Quarterly Journal of Speech and Speech 
tfonographs reveals that no rhetorical study has been made of
John F. Wilson and Carroll C. Arnold, Public Speaking as a
liberal Art (Boston; AUyn and Bacon, Inc., 1961*j, pp. l2$-l63. 
^^ibid., p. 127.
3(^ i d ., pp. 128-150.
31lbid., pp. 150-162.
lU
Joseph Emerson Brown. Di the past, however, some historical studies 
have been coiq>leted on Brown. Louise B. HjU wrote her doctoral 
dissertation on Governor Brown and the Confederacy at Vanderbilt 
University. She later, in 1939» used the data from this study to 
publish a book, Joseph E. Brown and the Confederacy. She restricts 
her reporting in both books ;to Brown's activities in Georgia from the 
formation of the Confederacy to its end. Although she gathered scrbo 
data from Brown's speeches for her study, she makes no atteng)t to 
evaluate his rhetoric. Two additional historical studies were written 
on Brown's life by his contenporaries: I. W. Avery's The History of
the State of Georgia, 1881; and Robert Fielder's A Sketch of the life 
and Times and Speeches of Joseph E. Brown, 1883. Two papers have been 
published on Brown in the Georgia Historical Quarterly: One study was
written by J. R. Hay in 1929, and the second article was completed by 
J. H. Bass in 193U. All four studies contribute excellent background 
information about Brown, but none of the studies attempt to evaluate 
his rhetoric.
Major Sources
Several books, in addition to the studies mentioned earlier, 
were especially useful in providing historical background for this 
study. These books included E. Merton Coulter's The South During 
Reconstruction 1865-1877, Dwight Lowell Dumond's The Secession 
Movement I86O-I86I, John Samuel Ezell's The South Since 1865, Allen 
Nevin's two volumes on the Ordeal of the Union, Henry Savage's Seeds 
of Time, C. Vann Woodward's Origins of the New South. The first three 
volumes of The Confederate Records of Georgia and many others also 
provided information.
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Brown *8 ideas were expressed in both the speeches he delivered 
and the letters he published in newspapers between 1857 through i860.
To gain greater insight into his thinking, the writer attempted to read 
all of his speeches and letters that were presented between these years. 
During this period Southern newspapers devoted their major coverage to 
politics and agriculture, and their coverage was comprehensive. Eaton 
wrote that literary talent in the South was expressed most potently to 
the field of journalism. The Southern newspapers were devoted to 
reporting debates in Congress, relaying foreign news, publishing letters 
on political issues, but gave little space to local news.3%
Most of Brown's rhetorical efforts are published in "Brown's 
S c r a p b o o k s . "33 This source consists of 57 scrapbooks kept by Brown's
wife, covering the period from 1852 until his death in 189U.
! .
Mrs. Brown kept two scrapbooks concurrently, one book containing
clippings reporting favorable comments on her husband's activities,
the other book containing the critical reviews. The scrapbooks
contain clippings from many national publications as well as from the . ^
state's major daily and weekly journals. They will serve as a major
source in this study since they contain a large quantity of primary
source material. The historical studies cited earlier draw much of
their data from these same newspaper clippings.
32ciement Eaton. A History of the Old South (New York; The 
Macmillan Conçjany, 19h9), p.
33a  copy of "Brown's Scrapbooks" is available in microfilm at 
the University of Oklahoma's library.
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In addition to the studies already mentioned, information vas 
gained Arom the vritings, speeches, and biographies of Brown's 
political contemporaries. This research included studying Frank H. 
AlAriend's Life of Jefferson Davis, Benjamin H. Hill, Jr.'s Senator 
Benjamin HI Hill of Georgia; His life. Speeches and Wri.tlngs,
Benjamin H. Hill's "Notes on the Situation," Haywood J. Pearce's 
Benjamin H. Hill— Secession and Reconstruction, and the speeches of 
Robert L. Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, Herschel V. Johnson, Howell 
Cobb, and others.
Plan of the Study 
Chapter Two
Chapter Two briefly describes Joe Brown's life. Thonssen 
and Baird have written that "men use speech to achieve certain 
responses firom hearer s.T hey  point out that every speaking 
situation involves a speaker, a medium of eagression, and the 
recipient of the message.Before any attempt should be made to 
evaluate a speech, necessary data should be gathered about the speaker. 
Chapter Ttro, therefore, proposes to provide any personal information 
about Brown that might aid in evaluating more effectively his rhetoric. 
This chapter describes his background, character traits, and speaking 
career.
^^Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., p.
35ibid.
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Chapter Three
From 18^7 through 186$ Georgians were faced with many 
problems: They had to determine the relationship existing between
the states and the Union. As events occurred indicating that the 
North was gaining sufficient power to determine slavery's future, the 
South had to select the program that would best protect its investment. 
After the South agreed to withdraw from the Union, it was faced with 
the numerous problems related to farming a new government and con­
ducting a war to protect that freedom. The three speeches selected 
as representing Brown’s rhetoric ftom 18$7 to 186$ are evaluated in 
Chapter Three.
Chapter Four
The North emerged victorious from the Civil War in 186$, 
establishing its claim that the states could not secede from the 
Union. A new problem concerning states * relationship to the Union 
was immediately introduced, determining the procedure that would be 
employed to allow the defeated states to return to the Union.
The reconstruction period in Georgia extended from 186$ to 1872. 
Between these years two reconstruction programs were introduced: The
first program was introduced by President Johnson and was immediately 
accepted by Georgia. The United States Congress rejected the presidential 
program, and introduced their own program containing harsher terms 
that divided the state over the policy that should then be followed.
The rhetoric Brown enqployed concerning each program is evaluated in 
Chapter Four.
18
Chapter Five
After 1871 the Democrats returned as the ruling political 
party of Georgia. Sometime between I869 and l8?l Brown had switched 
back to the Democratic Party. Although many Democrats refused to 
welcome Brown back into the party, in I88O Governor Alfred H. Colquitt 
appointed Brown to serve the interim term vacated by United States 
Senator Gordon. This appointment, in addition to Brown's decision to 
n m  for re-election in I88O, set the stage for determining the 
people's acceptance or rejection of his leadership.
A second problem was introduced during this period when the 
Republican Party re-initiated the old issue concerning the state's 
relationship to the Union. The dispute was presented by the North in 
the "bloody shirt" argument. The argument had been dropped in 18?6 
but was re-introduced in 18?8. Congress clarified the North's 
position idien it reminded Southern members that they held these seats 
only by the grace of the North.
Brown delivered two speeches treating these problems. The 
first speech was delivered before the Senate and defended the South's 
right to participate in the government. The second speech was 
delivered in De Gives Opera House and defended his policies since 
1865. These speeches are evaluated in Chapter Five.
Chapter Six
Certain problems and objectives that this study proposed to 
investigate were listed earlier in Chapter One. Chapter Six attes^ )ts 
to summarize some answers to these problems discovered in earlier 
chapters and to list any of thé objectives that may have been achieved.
19
nie chapter is divided into two sections. The first section 
summarizes Brown's ideas concerning his reasons for supporting the 
Radicals* reconstruction program and indicates the consistency of his 
policies. The second section reviews his total rhetorical effort 
between 18^7 and 1880 and attempts to draw some final judgments 
concerning this rhetoric.
CHAPTER n
A REVIEW OF BROm'S BACKffilOUND, CHARACTER TRAITS,
AND SPEAKING CAREER
'Dionssen and Baird wote that a critic must possess knowledge
concerning a speaker's background and character before he can
evaluate the orator's rhetoric.^ They gave additional emphasis to
this idea by referring to Herbert Wicheln's statement that knowledge
about the general conduct and character of the man is essential to
understanding the speaker's oratory.^ Chapter Two proposes to present
the Information describing Brown's background, character traits, and
speaking career that will aid most in contributing to a more effective
evaluation of his rhetoric.
Brown's Background 
Brown's Paternal Background 
Brown's forefathers were Scotch-Irish Presbyterians who lived 
in the vicinity of Londonderry, Ireland. In 1?U5 his great-grandfather 
emigrated to America and established permanent residence in South 
Carolina. In 1821 Mackey Brown, Joe Brown's father, moved to Tennessee, 
where he met and married Sally Rice. Shortly after their marriage the
^Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 19U8), p. 1$.
^Ibid., p. 17.
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young couple moved back to the elder Brown’s home county, Plcktns,
South Carolina.
Joseph Emerson Brown, the oldest of eleven children, was bom 
in Pickens District, South Carolina, April 1$, 1821. His parents 
moved to Union County, Georgia, shortly after Brown’s birth. The new 
home was a small, unproductive acreage of rocky, hilly land that 
provided a meager living for the large family. The entire family was 
forced to work to provide the bare necessities. Brown began working 
in the field when he was only six, and he was performing the work of 
an adult before he was ten.3
A major part of the family income came ftom the sale of 
vegetables and produce marketed in the nearly community of Gaddistown. 
Brown took the produce into town to sell each Saturday. Bill Arp nar­
rates the following incident in this period of Brown’s life, in one of 
his letters in the Constitution (as told to him by General Ira Foster)s
Joe cultivated a little scrap of hillside land with a 
pair of bull calves, and every Saturday hauled to town some 
potatoes or cabbages or light wood or other truck in trade and 
took back something for the family. In 1639, I think it was, I 
was riding to Canton in a buggy, and I overtook a young man 
walking in a muddy lane. I asked him if he would not take a seat, 
and he looked down at himself and said he was too nmddy, and that 
he would dirty up the buggy. I insisted and he broke off a 
splinter from a rail and scraped his shoes and got in. I learned 
his name was Joe Brown, and he was going to Canton to get some­
thing to do. I have kept an eye on him for forty years. He is 
a wonder to me.h
Brown married Miss Elizabeth Gresham in 16U7. Miss Gresham 
was the daughter of a Baptist minister in South Carolina. Joe and his
^”Who is Joseph E. Brown?" Savannah Homing News, June 30, 1857.
^Cited in I. W. Avery, The History of the State of Georgia (New 
York: Brown and Derby, I88l), p. 10.
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young bride made their home in Canton, Georgia, where he had estab­
lished a law practice. A reporter for The Morning News described 
6^rs. Brown as being an excellent wife and a devoted mother to their 
five children.^
Brown's Educational Background 
Brown's Grade School and Academy Education. Joe Brown 
received the normal grade school education afforded rural youths in 
Georgia before the Civil War. This education consisted of a limited 
learning of the three R's— reading, 'riting, and 'rithraetic.^
Brown left home in l8U0 to further his education. A journalist 
writing in The Daily Examiner esqilalned that Brown had only a small 
sum of money and a yoke of oxen to pay for his education.? Brown 
sold the team of oxen to pay for eight months' board and went in debt 
for his tuition at CAlhoun Academy in Anderson District, South 
Carolina. He left the academy after eight monUis and secured a job 
teaching a three-months' school in Union County, Georgia. The salary 
he earned provided sufficient funds to repay his debts and allow him 
to enroll for a new term.®
Brown returned to Calhoun Academy in January, 181|2. His new 
instructor was Wesley Laverett, one of the better classical scholars
^Savannah Morning News, June 30, 18$7.
^Avery, op. cit., p. 10.
*^Tiftio is Joseph E. Brown?" Daily Examiner (Atlanta), 
July 8, 1857.
Q
Avery, op. cit., p. 10.
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and teachers in the state. A bond of friendship between the two men 
inspired Brown to follow his instructor to a new acadeny near Anderson 
Court House the following year.9 Brown completed his education in the 
academy under Laverett <s instruction, concentrating primarily in 
language and mathematics.^^
Brown graduated from the academy in l8Uli, at the age of twenty- 
two. He did not have sufficient funds to attend college.^ Instead, he 
moved to Canton, Georgia, and opened an academy for "day" students. He 
proved to be an excellent teacher and was able to increase, the enrollment 
from six to sixty students within a few weeks.^ He taught the school 
for one year.
Brown's Legal Training. Brown started studying law immediately 
after establishing residence in Canton. His days were devoted to 
teaching at the academy, and his evenings and Saturdays were spent 
preparing for the bar.^3 He earned enough money teaching that first 
year to pay off all his educational debts. He then discontinued 
teaching in the academy, seeking a position that would provide him 
time to devote additional attention to his study of law.
Brown accepted a job teaching Dr. John W. Lewis' children in 
l8h$. The new job provided him the additional free time he was seeking^
9lbid.
^%obert yielder, A Sketch of the life and Times and Speeches 
of Joseph E. 'wn ( S p r i n g
31lbid.
^ Ibid., p. 98.
33Avery, op. cit., p. 11.
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as veil as sufficient money for his needs. The additional study 
time enabled Brovn to take the law examination in August, 18U5*^ 
Avery wrote: "Brown was said to have answered incorrectly but one
question put to him by the examining committee of lawyers, who seeing 
they had an unusually well-informed supplicant to test, made the ordeal 
as critical as they could."iS
Dr. Lewis encouraged Brown to attend graduate law school and 
lent him the money needed to complete the course of study. Brown 
entered Tale Law School in 18U5 and conpleted the course work in two
y e a r s H e  not only carried a full load at Tale but found time to
broaden his education during those two years. Avery wrote: "In
addition to his regular studies Brown found the time to attend many 
lectures of professors in the other departments. He proved to be a 
frequent visitor to the lectures of Professor Silliman in Chemistry
and Geology, Dr. Taylor in Mental Philosophy, and Dr. Blight in
Anatony.
Brown's Political Career 
Brown Elected to the State Senate. , Brown made his first 
political race in 18U9 idien he ran for the state senate. 11c was 
nominated Democratic candidate in the forty-first district idiich 
included Cherokee and Cobb Counties. The Hhig Party nominated
J^Ibid.
iSibld., p. 18.
l^Daily Examiner (Atlanta), July 8, 1857. 
l^Avery, op. cit., p. 13.
2^
John M» Edge to oppose Brown in the election. Brown won the election 
by a decisive majority in what was described as a very heated contest.^^ 
Brown became the Democratic leader in the senate although he 
was a junior senator and the youngest member in the body. He was 
named to serve on many standing committees, including the judiciary 
coirindttee and a majori^ of special committees organised to study 
current legislation. Avery reported that major Democratic measures 
were passed under Brown's able l e a d e r  s h i p .  ^ 9 Although he was successful 
as a state senator, he did not run for a second term. He preferred to 
devote full time to his law practice.
Brown's political philosophy began to emerge during his term 
in the senate. He believed the Southern states' conventions should be 
called to determine the South's course when serious national problems 
arose. He supported the Democratic stand calling for national territory 
to be open to slavery, and further, he branded the WLlmot Proviso uncon­
stitutional. His political outlook is described in the following manner:
Brown is a democrat of the old line. In the turbulent 
year of 1852 he was a Southern Rights Democrat, believing the 
Federal Government to be a creature of the State Governments, 
and in all matters net delegated or unparted by the states, 
subordinate to the independent sovereignties. He is also a true 
union man, willing and anxious to adhere to that dierished 
fraternal relation that the different states bear to each other 
just so long as, and no longer than, the federal government will 
effectively guarantee to each individual state the enjoyment of 
her reserved ri^ts. He loves the Union for the sake of the 
states, not the states for the sake of the Thiion.^ O
iGlbid., p. 19.
19ibid., p. 20.
^QSavannah Morning News. June 30, 1857.
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Brown vas nominated on the Democratic presidential electoral 
ticket in 18$2. He continued his success of winning political contests 
hj receiving the largest vote of any candidate on the ticket.2^
Brovn Elected to the Blue Ridge Circuit Court. Brown vas 
persuaded to oppose David Irvin for the position of Blue Ridge 
Circuit Judge in 18$$. Judge Irvin vas the incumbent Whig candidate 
and very popular with the people. Brovn von the race by a large 
majority. Since the Blue Ridge Circuit vas predominantly a Democratic 
District, Brown’s victory was not surprising. More inç)ortant vas the 
size of the winning vote. Irvin was able to carry only three 
counties by a combined total of sixty-eight votes and von his home 
county by only two votes. The final count gave Brovn a majority 
victory of over 2700 votes.22
Brovn Elected Governor. Brovn was nominated the Democratic 
candidate for governor in 185? quite unexpectedly. The party selected 
him only after it had been unable to agree upon one of the leading 
contenders. Avery gives the following brief simmary of the 185? 
Democratic Convention:
The Democratic Convention of 1857 was a very memorable 
one in Georgia politics. It was marked by much personal heat,, 
it ended in a protracted convention, and had an utterly unex­
pected result. It finally settled the gubernatorial aspirations 
of son» very prominent and distinguished men, and brought to 
the front by one of those scratches that sometime occur in 
politics, an almost unknown individual who from that day to 
this has been the leading factor in public matters, and idio is 
today the most powerful citizen in the state of Georgia. 23
2^Avery, op. cit., p. 27.
22savannah Morning News, June 30, 1857.
23Avery, op. cit., p. 31.
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The Democratic Convention met at Milledgeville, on June 2kt 18$7* 
Five prominent citizens were seeking the Democratic nomination for 
governor. The leading candidates were James Gardner, Henry G. Lamar,
John H. Luiqpkin, William H. Stiles, and Hiram Warner. None of the five 
candidates could gain the needed votes for nomination and none was 
willing to give his support to any other of the leading four. Twenty 
unsuccessful ballots were taken during the first three days. The 
Convention leaders realized that further balloting would be useless and 
named a selecting committee to work out a compromise. They selected 
three men from each congressional district to serve on the committee.
I. N. Trammell from Cherokee County, a member of the selecting 
committee, saw an excellent means of nominating his close friend, Joe E. 
Brown, as a comproMse candidate. The chairman opened the meeting by 
suggesting that each member list his preferred candidate on a secret 
ballot. Before the ballots were counted, Trammell* prompted Linton 
Stephens to move that the committee dispense with counting the ballots 
and nominate Brown as the con^romise candidate. The motion carried and 
Brown’s name was presented to the convention. The body accepted the 
recommendation and Brown was nominated Democratic candidate for governor.
The Whigs, after suffering defeat in the national election 
of 1852 and the state election of 1853, joined forces with the Blow 
Nothings to form the new American Party in 1855. In 1857 the new party 
nominated Benjamin H. Hill as their candidate to oppose Brown. Hill 
had gained statewide prominence, following a series of successful 
debates with Robert Toombs.2L
2^Fielder, op. cit., p. 85.
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The Issues in the 1857 state election were largely national 
in scope. The Democrats upheld president James Buchanan's administration 
and condemned governor Robert J. Walker's course in Kansas. They 
advocated the state should .further retain control of the state road.
The American Party also condemned Walker, but they held Buchanan 
responsible for Walker's action. Ben Hill argued that the state road 
should be sold since it had been used for party plunder. Both parties 
endorsed the Georgia Platform, the Dred Scott Decision, and condemned 
further agitation of the slavery question.25
Brown won the election, as might be expected, since the state 
contained a Democratic majority. Louise B. Hill believes that - 
conditions outside the state contributed greatly to Brown's large 
majority victory. 26 Avery credits Brown with the victory because he 
won by a larger majority than the Democratic candidate in 1855 when 
the American Party was much weaker.27 Furthermore, the American Party 
was never able to rebuild after this crushing defeat. Regardless of 
the reason for the victory. Brown was elected governor, a feat he 
accomplished for an unprecedented four successive terms. His 
administration extended from 1857 through 1865.
. President Andrew Johnson required Brown to resign as governor 
at the close of the Civil War. The President then appointed James Johnson
25Louise B. Hill, Joseph E. Brown and the Confederacy (Chapel 
Hill, University of North (!:tarolina Press, p. 15. Por information
describing the Georgia Platform see below in Chapter Three, p. 55#
26ibid., p. 30.
27Avery, op. cit., p. U6.
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provisional governor on June 17, 186$. Brovn presented his resig­
nation address to the people on June 29* He expressed his appreciation 
for the honors the people had bestowed upon him and advised them to 
accept the President's reconstruction program.
Brown continued to play an active role in state affairs after 
he resigned as governor. Louise B. Hill speculates that Brown was 
instrumental in influencing President Johnson to sup{X)rt a reconstruction 
program favorable to the South,^8 Furthermore, the people looked to 
Brown for continued guidance during the early phases of the reconstruction 
program.
Brown Becomes a Republican. Georgia adopted a new constitution 
as required by President Johnson's reconstruction program. The new 
constitution repealed secession, abolished slavery, but failed to 
declare the Secession Acts null and void. The state held an election 
in November, 1866, to elect new state officers. Brown declined to 
run for governor although the people offered him the nomination. He 
had not been granted amnesty and, further, feared that his election 
would create bitter feelings in the North. President Johnson recog­
nized the newly formed state government in April, 1866.^^
Many Northern Congressmen felt that President Johnson's 
reconstruction program did not punish the South sufficiently. They 
further believed the Republican Party could be strengthened by delaying 
recognition of the Southern states. Congress refused to seat the 
newly elected Southern Congressmen and took the fight to the people.
28aill, op. cit., p, 266,
^9Atlanta Daily New Era, February 26, 1867.
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The people in the election of 1866 gave the Radical Republicans the 
majority vote needed to determine national policy* Congress then vetoed 
the President's program and wrote a more demanding reconstruction program 
over the President's objection.
Brown visited Washington early in 1867 to determine the North's 
attitude toward reconstruction in the South. After visiting with men 
from all walks of life, he returned home and published a letter advising 
the state to accept the Radicals' program.^^ The Republicans in Georgia 
honored Brown's stand by turning to him for advice. He joined the 
Republican Party and in 1868 attended the national convention, where he 
supported Grant for President. The Radicals, under Brown's direction, 
rewrote the state constitution in 186? to meet the new requirements 
demanded by the Radicals * program of reconstruction* Louise B* Hill 
credits Brown with being responsible for Georgia's moderate constitution.^^
Brown Appointed to the State Supreme Court* The state adopted 
the Radicals' program in 1868* The Republican Party attempted to e^ qiress 
its gratitude to Brown by nominating him for the United States Senate*
The state legislature denied Brown the nomination and gave him the only 
political defeat he ever suffered. Governor Bullock then appointed 
Brown Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court*
Brown Elected Senator* Brown resigned from the bench in 18?0 
and very shortly thereafter quit the Republican Party* He supported the 
Democratic nominee for governor in 18?1 and was selected to acconqiany
30lbid.
^%iU, op. cit., p* 276.
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the victorious candidate to his chair of office*-’^  The national 
Democratic Party recognized Brovn *s return to the fold by sending him 
to Florida to represent the party in the disputed TUden-Hayes election.
John B. Gordon resigned his seat as United States Senator from 
Georgia In i860. Governor Colquitt Immediately appointed Brovn senator 
to complete the interim term. Colquitt defended his appointment on the 
grounds that Brovn vas the best qualified man for the position and vas 
needed to help defeat the up-and-coming Farmer’s Alliance Party.33 
Brovn returned home following adjournment and announced his 
candidacy for the vacant office. He was opposed In the election by 
General A. R. Lawton. The Issues in the 1680 election centered around 
Brown's record during reconstruction and his appointment to the Senate. 
Brovn won the election over Lavton by a vote of 1U6 to 6U. His victory 
in the election established him as a political leader in Georgia. He 
held the post until his death on November 30, 189U.
Brown's Personal Traits 
The introduction to this chapter emphasizes that the critic 
must have information describing the speaker's character before any 
speech can be evaluated. TMs phase of the chapter is devoted to the 
personal traits reflected in Brown's character.
Hill writes: "Three of Brown's most pronounced characteristics
were in evidence by 18$7: he was a vote getter, he was an able
32Mildred C. Thompson, "Reconstruction in Georgia," Stupes in 
History, Economics and Public Law (New York: Columbia Unlversi'ty Press,Blbï, Ülir; ÜW5.
33h u i , op. cit., p. 30.
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executive, and he was a money m a k e r . T h e  truth of Hill’s observation 
was not only clear in 18^7, but time has served to strengthen her 
observation. Brown's ability to gain votes can be seen in the fact 
that he never lost an election that was decided by a popular vote of 
the people. Historians further testify that Brown performed very abiy 
in every governmental and business post he occupied, supporting the 
observation that he was a capable executive. The fact that he died a 
very rich man, as contrasted to his youthful poverty, gives adequate 
claim to his money-making ability. These three points provide an index 
to his character. But what traits made the result possible? The 
Chronicle, a paper that never supported Brown, reported that "there can 
be no opposition to Brown on the grounds of his intellectual ability or 
his personal integrity. The Ifoming News observed that "in soundness 
and maturity of judgment he has but few equals in the s t a t e . A v e r y  
wrote, "In every hamlet the people knew him as a man of brain, rock- 
willed, and the people's f r i e n d ."37 The traits that seemed to determine 
Brown's character thus seem to be his judgment, his personal Integrity, 
and his rock-willed determination.
Brown's Judgment
Many ideas could be advanced explaining the secret for Brown's 
seemingly infallible judgment. Fielder wrote, "Brown has quick intuition
3 U i b i d ., p. 12.
3^ Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, June 11, 1888•
3^Savannah Morning News, June 30, 1857.
37Avery, op. cit., p. 67.
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and makes rapid judgment. He has uncommon Industry and energy, but 
with them the capacity of swift assimilation, and instantaneous decision. 
Added to these is his trait of never allowing his wishes to deceive his 
perception."3® Avery suggests another possible additive irtien he writes, 
"Affluent as Georgia has been in remarkable men, it is a matter of 
material doubt if the annals of the commonwealth can show a character 
of more brain and will than Brown."39 Research of the various views 
explaining the constituents for Brown's Judgment can be summarized to 
include his intelligence, his thorough investigation, his ability to 
assimilate rapidly, and his freedom from emotional conflict when making 
a decision.
Brown seemed to utilize this unerring judgment in business as 
well as in government. Whether engaged in making a governmental 
decision, in meeting a political foe in verbal combat, or in making a 
decision in the business world, he was noted for his discriminating
judgment. _
Brown's unerring judgment, whether in business or politics, 
did not occur just by chance. Historians note that Brown patiently 
gathered all the available data on any problem, sifted through the 
facts until he had a thorough picture, and only then would he take a 
position. Fielder, who served as Brown's personal secretary during the 
years 1857 through 1865, wrote, "He is in less a hurry than any living 
man, and he does all things thoroughly; he is the most deliberate of
3®Fielder, op. cit., p. 505«
^^Avery, op. cit., p. 5.
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men, and the roost attentive to his smallest obligation. He forgets 
nothing and attends to everything."kO pieider further echoed Avery’s 
thesis that Brovn refused to allow his emotions or wishes to color his 
decisions, but rather chose to act on evidence only.^1 Brown's ability 
always to take a successful stand in business and politics seems to 
establish Avery’s thesis.
Brown’s Personal Integrity 
A writer for the Homing News commented: "In the point of
purity of character, integrity of purpose in public and private life, 
Joe Brown has no superior a n y w h e r e . "h2 These words merely echo the 
tribute to Brown’s personal integrity that have been voiced by many 
writers. Although Brown’s character at times was questioned, notably 
by political opponents during moments of anger, no one was ever able 
to present any evidence establishing dishonesty in Brown’s personal, 
business, or political life. His personal integrity can perhaps be 
attributed to the fact that he was a moral person who was personally 
and politically honest.
Brown was a very devout and religious man. He was a member of 
the Baptist faith, and throughout his life he participated actively in 
its services. He contributed liberally to its financial program and 
served as a deacon, the highest office open to laymen.
^^Fielder, op. cit., p. $0h.
Mlbid.
^ Savannah Morning News, June 30, 1857. 
^^Fielder, op. cit., p. 93.
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Brown vas not only a devoutly religious man but one with strong 
convictions concerning temperance. Fielder offered the following comments 
concerning these convictions: "He abstains habitually and totally from
all intoxicating drinks, and loathes and rejects tobacco in all forms 
and uses. In my intimate and cordial friendly relations with him in 
private life, I have never heard him use a profane oath, or relate an 
obscene or vulgar anecdote."kb gig distaste for the use of alcohol 
introduced an interesting highlight in an early political race. In 
his race in 18U9 for a seat in the state senate, one of the arguments 
used against him was his opposition to intoxicating drink. Hi a re^on 
where many of his constituents owned their own stills such a charge 
seemed rather serious. He broke the time-honored tradition and refused 
to allow Georgia "coim" to be served at his political rallies.k5 Brown 
later broke another tradition when he refused to serve any form of 
alcohol in the governor's mansion.
Brown's personal and political honesty can be exenqplified in 
the appointments he made to governmental posts. A reporter gave the 
following warning to Georgia office seekers after Brown was elected 
governor:
Before you ask an office or place from Governor Brown, 
just ask your best friend if you are capable and laying your hand 
upon your heart, ask yourself if you are honest. If you get a 
response in the negative to either of these inquirier, you will 
save time and postage, and the mortification of a refusal, by 
dropping the suit.ko
kklbid.
k5Avery, op. cit., p. 16,
k^Savannah Morning News, June 30, 18$7«
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Avery explained, '•Fidelity to hie friends is a crowning quality of the 
man, and has been a large factor in his success."h? Although Brown was 
noted for remembering and placing his friends in office, he placed only 
those friends capable of performing the job. One such example was the 
appointment of his old friend and benefactor. Dr. John W. Lewis, as 
director of the state roads. Dr. Lewis was a very able administrator, 
making the roads produce a large profit for the state. Further, history 
records no incident involving a Brown appointee with any scandal while 
in office.
Brown's personal and political honesty is further established by 
the fact that no political enemies were able to prove that he committed 
a single dishonest act. Two charges were made against him and both 
charges were proved false. The first charge was that Brown made a huge 
financial profit from his administrative activities during the war.
Hill denies this charge, explaining that no proof was offered estab­
lishing any guilt.^® The second incident charged Brown with employing 
dishonest action in leasing the state road. Released facts established 
that the state had leased the state road to Brown although a rival 
company had bid a higher monthly payment. A congressional committee was 
appointed to investigate the charges of fraud. The investigating 
committee discovered that one company had made a higher bid, but the 
stock holders lacked the necessary capital to assure the state that the 
company would be able to meet the monthly payments. The committee
^?Avery, op. cit., p. 12.
^^Hill, op. cit., p. 2h9.
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reported these findings and Congress cleared Brovn by an ovendielDdng 
majority vote,^9 Brown’s integrity and honesty is summarized by 
Alexander H. Stephens as follows: . "No man has ever successfully 
fastened upon Brown a stain that compromised his honesty as an 
individual,"^®
Brown’s Willingness to Fight for His Beliefs 
Brown was described earlier in Chapter Two as a rock-willed 
individual. Waiters report that Brown always approached each problem 
deliberately and objectively. He would never take a stand until he had 
sifted through all the facts and was sure of his position. Once the 
stand had been taken, ' however, he was willing to defend it without 
thought to the possible odds. Fielder described this trait by 
explaining "his superiority is in his more thorough investigation and 
more resolute determination,"^^ Brown’s willingness to fight for his 
belief can be supported by three incidents in his career.
The first incident was Brown’s fight with the state banking 
interest in 1857. The banks suspended specie payment shortly before he 
was inaugurated as governor in 1857. The banks claimed the action was 
necessary to defend against heavy drafts being made on their coin by 
the North. Former Governor Hershel V, Johnson had argued earlier that 
the banks were in excellent condition holding $12,01:0,000 capital and 
having $5,663,000 in circulation. Brown announced that in his judgment 
the suspension was unnecessary. He threatened to begin proceedings,
^^Atlanta Constitution, August 2U, 1872.
5®Cited in Car ley County News (Blakely, Georgia), June 11, 1880, 
S^Fielder, op. cit., p. 505.
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forcing the banks to forfeit their charters if they continued to spspend 
specie payment. legislators, outstanding citizens, and newspapers 
united to oppose Brown. Brown was not awed in the least by his 
opposition, but carried the fight to the people. He was not only 
successful in winning his fight with the banks, aided by the support of 
his constituents, but also affected additional banking reforms.
The second incident occurred during the Civil War. President 
Jefferson Davis requested more power for the Confederate Government. 
Brown fought the request on the grounds that Georgia had seceded from 
the Union to protect its rights. Relinquishing this jealously guarded 
power to the Confederacy would have defeated the purpose for secession. 
Hill argues that Brown’s stand was very unpopular with Georgia and with 
the South.^2 she writes that Brown’s motives were selfish and that 
many historians were critical of his action. Brown’s real motives in 
the fight are of little importance at this point. More important is 
the observation that Brown again was willing to fight for his beliefs.
The third incident occurred when the Radicals rejected President 
■ Johnson’s-.reconstruction program and substituted their own plan. The 
Democrats in Georgia advocated rejecting the program because they 
believed it to be unconstitutional. Brown believed the constitution­
ality argument was moot since the Supreme Court would never rule on the 
question. He argued that Georgia would have to submit to the Radicals’ 
program before the state would be re-admitted to the Iftiion. Brown’s 
friends warned him that supporting the Radicals’ program was folly and 
could only lead to defeat and certain political suicide. He ignored his
52HiH, op. cit., pp. 259-260.
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friends' pleas and carried his arguments to the people. He reasoned 
that the sooner Georgia adopted the acts the sooner the state would be 
re-admitted to the Union, Thus, a third time Brown demonstrated he was 
willing to fight for his beliefs regardless of the odds.
Brown's Speaking Career 
Brown's Speech Training 
Very little has been written describing any training Brown 
received in rhetoric or public address. Writers describing his formal 
educational background mention no speech training he received while in 
school. Educational historians describe the curriculum taught in South 
Carolina's Academies, and one may guess that Brown had some training.
At the time Brown attended Calhoun Academy, rhetoric was one of the 
major courses in the curriculum and debating societies were very active 
in the academies.Brown's early speaking efforts revealed sufficient 
knowledge of argument and organization to infer that he had studied 
some rhetoric in school.
Brown seems to have been a fair speaker when he entered public 
life. He made his first speech on record before the examining 
committee when he was seeking admittance to the bar. Avery noted that 
Brown had clear organization, close and logical arguments, and 
demonstrated an ability to appeal to an audience in this speech.
A newspaper writer reported that Brown had no equal as a pleader when
^^Degar W. lüiight, A Documentary History of Education in the 
South Before i860 (Chapel Hill: University of Hortb Carolina Press,
1953), IV, 3^ 5.
^^Avery, op. cit., p. 12.
. _  Uo
trying a case in court,55 That Brown was the leading spokesman for the 
Democratic Party in the Georgia. Senate in 18U9 suggests that he was at 
least an adequate speaker.
Although Brown was an able speaker when he entered public life, 
he still had much to leam. His inadequacy was indicated in his early 
debates with Ben Hill during the 1857 race for governor. The political 
leaders were so concerned that they wired Toombs to come to Brown's 
aid. The debates between Brown and Hill were halted while Toombs took 
Brown to a more friendly section in Southern Georgia. After three 
weeks' intensive coaching Toombs returned to Washington convinced that 
Brown could debate on even terms with HLll.^^
Brown's Speaking Skills 
Robert Fielder described Brown's speaking skills in the 
following manner: "As an orator, in the popular understanding of the
term, he is barely the equal of Stephens, Cobb, Toombs, or Hill; but as 
a debater he is the inferior of none, and the superior of most of them."57 
Fielder explained the contrast in oratory and debate further when he 
wrote, "Brown never deals in fiction or fancy in conveying his thoughts 
to his hearers, but uses facts and reasons, and the most exhaustive 
arguments, in the plainest, and approved English w o r d s . T h e  private 
papers of Colonel James Gardner, published in l850, also referred to
55savannah Homing News, June 30, 1857. 
56hiii, op. cit., p. 17.
57Fielder, op. cit., p. 69.
58lbid.
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Brown’s speaking skills as including clear organization and logical 
argument.Louise B. Hill suggested one other skill possessed by 
Brown, the ability to appeal to the people: "Brown developed to an
uncanny degree the ability to sense the popular mind, probe its depth, 
and with the precision of a chemist to gauge its reaction.Brown’s 
speaking style seemed to depend upon the use of argument and the ability 
to adapt to the people.
Brown’s Use of Argument. Writers seem generally to agree that 
Brown depended more upon strong arguments to accomplish his goals than 
upon any other skill. He employed these arguments only after the topic 
had been exhaustively researched. Fielder observed that Brown made a 
careful, objective, thorough investigation on any subject before he 
formulated his opinions.Hill wrote that Brown was prone to withhold 
comment on an issue until all the facts had been assembled. Once the 
facts had been gathered, he then approached the dispute with "plain, 
honest, unanswerable arguments."^2
Brown’s Use of Audience Adaptation, iifriters vary in their 
explanation of Brown's success in appealing to his audiences. Avery 
and Fielder attribute Brown’s success to the sympathy and concern he 
had for people.Hill attributes Brown's success to his knowledge
^9cited in the Daily Examiner (Atlanta), July 9, 1857»
^®Hill, op. cit., p. U8.
^^Fielder, op. cit., pp. 101, 50U, and 5o5.
^^Hill, op. cit.j p. 13.
^3Avery, op. cit., p. 59; and Fielder, op. cit., p. 101.
of the psychology of dealing with people.oh Grady believed Brown 
achieved audience appeal by employing a language people understood,
Grady amplifies his point by describing Brown's language as consisting 
of "a simple style, using the homeliest phrases, but that his words go 
to the heart each time. There was a sympathy between Brown and the 
people that not even the eloquence of Toombs could match, or the skill 
of Hill destroy.
Brown's Use of Delivery. Brown's delivery was governed pri­
marily by his physical build. His chest was too thin for great strength 
of lungs, and his throat was weak and subject to irritation and disorder. 
A bronchial disorder often forced him to cancel or postpone planned 
speaking engagements. His voice was nasal and his pronunciation 
provincial. His rate was slow and deliberate. Although his weak lungs 
contributed to soft force, his voice was clear and distinct and could 
easily be understood. Fielder wrote that Brown was never loud or 
vehement, even in the most important speeches, but was always self- 
possessed, self-reliant, confident, and deliberate.^
Brown, physically, was a frail man about five feet, ten inches 
tall and weighed approximately one hundred forty pounds. He stood 
erect when he spoke, never slouching. His gestures were awkward and 
few in number. He tended to follow a pattern, gesturing in straight 
up and down lines, dropping one hand into the palm of the other, letting 
the other hand fall and rise on the speaker's stand in pump-like motion.
^^Hill, op. cit., p. U8.
^^Henry W. Grady, Daiiy Atlanta Intelligencer, July 30, 1857*
^^iélder, op. cit., p. 28.
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Brown could and did deliver his speeches either extenq)oraneously 
or from manuscript. He employed extmiqporaneou- and even ^ pronptu 
delivery in his political speaking. Often times his political 
campaigning consisted of debating and presenting heckling speeches, 
making the impromptu method mandatory. Brown's debates with Ben Hill 
in the 1857 gubernatorial election provides an example of this type 
of speaking. In these debates one speaker would present his platform 
or constructive arguments in an hour-long speech. The second speaker 
would have approximately ninety minutes to present his arguments and 
rebuttal. The first speaker would then end the debate with a thirty 
minute rebuttal. Avery wrote that Brown was alway^ g clear, cool, and 
ready-witted in these debates.
Brown read his annual messages and formal speeches from 
manuscript.^® He would dictate the original draft to a stenographer.
He would then take the original draft and carefully revise and read 
the speech to his wife until he was satisfied that it was ready for 
presentation.^ 9 He further presented many of his speeches in state 
newspapers in the form of letters. These speeches were prepared by 
the same method that he used in writing the formal addresses.
Brown's speaking style and skills might be summarized in the 
following manner: He enç)loyed a soft, deliberate delivery, presenting
his ideas in single but specific language. He would never discuss an
^7Avery, op. cit., p. UU.
68lbid., p. 129.
^^Frank G. Carpenter, "Joe Brown of Georgia," New York Times, 
January 11, 1687,
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issue until the subject was thoroughly investigated, preparing his 
ideas for presentation either by extempore or manuscript reading, 
employihg clear organization and sound reasoning to achieve his 
objective.
CHAPTER m  
BROWN'S RHETORIC OF SECESSION 
Introduction
Chapter Tvo enumerated Joe Brovn'e personal traits as they are 
revealed in a review of his background, character, and speaking 
technique. Since this study is concerned with the ideas Brosn 
advanced during the years 1857 through i860, an atteiq>t was made to 
describe only those traits which will contribute to a more thorough 
evaluation of his rhetoric to this period. The following three 
chapters propose to evaluate the ideas Brown advanced to his attempt 
to influence the course of action Georgia followed during these years. 
Chapter toree evaluates his rhetoric between the years 1857 and 1865.
Beginning with the Con^omise of 1850 until Idncoln was elected 
president to i860, the United States was constantly plagued with the 
problem of territorial disposition, which centered around two questions: 
Could slavery be carried into the territories? Would the state or 
federal government resolve the conflict? The South was divided over 
the course of action it would follow to protect its right to maintain 
slavery. Brown's attitude changed from a desire in 1850 to resolve 
the conflict within the Union to the belief to i860 that the South 
must secede to survive.
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Three speeches have been selected to represent Brown's 
attitude in the years 1857 through 1865. These three speeches are 
his inaugural address in 1857, his inaugural address in 1859, and a 
special address to the state legislature on November 6, i860. The 
ideas presented in these speeches reveal a progressive trend Aram 
Brown's belief that the Union could be saved to his aggressive plea 
for secession. These ideas parallel the South's progressive acceptance 
of the secession philosophy.
Chapters Three, Four, and Five employ two steps in evaluating 
Brown's invention: The first step presents the necessary background 
information. The second step is devoted to evaluating how well Brown, 
considering the goals he desired to achieve, adapted his ideas to fit 
the attitudes of his peers, and adjusted to the needs of the times.
The Political Context, 1850-1861 
The National Political Context
By 1850, a national political problem had been introduced 
concerning the disposition of territory acquired from the Mexican War. 
Ihe problem eventually terminated when several Southern states seceded 
from the Union resulting in civil war. %is national problem was 
whether Congress had the power to quarantine slavery in the Uhion, or 
if the power resided with the states? The Compromise of 1850, the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act in 185U, and the Bred Scott Decision in 1857 
provided the focal points in üiis bitter political struggle.^ Old- 
line political ties were dropped throughout the nation as divergent
iDwight Lowell Dumond, The Secession Movement I86O-I86I 
(New York: The Macmillan Conqjany, 193l), p. 1.
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doctrine concerning the slavery issue forced the formation of sectional 
political parties*^ The national political scene can be described by 
reviewing the political events that transpired in these three disputes.
The Coiqpromise of 18$0. From 1820 to 1Q$0 the Missouri 
Conqsromise governed the further expansion of slavery into new terri­
tories. Shortly before 1850 a series of events occurred that rendered 
the Compromise an unsatisfactory solution. The Mexican War supplied 
the United States with additional land for settlement. California, a 
part of this new territory, petitioned for immediate entrance into the 
Union as a free state. In 18U6 Representative David WLImot introduced 
a resolution that called for all the territory gained from Mexico to be 
closed to slavery. Northern members in both the Whig and Democratic 
Parties supported the resolution. The South had never been satisfied 
with the Missouri Cougar omise, but they were unwilling to kill the act 
and adopt a new resolution prohibiting further slavery expansion into 
newly-opened territories. Thus the first battle lines were drawn over 
the %lmot Proviso as each section began to formulate new political 
doctrine.
The prevailing political philosophy in the North advanced 
the belief that the United States Congress held the power to regulate 
the existence of slavery in the territories. The North reasoned that 
Congress not only had this power, but had passed regulatory bills in 
1789, 1803, and 1820. They believed the federal constitution granted 
Congress this power. Article IV, Section 3, states that Congress shall
^Allen D. Candler, The Confederate Records of the State cdT 
Georgia, 7 vols. (Atlanta: State kiting Office, 1909), I, 7-10.
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have the power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the 
territory or other property belonging to the United States. The Supreme 
Court case of American Insurance Company versus Canter was cited as 
evidence supporting the Northern interpretation of the constitution. In 
this case Chief Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion ruling 
that Congress held the power to govern the territories.^
Political theorists in the South held the belief that the 
federal government was a government of the states. The states, not the 
nation, jointly owned the territories. Therefore, Congress had no legal 
authority to deprive any state of its equal right, nor any justification 
to forbid any citizen from immigrating with his property into any of the 
territories. The Southerners cited the Supreme Court decision in the 
United States versus Gatiot as their evidence.^ The Court defined land 
as the only property Congress could regulate in the territories in this 
decision. The South argued that a newly organized state's constitution 
alone could prohibit slavery within its boundaries. Therefore, slavery 
could net legally be prohibited from any territory until the newly 
formed state specifically denied its entrance.
ühe Midwestern Democrats introduced a moderate political 
doctrine. These Free-Soilers argued that neither the state nor the 
federal constitution could regulate slavery. They reasoned that all 
power not specifically granted to the federal government resided in 
the people. Thus, the people occutying the territory held the right
3AUen Nevins. Ordeal of the Union, 2 vols. (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 19U7), I, 26l
^Ibid.
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to determine whether slavery would be legal in their area.-)
Southern states' rights leaders called for a convention of 
Southern states in 18U9> The purpose of the convention was to adopt a 
united course to follow in attacking the proposed Wilmot Proviso.
Southern sentiment for a time seemed to favor secession.^ Early in 
18$0, before the convention was able to meet. Clay offered a compromise. 
The Compromise included admitting California as a free state, 
establishing territorial governments in New Mexico and Utah without 
stipulations for or against slavery, paying Texas for the land taken 
over by the federal government, passing a fugitive slave law, and 
abolishing the slave trade within the District of Columbia. Moderate 
Whigs and Democrats, North and South alike, united to pass the Congnromise. 
The Compromise came early enough to weaken the secessionist movement in 
the Southern convention and the %ion was temporarily saved.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act. The national political calm initiated 
by the Compromise of 18^0 proved to be short-lived. A bill was intro­
duced in 1852 opening the Nebraska territory for settlement. The 
framers of the original Kansas-Nebraska Act did not mention the
t
expansion of slavery. They relied instead on the Missouri Compromise 
and its demarcation of that system. The bill failed" to paés by only a 
few votes and its passage seemed a certainty in 185L.7 Senator Stephen 
A. Douglas re-introduced the bill in iQSh» but not in its original form.
^Ibid., I, 28. 
^ i d .. I, 2U5. 
7lbid., II, 91.
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The new act proposed that Kansas and Nebraska be admitted separately 
and that the citizens in each territory determine the status of slavery 
by popular sovereignty.
Nevins advances the theory that the Kansas-Nebraska Act passed 
from lack of opposition, rather than from strong national support.8 
The South had never been satisfied with the Missouri Congxromise and now 
supported the Kansas-Nebraska Act as a means of eliminating the hated 
law. The North disliked any legislation that permitted slavery to esqpand. 
By supporting the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the North hoped that popular 
suffrage would prevent the further growth of slavery.
The new act did not remedy, but rather intensified, the growing 
sectional friction. First, the act destroyed the old Whig Party; 
secondly, it was responsible, in part, for the birth of the first 
sectional political party.9 The newly formed Republican Party gained 
its membership from the North and was dedicated to the destruction of 
slavery.^® Bie Republicans believed the federal government had the 
power, and responsibility, to prohibit slavery from any new territory 
opened for settlement. The passing of "personal liberty laws" in 
every Republican-controlled statue gave credence to this belief,^ The
%bid., n ,  121.
^Clement Eaton. A His^ry of the Old South (New Yorks The 
Macmillan Conçany, 19U9), p.
l^evins, op. d t ., H, 322.
llThe "personal liberty laws" were state enactments which 
forbade the practice of slavery within the states. Many of the laws 
made it almost iiqxjssible for the South to recover slaves that had 
escaped into these states.
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refusal to accept the interpretation of Negroes as proper^, the active 
support given to the abolition movement— all served to increase the 
antagonism developing between the two sections.
The Dred Scott Decision. The Dred Scott Decision added 
additional fuel to the growing sectional fire by widening the growing 
rift in the Democrat Party. The Democrats acidly disagreed over which 
agency, the state or the people of the state, held the power to regulate 
slavery in the territories. The Southern members believed the authority 
rested in the constitutional specifications adopted by the newly formed 
state. The Northern Democrats argued that the people in the territory 
should make the decision by popular sovereignty. % e  difference in 
interpretation was tenqporarily resolved at the Cincinnati Convention 
in 1856.^ The two factions agreed to wait for a ruling by the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court ruled on the question in the case of Dred 
Scott in 1857. Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority, declared 
the Mssouri Compromise unconstitutional and ruled that the states had 
the power to determine the status of slavery within their boundaries.
The Northern Democrats argued that the Dred Scott decision had 
not voided the idea of popular sovereignty as the solution for deciding 
the legality of slavery within the territories. The Northern Democrats 
could not accept this decision since Douglas* influence, and the 
party's strength, depended on the continued existence of the popular 
sovereignty plank. The refusal to accept the Court's decision caused 
many Southerners to read Douglas and his followers out of the party.
^Dumond, op. cit., p. 18.
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The stage was thus set for the split in the Democratic National 
Convention in i860.
The Democratic National Convention met at Charleston in i860. 
Sectional party lines were drawn from the outset, and the Convention was 
doomed to failure. The Northern section was bound to the popular 
sovereignty plank and to Douglas for president. Many Southern states 
were equally committed to 1die. Alabama Platform, idiich called for a 
congressional slave code for the protection of slavery in the territories 
and the nomination of a presidential candidate who accepted the pro­
slavery creed, and thus would not accept Douglas as a presidential 
candidate as long as he was the prophet of popular sovereignty.^ The 
Northern Democrats held a majority vote in the Convention since there 
were more states in the North than in the South. The party platform 
committee was dominated by Southern Democrats who wrote a platform 
rejecting popular sovereignty. The Convention adopted the minority 
report favoring popular sovereignty and many Southern states withdrew.
The remaining delegates voted to adjourn and reassemble at Baltimore 
on June 18.^ The Southern states returned home to seek farther 
instructions.
The Democratic Convention reconvened on June 18, i860. Many 
delegates had favored delaying the convention until some conç>rômise 
could be reached. Douglas would not accept the nomination without the 
popular sovereignty plank, and the North insisted that be be selected as
% i d . ,  p. 33.
^Ibid., pp.
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the candidate. The South was determined to support the Alabama Platform 
making a compromise impossible. Many Southern states bolted the 
convention and the North adopted the minority platform and nominated 
Douglas for president. The 231 Southern delegates assembled at the 
Maryland Institute on June 23, where they adopted the majority platform 
and nominated John C. Breckenridge for president.
Two other parties had conventions and nominated candidates 
while the Democratic split into divergent factions. The Constitutional 
Union Party met in Baltimore and nominated John Bell as its candidate.
The Bell supporters did not adopt a formal platform, but rather insisted 
they supported the constitution. The Republican Convention met in 
Chicago on May 17. The Republicans adopted a platform denying that 
slavery was based on common law, denouncing popular sovereignty, and 
defining the secessionist doctrine as treasonous.Idncoln*s nomination 
was viewed as a repudiation of radical anti-slavery sentiment.
A majority in the South believed a Republican victory would 
seriously endanger the continuation of slavery. The secession movement 
gained strength as it became more apparent that Lincoln would win. 
Following Lincoln's election in November and South Carolina's Acts of 
Secession in December, a divided Union became reality.
I5uirich B. Phillips, "Georgia and State Rights," Annual Report 
of the American Historical Association, H  (1901), 191.
^^Dumond, op. cit., pp. 96-97.
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The Georgian Political Context 
The South had been driven to a defensive attitude by 18$0. Ihe 
North vas criticizing most Southern institutions as veil as slavery. ^7 
For many years the nation had been able to avoid conflict by virtue of 
Southern political domination. As the North gained more and more 
political control from the South and esqployed that pover to benefit 
economic interests in the North, a frustrated SoutAi began seriously 
considering secession.
Very few Southerners questioned the South's right to secede.
A majorilqr held the belief that the states were sovereign. The states 
had voluntarily joined the Union, granting it specific, enumerated 
powers. In no place in the contract did it state that their surrender 
was permanent or irretrievable. The major conflict in thinking in the 
South concerned the method and time for secession. Three schools of 
thought developed in the South concerning the topic of secession: One 
group remained loyal to the Union to the end. A second group desired 
to remain in the Union until it became apparent the North would no 
longer honor Southern grievances. A third group desired immediate 
secession by action of states individually or as a group. Transpiring 
political events and persuasion provided the third group the necessary 
momentum to gain its o b j e c t i v e . ^ 8
^^Henry Savage, Jr. Seeds of Time (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1959), p. 10$.
^®Dumond, op. cit., p. 167.
The Compromise of 1850« Georgia opposed the Coiqiromise of 18^0 
at first because of a misunderstanding.19 Earlier that year the 
Governor had called for a state convention to determine idiat action 
Georgia should take toward the coi^omise. Just when it seemed the 
state would reject the con^omise, Howell, Cobb, Tooimbs, and Stephens 
united to push the passage of the bill. They employed a successful 
speaking campaign that persuaded the state to adopt the Georgia Platform 
and give its approval to the bill.20 The Georgia Platform listed a 
series of encroachments on Southern rights which would justify the 
recourse of secession. These encroachments included abolition of 
slavery in the District of Columbia, suppression of the internal slave 
trade by an act of Congress, any law prohibiting the introduction of 
slaves into the territories of Utah or New Mexico, refusal to admit a 
slave state into the Ihiion, and serious modification of the Fugitive 
Slave Law. All the states in the lower South and many in the upper South 
shortly followed Georgia's lead in approving the bill.21
Phillips concludes that a coalition of the Whigs and Democrats 
in Northern Georgia was responsible for the Georgia Platform. 22 Many 
things contributed to the defeat of the secession movement in 1850. 
Georgia's Congressmen had earlier advanced arguments against the 
Compromise of 1850 designed to scare the North. Georgians had accepted
19philUps, op. cit., p. 163.
20Eaton, op. cit., p. 5U7.
21lbid.
22phillips, op. cit., p. 165.
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these arguments at face value, thus building a strong opposition to the 
bill. Further, Georgia had always been a moderate state and was cool 
to any strong talk favoring secession. These reasons added to'be fact 
that Georgia was experiencing growing prosperity throughout the state 
discouraged any strong secession movement.^3
The governor's race in Georgia in 1851 indicated that the 
loyalty to the Union was strong at that time. The Constitutional Ibion 
Party ran Howell Cobb against the secessionists' candidate Charles J. 
McDonald. Cobb won the election by more than 18,000 votes. The Georgia 
Platform pledged the state to the Union, but that platform also, it 
should be remembered, listed the preconditions she would insist upon if 
that loyalty was to continue.2k
The Kansas-Nebraska Act. Georgia supported the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act in l85U* In fact, Stephens played a vital role in the bill's 
passage by closing debate on the act, thus forcing it to an early vote.^^ 
The state legislature indicated popular state support when it gave the 
Act a strong vote of confidence.^6
Georgia supported the Kansas-Nebraska Act for several reasons: 
First the state had never given strong support to the Missouri Compromise 
and the new bill provided the means for destroying it. Secondly, Georgia 
approved the Act because it was in keeping with the philosophy stated in
S^jic-vins, op. cit.. I, 376.
2%udolph Von Abele, Alexander H. Stephens (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 19U6), p. 131.
^^Ebid., p. mu.
^^Phillips, op. cit., p. 173.
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the Georgia Platform and demonstrated the finality of the Conqporomise 
of 18$0. In the third place, the state was pleased with the prospect 
of joining forces with the Northern Democrats to strengthen the U n i o n . ^7 
The general mood in Georgia at this time was evident in the 
changes which took place in the political parties of the state. The 
Union coalition in 18^1 had spelled the death of the Nhig Party. 
Historians fonnd it extremely difficult to distinguish between the 
basic philosophies of the Whigs and the Democrats in the presidential 
race of 1852.^® In fact, a majority of the Whigs had joined the 
Democratic Party by 185U. Whig members unable to join the Democrats 
gave their loyalty to the Know Nothing Party.
The Dred Scott Decision. The Democrats began to experience 
conflict within their ranks shortly after the Kansas-Nebraska Act was 
passed. The newly formed Republican Party was actively engaged in 
sending agents into Kansas and Nebraska to make them free states. The 
Northern Democrats immediately made it clear they expected the 
slavery issue to be settled by popular sovereignty. Many Georgians 
believed that anti-slavery elements in Congress would reject any pro­
slavery constitution offered by Kansas. In 1855 Governor Hershel V. 
Johnson advised the Georgia Legislature to call a state convention to 
determine a policy of resistance in case such a problem developed.29 
The Legislature failed to act on his wishes but the state did sponsor a
27ibid.
2®Phillips, op. cit., pp. 166-167.
29pederal Thiion (Milledgeville, Georgia), November 6, 1855.
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number of expeditions to Kansas. In the meantime the Democrats resolved 
their immediate difference with the Cincinnati Resolution of 18$6.
The Kansas conflict was an inq>ortant Georgian political issue 
in 1857. President Buchanan had sent Robert J. Walker to Kansas in June 
to serve as territorial governor. Governor Walker had immediately 
expressed the opinion in his inaugural address that Kansas should be a. 
free state. The Democrats in Georgia defended Buchanan and placed the 
entire blame on Walker. The opposing American Parly held both Buchanan 
and Walker responsible. As expressed in the 10,000 vote victory won by 
the Democratic candidate for Governor, the general sentiment supported 
the Democratic philosophy.
The Dred Scott decision intensified the national conflict and 
widened the split in the Democratic Party. The Northern Democrats 
refused to accept the Court's decision as they had agreed to at 
Cincinnati in 1856. Democrats in Georgia bitterly turned their backs 
on Douglas and his followers. The split in the party was never healed 
and resulted in the formation of two parties in i860.
There were no real national political problems in Georgia in 
1858 or the first half of 1859. Although Kansas seemed destined to 
enter the Union as a free state, and although many Democrats were angry 
with Douglas, most Georgians were still content with the Union. Stephens 
called attention to the political calm in a speech delivered on 
July 2, 1859.^® later that same month Senator Iverson, seeking re-election, 
shocked the people by predicting the Democrats' defeat and a Republican
3O70JU Abele, op. cit., p. 175.
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victory in i860. Georgia evidently resented his belief, because he was 
not re-elected to office. The general feeling in the state was that 
Iverson had exaggerated the situation in an effoirb to gain v o t e s . A t  
this time Georgia still seemed to be quite friendly toward her Northern 
sister states.
The tranquility in Georgia was shattered by John Brown's raid 
on Harper's Ferry in October, 1859. Eaton observed that this raid tore 
the fraternal bonds between the two sections which served as the only 
enduring basis of a Union at this time.32 a large number of Southerners 
realized that a majority in the North did not share the views of the 
Abolitionists, yet the popular canonization of John Brown far over­
shadowed the few Union meetings held in the chief cities in the North .33 
Gradually the South's hatred for the Abolitionists was transformed into 
a hatred for the North. The secession movement gained popular momentum 
as the raid convinced many that the South must achieve unily.
In the spring of i860, Georgia sent her delegates uninstructed 
to the Democratic Convention in Charleston. Many Georgia delegates 
bolted the Convention along with the delegates of many other Southern 
states. Georgia called a new state convention to select delegates and 
make plans for the Baltimore Convention. The conflicting ideas in 
Georgia are revealed in the various speeches delivered at the second
33-Phillips, op. cit., p. 186.
^^Eaton, op. cit., p. 570.
33pederal Union (Milledgeville, Georgia), December 27, 1859.
The Union meetings consisted of people in the North critical toward the 
John Brown raid and supported the Southern stand.
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state oonvention. Howell Cobb, speaking for the secessionists, eaqpressed 
little faith in the Northern Democrats and felt that the South should 
follow an independent action. Ihe Northern Democrats' refusal to 
accept a plank recognizing the equality of the states, plus their 
determination to nominate a candidate hostile to the South, convinced 
him of the necessity of the course of action he adArocated. Alexander 
H. Stephens, speaking for the group desiring to remain in the Ihion, 
suggested that existing problems could be resolved within the bond of 
federalism. The South had made a mistake in abandoning the non­
intervention position at the Charleston Convention. He warned that 
unless a wise counsel were pursued, the nation would find itself at 
war.^^ The non-slaveholding class selected Joe Brown as their chief 
spokesman. Brown took a ndddleground position in the debate. He 
certainly believed the South had the right to secede, and advised the 
State to so act should the North violate the Georgia Platform. He 
believed that the %iion could be saved by the Democratic Party and 
worked toward unifying the warring factions. He petitioned the Party 
to send delegates to Baltimore lAo were instructed to form a compromise 
plank and select an acceptable candidate.35
The Northern Democrats proved unwilling to conguromise their 
convictions. Georgia then bolted with the other Southern states and 
selected Breckenridge as their presidential candidate. The Northern 
Democrats' unwillingness to conpromise forced Brown to join forces with
^^on Abele, op. cit., p. I8l. 
3^Phillips, op. cit., p. 189.
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Cobb and Toombs in support of Breckenridge. This coalition, coupled 
with Lincoln*8 election, gave the secessionist forces sufficient 
strength to vote Georgia out of the Union in January, I86I.
An Evaluation of Brown's Rhetoric, 1857-1861 
Brown's Attitudes Toward the States' Rights Issues 
From 18$0 to 1861 the states' rights controversy took shape 
in the battles waged over the Conpromise of 18$0, the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act, and the Dred Scott decision. Joe Brown's philosophy concerning 
the controversial dispute over the relationship between the states and 
the Union can be described through a review of his attitudes toward 
slavery and these three disputes.
Brown's Attitude Toward Slavery. Brown was reared without the 
personal services of slavery. Only after his law business had increased 
to the point that he could no longer care for his farm, had he purchased 
a few field hands to tend the crops.Economic conditions, rather than 
any distaste for slavery, were responsible for his failure to purchase 
slaves sooner. The mountainous farms in Northwest Georgia were not 
economically suited to slavery, and a majority of the residents in that 
area were non-slaveholders. Brown shared the beliefs of his neighboring 
yeoman farmers that slavery was legal and its benefits made it a 
desirable system for the non-slaveholders, as well as the o w n e r  s. 37 
When the Wilmot Proviso was introduced, prohibiting the eagansion of
3^The Cherokee County Tax Census taken in 1850 revealed that 
Brown owned only three slaves.
37john Samuel Ezell, The South Since 186$ (New York: The 
Macmillan Compaiy, 1963), pp. 10-11.
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slavery into the territories obtained from Mexico, Brown bitterly 
denounced the proposal. In a speech delivered February 1, 1850, he 
defended the justice of slavery, arguing that the constitution gave 
Congress no right to abolish slavery in the territories.38 After his 
election as governor in 1857 he became the recognized spokesman for the 
non-slaveholding citizens in the state.39
Brown's Attitude Toward the Compromise of 1850. In 18U9 Brown 
was an ardent states' rights advocate. He believed that an injustice 
had been done his native South, and was ready to contend for her 
r i g h t s . H e  had long opposed the Missouri Compromise and was ready 
to support any action that outlawed the bill. Although he preferred 
secession as a solution in 1850, he joined the majority in his state in 
pledging their loyalty to ihe Georgia Platform and supported the 
Compromise of l850. He continued to support the Platform until the 
Northern Democrats forced the Southern members out of the party at the 
Baltimore Convention.
Brown's Attitude Toward the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Brown 
supported the Kansas-Nebraska Act for two reasons: First, he favored 
the Act because it replaced the infamous IDLssouri Comromise.^  Secondly, 
he favored the Act because he believed it was a course of action which 
supported the principles formulated in the Georgia Platform.
38phiUips, op. dt., p. I8l.
39ibid., p. 187.
^pReported in a speech delivered by Brown at the ratification 
meeting in Cherokee County in 1857. See "Brown Scrapbooks."
^^ N^evins, op. cit., II, 95.
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In his campaign for governor in 1857, Brown defended the Act, 
upholding Buchanan's action and placing all the blame for the existing 
trouble in Kansas on Governor Walker. He argued that Walker had no 
right to interfere with the people's selection of a constitution. He 
reasoned that Buchanan had intended that only the legal residents of 
the territory should be allowed to vote.^
Brown's Attitude Toward the Dred Scott Decision. the Dred 
Scott decision the court had ruled that land was the only property that 
Congress could legislate on in the territories. Althou^ the Northern 
Democrats had agreed at the Cincinnati Convention to abide by the 
Court's decision on this issue, they refused to accept the Court's 
ruling as being applicable. This attitude toward this decision caused 
many Southern Democrats to feel that Douglas and his followers were 
espousing views inimical to them and to party solidarity.
Joining the South in accepting the Supreme Court's ruling as 
being final. Brown did not take an active stand on the party split 
until he became persuaded that the Republican Party posed a serious 
threat to states' rights. He then advanced the idea that a unified 
Democratic Party was needed to preserve the Ihiion and states' ri^ts.
He continued in his attempt to resolve the differences between the 
two factions, until the Northern Democrats made clear at the Baltimore 
Convention that they would not conpromise their beliefs. Following 
the Convention, Brown gave his support to the secessionist movement.
^Haywood J. Pearce, Jr., Benjai^ H. ffiJU Secession and Recon­
struction (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, l^âB), p. É9.
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The First Inaugural Address, 1857 
Background of the Address. Broun faced many problems as he 
prepared to deliver his first inaugural address: He had been a
compromise candidate, nominated accidentally after the party had been 
unable to agree upon a man among the five leading contenders. Before 
1857 state affairs had always been governed by men of wealth from 
aristocratic backgrounds, and now the governor's chair was to be 
occupied by a virtually unknown commoner.^3 Although Brown had been 
active in politics since 18U7, he was almost unknown outside the seven 
counties in the Blue Ridge Circuit. Thus, his first problem was to 
gain acceptance as the state leader, although handicapped by being a 
compromise candidate, unknown to the people, and having his admini­
strative ability seriously questioned by men of importance.^ A 
second problem had been created by the split in the state Democratic 
Party. The American Party had attempted to aggravate this problem 
further by forcing the 1857 gubernatorial campaign to be fought on 
national i s s u e s . A  third problem centered around the decisirâ that 
had to be made concerning the disposition of the state road. Democratic 
foes contended that state control of the road had proved too costly 
and demanded that the road be leased to a private company. The fourth 
problem had been introduced in the summer of 1857. That summer a
^3i, w. Avery. The ^story of the State of Georgia (New York: 
Brown and Derby, I88l), p. W .
^Phillips, op. cit., p. 182. 
hSpearce, op. dt., p. U9.
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mild recession had occurred when the state banks suspended specie 
payments.The banks claimed they were forced to take this action 
in defense of heavy drafts made on their coins by the North. Foes 
to this suspension pointed to the banks* large capital and adequate 
circulation as proof that the banks* action was unnecessary. The 
fourth problem was to provide an adequate solution for the banking 
crisis.
Brown, dressed in an unfashionable, but neat, black suit, 
entered Capitol Hall Friday morning, November 6, 18^7, to present his 
first inaugural address. Avery observed that as Brown faced the large 
audience his conq)osure was perfect, and his movements, idiile not free 
and easy, were not awkward.^? After a brief pause. Brown began his 
address in a calm, clear, conversational voice.
Summary of the Ideas. Brown opened his address with a plea for 
uniiy regardless of party affiliation in order to secure the development 
and safety of the state. He then turned his attention to the local 
scene, proposing remedies for existing state problems. These proposals 
included needed internal economic development, a suggested program for 
public education, a solution for the disposition of the state road, and 
the type of How he desired enacted to ease the banking crisis.
Not until near the end of the address did Brown direct his 
attention to the states* right problem. His ultimate desire, expressed
^^Avery, op. cit., p. 1*9. See also E. Merton Coulter, Georgia, 
A Short History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,wJTi^ inr-
^^Avery, op. cit., p. 1*9.
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in this address, vas that Georgia be guaranteed the preservation of 
her inherent rights. This goal vas expressed by Georgians, he believed, 
vhen they adopted the Georgia Platform. He reasoned that the state had 
approved the Kansas-Nebraska Act because it contained the principles of 
non-intervention. Georgia vanted no more than this constitutional 
guarantee and vould accept nothing less. He then gave his assurance 
to the people that he accepted the responsibility as governor to take, 
if necessary, whatever action might be needed to preserve Georgia's 
rights. He closed the address vith the prayerful hope that the 
national councils vould be tenured vith visdom, moderation, and 
justice, so that "equality in the Union mi^t be maintained, and our 
constitutional ri^ts and privileges be perpetuated and transmitted 
uninçalred to the latest generation."^®
Analysis of Brovn's Invention. The significance that Brovn 
placed on the states' rights issue in con^arison to internal state 
problems in 1857 is seen in the. amount of space he devoted to the 
national issues. Much less than a fifth of his speech vas devoted to 
the national issues, and he discussed this topic only after he had 
disposed of what seemed to be more vital issues.
Brovn gave isqportanoe to only two ideas in his discussion of 
Georgia's relationship to the Union: First, the present position now 
held by the state toward this controversy; and secondly, the position 
that he, as governor, was willing to take in support of the state's
^®A copy of Brovn's Inaugural Address can be found in the 
Federal Union (Milledgeville, Georgia), November 7, 1857. See also 
"Brown's Scrapbooks."
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position. His interpretation of the position held by Georgians toward 
the state's relationship to the IMion was revealed in three key 
statements. The first indication came in his opening remarks when he 
requested unity among the people regardless of party affiliation in 
order to secure the development and safety of the state. The second 
statement was his assertion that Georgians had again and again 
supported the principles of non-intervention contained in the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act. The third statement was his belief that Georgians 
demanded no more than their constitutional rights and equality in the 
Union, but they would be content with nothing less. These three ideas 
are summed up in the conclusion when he prayerfully hoped that the 
national councils would so act that Georgia's equality in the Union 
might be maintained, and its constitutional rights and privileges be 
perpetuàted, and transmitted unimpaired to the latest generation. The 
governor affirmed that he was willing to take any action necessary to 
maintain Georgia's rights and would vindicate her honor at any and every 
hazard.
Two conclusions can be drawn concerning Brovn's treatment of 
the national issues: First, he apparently had concluded that Georgia's 
rights were not seriously jeopardized at that time; and secondly, his 
objective in the discussion was to present his views and position on 
those issues. Concerning the first conclusion, at no time in the 
address did he warn of any serious danger or threat to Georgia. Rather, 
his approach to the subject was to present what Georgia demanded and 
idiat she would defend.. Even his willingness to defend her rights 
emphasized the idea if, not idien, the hazard came. Concerning the
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second conclusion, the informative pattern he eoçloyed suggests the 
purpose of the speech. No atteiqrb vas made at any point either to 
prove a point, or to persuade the audience. His pattern of asserting 
ideas and conclusions forces one to assume either that he vas merely 
expressing his vievs, or that he customarily exerted little discipline 
in attea^ting to prove his points. Certainly the latter conclusion is 
disproved by authorities familiar vith his rhe t o r i c T h e  purpose to 
inform vas further revealed by the absence of any emotional appeal in 
his address. The fev statements that carry cong)limentary terms strive 
for goodvill rather than appeal.
Evaluation of Brovn's Invention. Historical data and 
interpretation supports the thesis that Brovn displayed discriminating 
judgment in his selection and adaptation of ideas. A number of 
incidents point up reasons for Georgia's satisfaction vith the status 
quo concerning the state's relationship vith the Union: First, the 
Eansas-Nebraska Act vith its policy of non-intervention by the federal 
government vas an established fact. Although the state Democratic and 
American Parties had differed over Buchanan's action in establishing a 
government in Kansas, they both supported the bill*^® Secondly, they 
vere further satisfied in March, 1657, vith the Court's decision in the 
Dred Scott case, making land the only property that Congress could 
legislate in the territories. Again, this action vas hailed vith much
^%any historians mention the rigid discipline Brown employed 
to obtain all -Uie available facts to establish his case. See Daily 
Examiner (Atlanta), July 9, 1857.
^Opearce, op. cit., pp. 23-25.
Cl ^gratification by both p a r t i e s Thirdly, no new national problem had 
been introduced to cause any uneasiness in Georgia. Even the attempt 
by the American Party to make national issues a key point in the state 
elections in 1857 had proved very unsuccessful.^^ Thus, the state 
seemed satisfied with the status quo in national affairs in November, 
1857. Status quo on the sectional conflict as interpreted by Georgians 
meant that the South could take its slaves into any new territory until 
the newly-formed state made slavery illegal. They further interpreted 
it to mean that the federal government had no legal right to legislate 
any restrictions on slavery in any state. Accepting this ideology, 
Georgia was at present satisfied, but jealously guarding against any 
loss of its constitutional rights and equality in the IMion. Thus, they 
were vitally interested in knowing whether public officials would guard 
this position. The importance Georgia gave to selecting a states* 
rights man is pictured in the conversation Linton Stephens had with his 
brother when announcing the Democrats' nomination of Brown as governor, 
linton assured "Alex" that Brown was very capable, and "was a firm 
Southern rights man."^^ Since Brown's philosophy was virtually unknown 
to the people in the state, and since the defense of states' rights was 
so ii^ Kjrtant, it was essential that Brown present his views on the 
national controversy to the people.
^^Ibid. The decision also served to solve the existing 
difference between the "sectional" and "national" factions in the state 
Democratic Party. See Phillips, op. cit., p. 175.
^^The national issues were introduced by the American Party in 
an effort to draw attention from their connections with the fiiow Nothing 
Party. See Pearce, op. cit., p. 23, and Von Abele, op. cit., p. 175#
^^Cited in Von Abele, op. cit., p. 162.
70
Brown en^loyed discriminating judgment throughout his address.
In his remarks to the people he employed a language that presented his 
ideas clearly in a manner lending much to popular acceptance. First, 
he briefly, but clearly, outlined his support of the Georgia Platform, 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and a policy of continued watchfulness over 
the state's constitutional rights and equality In the Ihilon. He further 
gave the assurance that he would willingly take the necessary steps to 
protect these rights. Secondly, his Ideas were those the majority In 
Georgia desired to hear. Georgians commonly accepted a single position 
concerning the stand the state should take regarding slavery.The 
only national issue that provided clash between the two parties concerned 
idiat administrative official should take blame for Walker's action in 
Kansas. Brown avoided discussing this topic and was not drawn into a 
defensive position In the speech. Thus, Brown was able to present the 
information the people desired In a very clear fashion.
There are no means to measure down's effectiveness by audience 
reaction since he made no appeal for action. His purpose in the address, 
as stated above, was to present his position on the question of states' 
rights. Phillips concludes that the new governor made clear what might 
be expected of him in case any attack was made on slavery during his 
term of office.Avery has written that idien Brown completed his 
address the people knew what to expect from hlm.^^ Accepting the
^^PhlUlps, op. cit., p. 182, 
^^ Ibld.
^^Avery, op. d t ., p. 1*9.
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principle that his purpose was informative, that he selected the 
material that should be discussed, and that he adapted that material 
to the audience, then one must conclude that it was an effective speech.
The Second Inaugural Address 
Background of the Address. On October 16, 1859, just less than 
one month before Joe Brown delivered his second inaugural, John Brown 
led the raid on Harper's Ferry. This raid served as the spark that 
ignited the move toward Southern unification that could terminate only 
with secession. Many Georgians interpreted the raid as representing 
the general attitude found in the North and thus cut the last tie of 
friendship between the two sections.Before this raid, the national 
political scene had been; relatively peaceful in Georgia. While many 
Georgians differed on state problems, they seemed universally to 
agree on the slavery controversy. Stephens had commented upon the 
peace and quiet in the state lAen he announced he would not seek 
re-election to Congress.^® In July, 1859, Senator Iverson, in a speech 
for re-election, predicted a Republican victory in i860. The people 
looked upon Iverson's warning as a cheap political trick intended to 
gain votes, and responded by defeating him for the office. Toombs 
delivered a speech in September, 1859, indicating the state's 
satisfaction with national politics. Speaking for a majority of 
Georgians, he expressed the belief that Democrats would not have to 
add a plank to their platform demanding that slavery be protected in
57coulter, op. cit.* p. 31ii*
5%on Abele, op. cit., p. 175.
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the territories.59
A capacity crowd gathered in Georgia's Capitol Hall Friday 
morning, November U, 18$9. Senators, representatives, and leading 
citizens from all parts of the state had assembled to hear the Governor's 
address. For the past two years Governor Brown had remained silent on 
the national question. Now that Harper's Ferry had alerted the state to 
the threat posed by the Republican Party, the state turned to its 
leader for guidance. Georgians seemed to have been fairly evenly 
divided over the policy that should be inaugurated to meet this new 
danger. A small majority seemed to favor secession, while the 
minority preferred to look to Congress for a solution. The difference 
of opinion was further complicated by the continued split in the 
Democratic Party.
Summary of the Ideas. The first part of the address was devoted 
to a review of the existing circumstances present in the state when 
Brown took office and the critical test the people had placed upon his 
administration. He concluded that the people had announced their 
verdict at the polls in 1859 idien they awarded his administration with 
an even larger majority than in 1857. He then congratulated i^e people 
on living in such a wonderful state, and enumerated the many things in 
which they could take pride.
Brown again devoted the last part of his address to the 
sectional conflict. He introduced this section by calling attention to 
the growing Republican movement and its threat to the security bf the 
states' ri^ts. Â strong, unified Democratic Party, he contended, held
59ibid., p. 177. See also Phillips, op. cit., p. l86.
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the only hope for the Union's survival. Although the party vas nov 
split, it could, as in the past, regroup to champion the constitutional 
rights of every section in the IMion. He believed that the election 
in i860 vbuld decide the fate of the Union. He expressed his love for 
the Union and his determination to make every sacrifice to maintain it, 
but if unity failed, he loved the state more. For the present the people 
should strive to maintain the Union, but if the conflict came, he 
advised the citizens to withdraw from the %iion. He closed the address 
with the prayerful hope that Almighty God would avert this break, and 
"that wisdom, moderation, and justice may control all our National and 
State councils— and that the rights of the States and the Union of the 
States may be thus perpetuated."^®
Analysis of the Ideas. Brown devoted approximately one-third of 
his address to the sectional conflict. The increased coverage given to 
the subject in this address, compared with the brief treatment in 18$7, 
gives some indication of the South's growing concern over the threat 
from the North. Von Abele pointed out this trend idien he wrote, "The 
passion aroused in the South was caught up in a whirlpool of hysteria 
from idiich there was no escape but war."&l The South's anger was 
directed at the Abolitionists' increasing attack upon slavery, and at 
the increasing number of Northern Republicans who were defending 
John Brown Governor Brown interpreted these events to point up one
^®Brown's Second Inaugural Address is in Federal Union 
(Hilledgeville, Georgia), November 1659. See also "Brown Scrapbooks."
^^Von Abèèe, op. cit., p. 177.
^^Goulter, op. cit., p. 31it*
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conclusion, the real threat to Southern security vas a victorious 
Republican Party. He reasoned that the only means of preventing this 
victory must rest in a strong, unified national Democratic Party. His 
objective in this address vas to persuade Georgians to support the 
Democratic Party.
Brovn *s concern over the strained relationship existing betveen 
the North and South vas indicated by the vording of his ideas. In the 
speech in 1857 he repeatedly referred to the Hnion of states; in the 
second inaugural address he referred to the nation as a Confederacy.
In the speech in 1857 he made clear that Georgia held no one responsible 
for the sectional conflict; in the 1859 address he not only held the 
Republican leaders responsible, but named them In harsh language. In 
1857 he saw no real threat to the Onion and merely generalized the 
action he would take to defend the state; in 1859 he not only saw a 
definite threat to Georgia's security, but pointed out that it might 
be necessary for Georgia to secede.
Brown employed both logical and emotional appeals in this 
address to achieve his purpose. The logic rested in his four-step 
pattern of arrangement within which he established the South's 
objectives, the threat to these objectives, the preventative measures 
or solution, and the motivational appeal. He made little use of logical 
proof in his effort to establish any of the points. Rather, he made a 
general assertion and then relied extensively upon emotional appeals to 
gain the audience's acceptance. He appealed to Southern pride when he 
reminded his audience of their forefathers' contract with the Ihiion.
He stressed the point that they would be unworthy of their sires if
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they remained in the Confederacy one day longer than that principle of 
equality existed. He employed such terms as "ambitious leaders," 
"sectional political party, " and "black Republicans" to establish the 
threat from the Republican Party. The rightness of the Democratic 
Party was described in such metaphoric phrases as "a noble ancient 
pyramid," "mighty Gibraltar," "Party of the Masses," and "the Party 
which, Phoenix-like, has risen from its own ashes."
Brown seemed to sense the possible failure of his plea for 
unity and devoted his conclusion to advising Georgia of the possible 
need for secession. Whether he sensed failure for his objective, or 
Was merely attençting to lay the groundwork for future unity of action, 
he offered the impassioned advice for Georgians to ready themselves for 
eventual secession.
Evaluation of Brown's Invention. Many historians attribute to 
the Harper's Ferry raid the breaking of the last link between the North 
and South. The dangers posed by the raid and the growing abolitionist 
movement were of sufficient importance to the South to warrant Brown's 
discussion. The passions aroused in the South by these events made 
clear that the time had come for action. Brown, as chief executive 
and leader of the largest single group in Georgia, had the responsibility 
to propose a course of action.He not only accepted this responsi­
bility but offered advice to cover the possible failure of his plan.
Brown's invention was very appropriate in view of his objective. 
Two major attitudes had evolved in Georgia concerning the sectional
^^Phillips, op. cit., p. 187.
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conflict. One group accepted the philosophy that a Republican victory 
in i860 would warrant Georgia's seceding from the Uhion; however, this 
group was divided over unifying with Northern Democrats to prevent a 
Republican victory. The second group did not question Georgia's ri^t 
to secede, but rejected the idea that a Republican victory would provide 
sufficient cause. Brown must persuade those in the first group opposed 
to joining forces with the Northern Democrats that unification was the 
only means of preventing a Republican success in the election. The 
second group must be persuaded that a Republican victory would warrant 
secession; therefore, they too must support unification to prevent 
defeat of the Democratic Party. A major part of his address was 
devoted to these two problems. He had no actual facts to establish 
that the Republican Party posed a serious threat and, lacking this 
proof, he turned to emotional appeal. Emotional charges of "pronqited 
by ambitious leaders," "sacrifice their country," and "black 
Republicans" pictures a selfish sectional party dedicated to refusing 
the South the equality obtained for them by their forefathers. This 
was not an argument that logically proved the point, but did utilize 
an excellent appeal to a then passionately-aroused South. Seeking to 
gain support and unity for the Democratic Party, he first appealed 
to the Democrats. He searched for common ground by placing the blame 
for party disruption on treacherous, unfaithful leaders. He did not 
name the leaders but left each man to choose his own. Then, with the 
use of analogy, attengited to prove that the Democratic Party, as in the 
past, could rise to champion constitutional rights. Seeking to convert 
the non-Democrats to the party, he offered them no middle-ground. There
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was only a vote for the democracy, or a vote against states* rights.
There are no valid means for establishing a causal relationship 
between this speech and the subsequent events in Georgia. However, 
artistically, the invention should be evaluated as excellent. Three 
elements made this an excellent, persuasive speech. The first component 
was the Governor's personal reputation. In 18$7 most of the state's 
newspapers were asking the question, "Who is Joe Brown?" BJy 18$9 that 
question had been answered and Brown was now one of the oû)st influential 
men in the s t a t e . A n y  remarks he madie would carry much influence 
because of his reputation as an honest and astute individual. This 
influence was further enhanced by his position as spokesman for the 
large non-slaveholding c l a s s . A  second component was the "band wagon 
appeal" contained in the popular arguments he advanced.^ The third 
coB^onent was the persuasive tools he selected to employ in his address. 
Although Brown did not offer any new ideas, he selected timely, 
persuasive appeals and appropriate arguments, and he adapted these 
arguments effectively to his listeners.^ 7 Hill's claim that Brown was
6^1bid., p. 187. See also Avery, op. cit., p. 98. Brown's pop­
ularity and influence is partially reflected in the support he received 
for re-election to governor in 18$9 from a large number of the American 
Party's newspapers. See "Brown Scrapbooks" for a list of these state 
newspapers.
65phiUips, op. cit., p. 187.
^Ibid. For a discussion of this kind of appeal see Wayne C. 
Hinnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Conqsany, 1957),
p. 102; and Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of Persuasive Speech (New 
York: Longman's Green and Conqpany, 1957j, p. Uh.
^7iverson had first offered these basic arguments in July, 1859. 
Brown was the first man of leadership in Georgia to offer these ideas 
after they had cost Iverson the election.
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able to sense the popular mind, probe its depths and then employ the 
most popular influence to reach the masses vas certainly warranted 
vith regard to this address.88
The Special Message, i860 
Background of the Address. Four political parties were 
striving to elect their presidential candidates in November, i860.
The inevitable split in the National Democratic Party had finally 
occurred at the Baltimore Convention in i860, and the Southern faction 
bolted to nominate their own candidates. The Southern faction supporting
i
the majority platform declared that the federal government was bound to 
protect all citizens* property in the territory, and that slavery was 
legal in the territories until the newly formed state made it illegal.
% e  Northern Democrats had secured the adoption of the minority report 
declaring Pereas differences existed in the party concerning Congress's 
duties and power regarding slavery in the territories, the party would 
stand by the Supreme Court's ruling on the subject.89 The Republican 
Party's platform declared that slavery was illegal in the territories 
and that Congress had no power to legalize its existence. The Union 
Party wanted to keep the states in the Union and referred to the 
constitution as its platform.70
Two prevalent points of view concerning the sectional dispute 
were held by Georgians in i860: A small majority favored secession in
88Loxiise B. Hill, Joseph E. Brown and the Confederacy (Chapel 
Hill; University bf North Carolina Press, p. W.
89i)vunond, op. cit., p. liU. 
70lbid., pp. 92-97.
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the event Lincoln was elected president, while the second group argued 
that Lincoln's election did not warrant secession. In general the 
group favoring secession supported Breckenridge for president, while 
the minority supported Bell.71
Throughout the spring and early summer Brown continued working 
to obtain a coüç>roinise between the two factions in the Democratic Party. 
Just before the Baltimore Convention he urged the state organization to 
send uninstructed delegates to Baltimore in the hope that the existing 
differences might be resolved.?^ The Northern Democrats were obviously 
unwilling to compromise their principles, thus forcing the final split 
within the party. Brown then gave his loyalty to the Southern faction 
and started working for the secessionist movement.
Brown delivered a special message to the legislature just before 
the presidential election in i860. The purpose for this address was to 
present South Carolina's invitation for Georgia to attend a Southern 
States' Convention. Most people felt Lincoln would probably win the 
election. With the election only one day away, and with the strong 
possibility of a Republican victory. Brown took this opportunity to 
persuade the legislature to adopt the course he outlined.
Summary of the Special Message. Brown introduced his aldress 
by presenting South Carolina's request for Georgia to participate in 
the Southern States' Convention. He advised against Georgia's
7^ Ibid., p. 98. The vote in Geor^a was $1,893 for Breckenridge, 
U2,8$$ for Bell, U,$80 for Douglas, while Lincoln's name did not 
appear £a the ballot.
^^Phillips, op. cit., p. 189.
80
participation on the ground that a number of states did not plan to 
attend. Turning his attention to the existing conflict, he advised the 
state legislature to call a special state convention to determine 
Georgia's course in the event Idncoln von. The purpose and theme of 
his address vas introduced in his opening argument. "In my opinion, 
the constitutional rights of the people have been violated by some of 
the non-slaveholding states to an extent lAich vould justify Georgia, 
in the judgment of all civilised nations, in adopting any measure 
against such offending states, vhich in its judgment, may be necessary 
for the restoration and future protection of all its ri^ts."^^ He 
claimed that the North vas guilly of creating this conflict idien the 
Republican states violated the constitution by enacting and enforcing 
anti-fugitive slave lavs. The North and South had formed the Ihion 
under a constitution vhich obligated the states to protect each other's 
rights. But nov the Northern states refused to honor their obligations 
and vere guilty of infringing upon Georgia's ri^ts. The North vas 
further destroying equal states' rights vith its double standard 
tovard slavery: accepting, morally, its right to gain vealth and
property through slave traffic but rejecting, morally, the South's 
right to maintain slaves as its property.
Directing his attention to vhat he believed vere the necessary 
remedies, Brovn asked the legislature to empower the governor to bring 
military action against private and public property of the offending
73Brovn's special message is published in Volume I of the 
Confederate Records of the State of Georgia. See Candler, op. cit.,
î7 î 9“ ^t:---------------------------------------------  —
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states. He further proposed that a tax be levied against all goods 
exported by these states, and that their citizens be denied the 
protection of Georgia's laws. He defended the legality of these acts, 
and argued that they would strengthen the Union because the pressure 
would be on the offending state, where it belonged, rather than on the 
Union. Brown then directed his attention to refuting the arguments 
against secession. He denied that secession would cause a civil war, 
that there was any danger from slave revolts, or from an increased 
incidence of runaway slaves.
In conclusion. Brown requested the legislature to call a state 
convention, if Lincoln were elected, to determine Georgia's course of 
action. He fur^er requested that one million dollars be appropriated 
to improve Georgia's military defense.
Analysis of Brown's Invention. Approximately one-half of the 
people of Georgia opposed secession. This group believed that the 
election of one man did not constitute sufficient threat to states' 
rights to warrant secession. They argued that an adequate number of 
Northern legislators would join with the South to enable Congress to 
preserve the states' sovereignty. They preferred to remain in the Union 
until Congress demonstrated its inability to preserve these rights, or 
until the North clearly became the aggressor.7^ This philosoplqr was 
presented by one of the leading spokesman for this group, Alexander 
Stephens. In his address to the state legislature on November lit, i860, 
he advised Georgia to let the North commit the acts of aggression.75 a
7^Dumond, op. cit., pp. lit3-lWt. 
75candler, op. cit.. I, 183-206.
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still smaller minority opposed secession because they feared Northern 
retaliation.
Before Brown could achieve his purpose, he had to establish 
either that Lincoln's election did warrant secession, or that the North 
was already guilty of aggression. He chose the latter means for 
persuading Georgians that the time to act had arrived. Brown differed 
slightly from Howell Cobb and Robert Toombs on the procedure of 
secession. Cobb and Toombs wanted the legislature to secede 
immediately.76 Brown argued in his address that the legislature 
should call a state convention to enable the people to make the choice. 
It was not that Brown opposed secession; he had apparently determined 
that a state vote on the question would provide the strongest appeal 
to the non-secessionists.
Brown depended both on logical and emotional appeal to establish 
that the Northern acts of aggression required secession. The logical 
arguments were drawn from the history of the slave trade and the enact­
ment of the anti-fugitive slave laws. The reasoning was based on the 
fact that each state had the responsibility of protecting and honoring 
the rights of the other states. His general line of reasoning was 
revealed in the following argument:
At the time of the formation of the constitution of the 
United States, the rights of the slaveholders were recognized in 
all the states. No political demagogue in the Northern states 
had been able to ride into power by denouncing the people and the 
institutions of the Southern states; nor had the Northern pulpit 
been desecrated by abolition h a r a n g u e s .77
7^Dumond, op. cit., pp. llih and I89. Toombs, Cobb, and Brown 
were the strongest leaders behind the secession movement in Georgia.
77candler, op. cit.. I, 20.
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This action, along vith the anti-fugitive slave lavs and its double 
standard tovard slavery, constituted the Northern acts of aggression.
His appeal to the South's emotions can be seen in his argument that 
"numbers of them advocate the doctrine that our slaves should be 
free among us, intermarry vith our children, amalgamate vith us, and 
be placed, in all respects, upon, a basis of equality vith our free
idiite population."78
Brovn eiqployed logical arguments to establish the advisability 
and legality of his proposed remedies. These proposals vere not nev, 
but had been offered at various times by other G e o r g i a n s .79 Brovn did 
go into more detail in developing his defense, relying upon his legal 
training to aid in attenç>ting to prove the legality of the acts.
Brovn attempted to remove any fear that the North vould go to 
var if the South seceded. He selected three arguments that should have 
been very effective for removing this fear: He first returned to
Buchanan's speech that advised the North to take no action if the South 
did secede. A second argument demonstrated the foolishness of fearing 
a Northern inspired Negro revolt. The third, and perhaps the strongest 
argument, vas built around the South's belief that the North's need for 
cotton vould prevent her from taking action.
Evaluation of Brovn's Invention. The sentiment vas prevalent 
throu^out the South that Lincoln vould probably vin the election.
Brovn, remaining true to the arguments he advanced in his second
77candler, op. cit.. I, 21.
7^]he state Democratic Convention adopted a resolution, in 18$$, 
requesting the Georgia Legislature to pass retaliatory measures against 
the anti-fugitive slave lavs. See Federal Ihiion (Milledgeville, Georgia), 
June 12y 1855*
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inaugural in 1859, now supported the thesis that if the Republicans won, 
Georgia should secede. Thus, in the address he treated ideas of para­
mount importance to all. The time was approaching idien Georgia must 
decide what course she would follow if Idncoln were elected. Brown 
treated this basic issue when he devoted all his arguments to the 
proposition that Georgia should secede.
Brown’s adaptation of arguments to his audience displayed a 
thorough analysis of the people. The first example of this adaptation 
can be seen in his selection of ideas. To acconplish his objective, he 
had to persuade those opposed to secession that conditions required this 
action immediately. Meeting this objection, he employed arguments 
attempting to prove that the North was the aggressor and that there was 
little danger of retaliation from the North. The second example of 
adapting the arguments to the audience was in the wording and structure 
of his arguments. He proposed not secession, but the calling of a state 
convention to determine the course Georgia should follow. The state 
convention was designed to appeal to the non-secessionists, since many 
of them preferred this move. Even the remedies offered to meet the 
crisis were presented as means of strengthening the Union, a goal that 
again appealed to the minority. He made use of facts as premises for 
his reasoning, lAile still appealing to such Southern prejudices as 
fear bf intermarriage, loss of equal rights, and loss of Southern 
wealth. He further argued that he was no disunionist per se, thus 
further striving to gain a fair hearing.
over Georgia mass meetings were being held and 
resolutions favoring secession were being drawn and sent to Milledgeville. 
See Von Abele, op. cit., p. 185.
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Certain signs ir^ -* '••’M  that the special message should be 
judged as an effective speech. Brown did not offer any new or 
original ideas concerning the sectional conflict. Any argument 
advanced in this addrôss can be found in any number of speeches 
delivered in i860; however, he did employ a sound, logical case, 
built on premises that would be accepted in the South. He further 
selected and adapted his arguments to the audience with discriminating 
judgment. Although there is no means to determine how effectively the 
arguments achieved their purpose, certain facts are available. South 
Carolina's Governor Vance g^ve Brown's speech credit for persuading 
his state to pass its secession acts, Phillips credited Brown as 
being responsible for the large se^escion vote polled in many pro­
union counties in Northwest Georgia.The s\,ate legislature did 
follow his request to grant one million dollars for the state's 
defense, and in December called for a state convention to assemble 
on January U, 1661, to determine Georgia's future. Although these 
events cannot be credited solely to Brown's address, the speech 
probably contributed to Georgia's eventual secession.
Conclusion
Brown did not provide any original leadership in the sectional 
dispute before the Civil War. The ideas he e^ qoressed in his rhetoric 
can be found in numerous earlier speeches and writings. However, 
Georgia's progressive, growing discontent with the North, consummating 
in her eventual acts of secession, was pictured in Brown's rhetoric
®^PhiUip8, op. cit., p. 206.
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during this period.
The peace, calm, and goodwill Georgia felt for the Union in 
1857 was expressed in Brown's first inaugural address. The passion 
that was aroused in the South by the raid on Harper's Ferry was pictured 
in the 1859 inaugural. Brown's reference to the state's menbership in 
the Confederacy rather than in the Union, his warning of danger from 
the sectional Republican Party, expressed the growing seed of discontent 
existing in the Soutk.
The special message in i860 presents a picture of the maturity 
of the secession movement. Secession was no longer a mere threat, but 
an act that had to be realized. No longer did he offer a prayer for 
wisdom, moderation, and justice in the nation's councils. Now the 
prayer was "that the God of our fathers may inspire the convention with 
wisdom, and so direct their counsel to protect our rights and preserve 
our liberties to the latest g e n e r a t i o n . "^2
^Federal Ifaion (Milledgeville, Georgia), December 11, i860. 
This quotation is taken from a letter published by Brown at the request 
of the people desiring his views concerning the election of delegates 
to the state convention.
' CHAPTER IV 
BROWN'S RHETORIC OP RECONSTRUCTION 
Introduction
Georgia faced two major problems between the years 1865 and 
1872: rebuilding her economy and re-establishing her political
government.^ Coulter has written that the Civil War may have been a 
political rebellion, but it brought about a social and economic 
revolution.^ Thompson wrote that "the problems of peace were far more 
difficult and intricate than were those of the war, and in 1865 when 
hostilities ceased, instead of the worst having passed, as the people 
of the South thought, the worst had only just begun in the region 
subject to reconstruction.
Following the War, Georgia was faced with many problems brought 
on by the conflict and by the "new order" introduced in reconstruction. 
These problems included the conversion of the Negroes from slavery to 
free labor, the adjustment of the land and planting system, the settle­
ment of social conditions brought about by the two races living side by
k^iildred C. Thompson, "Reconstruction in Georgia," Studies in 
History, Economics and Public Law (New York; Coluonbia University Press,
k w ,  ii£ ---------------
2e . Merton Coulter, Georgia, A Short History (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 19U7J, p. 3^8.
^Thompson, loc. cit.
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side, the relation of the rebel state to the IMion, the constitution of 
political citizenship in the state, and the struggle for party domin­
ation. Georgia's attempt to resolve these problems resulted in two 
revolutions.^ The first revolution lasted from 186$ to 1867 and was 
economic in nature, being devoted to resolving Georgia's labor problem. 
The second revolution extended from 186? to 18?2 and was devoted to 
gaining eventual political autonomy for the state.
Louise B. Hill wrote that historians leveled various charges 
against Brown for the political course he followed from 186$ to 18?2.
One major charge was that he was an opportunist seeking favor with the 
ruling powers. This charge would indicate that Brown took new positions 
as the changing political powers introduced new and different 
reconstruction programs. A second charge implied that Brown supported 
the Radicals' program for reasons of personal safety.^
This chapter will evaluate the rhetoric Brown employed in 
attempting to gain support for President Johnson's program of 
reconstruction from 186$ to 1867, and his attempt to get Georgians to 
accept the Radicals' program after the North rejected the president's 
program. A study of the rhetoric Brown employed during reconstruction 
should possibly support or deny the charges made against him and 
contribute further to the total characterization of Brown's rhetoric 
from 18$7 to 1880. Brown's resignation address as governor in 186$
^Ibid.
^These historians cited by Hill include Dodd, Freeman, Eckenrode, 
and Hay. She concluded that Avery and Fielder were the only apologists 
Brown had. Louise B. Hill, Joseph E. Brown and the Confederacy (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina k-ess, 1939/, pp. 259-è6Ô.
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will present his rhetoric favoring the presidential program, and the 
"Replies to the 'Notes on the Situation,'" represents his rhetoric 
favoring the Radicals' program.
Background to Reconstruction
The Economic Revolution _
Following the war three-fourths of the wealth of Georgia had 
disappeared. Over 3,000,000 acres of land were no longer suited for 
cultivation, idiile the price of farm land decreased from five to three 
dollars an acre. Stocks and bonds were worthless, end money had no 
value.^ The cities and countryside lay in waste while the people 
suffered under a huge debt lAich vas intensified when the federal 
government cancelled Southern war debts making collection almost 
impossible. Factories and industries had been destroyed and the 
South lacked the capital needed to rebuild them.? The economic 
conditions were even worsened when Georgians lost $272,000,000 in 
capital by the freeing of the slaves. Before the war Georgia was far 
above the average among states in railway transportation mileage, but, 
following hostilities, most of the tracks had been destroyed.®
Georgia immediately started rebuilding her economy in an attempt 
to overcome the existing prostrate condition. The planters, however, 
were faced with two immediate difficulties; a labor shortage and a
^Coulter, op. cit., p. 3U8.
7John Samuel Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: The
Macmillan Coirpaiy, 1963), pp. 26-28.
^ i d ., p. 27. See also Coulter, op. cit., p. 351*
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lack of capital to replenish their farming equipment."
The labor shortage had been brought on the freeing of the 
slaves. To the Negro, freedom meant all that slavery had not been. 
Slavery signified work, labor under constant supervision, restricted 
living quarters, and subjection to patrol. Freedom, on the other hand, 
meant idleness, roving from place to place, gathering in towns, and 
doing generally as pleasure dictated. The freed men had been informed, 
and believed, that by Christmastime the land would be divided and every 
Negro would receive forty acres and a mule.
Many Negroes had deserted the farms in the fall of 1865, leaving 
no one to pick the cotton. Obviously, some action had to be taken to 
solve the labor shortage before the spring of 1866. The states passed 
the "black codes" in an effort to solve the labor shortage. These codes, 
among other things, required that the Negroes be forced to work; however, 
the federal government ruled the "black codes" illegal.When General 
David Tills on took charge as Assistant Commissioner of the Freedman's 
Bureau in Georgia, he used the Bureau to enroll the Negroes and make 
contracts for them with the planters for the following year.^
The labor shortage was eventually resolved by two steps. The 
first step was accomplished with labor contracts formed between the 
Negroes and the whites by the Freedman's Bureau. These contracts
9Although the people were in serious economic conditions, 
stores were able to move their supplies at a very rapid rate. It was 
in agriculture that the most serious economic problems existed. See 
Thompson, op. cit., p. 98.
^PSzell, op. d t ., p. U7. 
^Thompson, op. cit., p. 50.
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required the Negroes to take enQ)loynent or be placed in jail. The 
planter was required to pay the female worker from eight to ten dollars 
and the male laborer twelve to fifteen dollars a month.^ The second 
program, the share crop system, was introduced when the planter 
discovered he would be unable to supervise all the employees, or pay 
wages, and he was unable to locate an acceptable field superviser.
Under the new program the plantation was broken into sections and the 
laborers farmed a few acres on shares. The tenant received from one-to 
two-thirds of the crop, depending on whether or not the owner had 
furnished both the seed and the farming e q u i p m e n t .^3
The planters faced another problem in attenpting to locate the 
necessary capital needed to replenish their equipment and to purchase 
the seed. The prostrate conditions in the South made it almost 
impossible for the planters to borrow money to carry on agricultural 
pursuits. As late as 1870, the six states of Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana, and Georgia had only thirty-six 
national banks, and these banks had a combined capital of only $7,000,000.^ 
There were even fewer state banks, and these banks did not have 
sufficient capital to make many loans. Thus, money was not available to 
provide the planters the capital needed to operate their holdings.
An old institution in the South, the country store, accepted 
new responsibilities and provided the needed credit to solve the second 
problem. This unique credit institution took the form of crop liens.
^Ibid., p. 75.
^^zell, op. cit., p. 5U. 
^Ibid., p. 118.
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Under the new credit system no money exchanged hands; rather between 
January and planting time the farmer would make a contract with the 
local merchant and promise to pay him a percentage of the crop in 
exchange for a specified amount of credit# The merchant, to avoid crop 
losses and bad debts, would mark his prices up anywhere from 10 to 200 
percent with an additional 8 to 15 percent interest charge added to 
the mark-up price.
Having to pay the high interest rates charged by the lien 
system, the farmers were never able to prosper. Thus, the poor whites 
and Negroes continued to remain subservient in the South. The Northern 
Radicals attempted to utilize this economic depression to make inroads 
into the South for the Republican Party. The Republicans promised the 
Negro political and social rights, but failed to grant the needed 
economic freedom, thus leaving him to the economic mercy of the South. 
Rie South was able to use the economic dependency to retain political 
domination over the Negro race.l^
The Political Revolution 
Although historians entitle the period from 1865 to 186? as 
the economic revolution, Georgia made an effort during this period to 
establish a political government. The liberal Republicans in the North 
believed the Confederate states should be admitted back into the Union
l^Ibid., p. 119.
^^Ibid., p. 55. A large majority of highly populated Negro 
counties had voted the Democratic ticket in 1868 election. See also 
Thompson, op. cit., p. 205.
17as rapidly as possiblePresident Johnson adopted the liberals' 
philosophy and introduced his program of reconstruction* The President 
believed that only three steps were necessary for the Southern states 
to gain recognition: the states should annul their secession ordinances, 
they should repudiate their debts contracted in carrying on the war, and 
they should free their slaves.^® The President proposed to have the 
people who had not taken an active part in the Confederaqr to oversee 
the restoration of their various states* The President refused pardons 
to the civil, diplomatic, and military leaders in the South*^ 9
President Johnson appointed James Johnson provisional governor 
of Georgia on June 17, 186$. Governor Johnson issued a proclamation on 
July 13, calling for delegates to be elected to attend a state 
convention to organise a permanent government* The election was to be 
held on the first Wednesday in October and only those citizens who had 
taken the amnesty oath were qualified to vote*
The convention delegates were con^rised mostly of old men 
lacking any previous experience in political leadership, Herschel V* 
Johnson and Charles J. Jenkins did provide adequate leadership in the 
convention.Johnson presided over the convention and Jenkins was 
chairman of the Committee on Business. The state framed a new 
constitution under the able guidance of Johnson and Jenkins which met
^^The liberal Republicans were the members who believed that the 
South and North should be reunited with very little additional demand*
^®Coulter, op* cit*, p* 360* 
^9ibid., pp. 319-350*
^^^orapson, op. cit*, pp. lU9-l50*
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the conditions prescribed by President Johnson.
Georgia united behind President Johnson's proposed program of 
reconstruction. The existing unity can be explained by reviewing the 
attitudes of former state political leaders toward the President's 
program: Joshua Hill, the leading Unionist in the state before the
war, wrote the President assuring him that Georgia was loyal to the
21Union. Alexander Stephens, a strong Unionist before the war, assured 
the President of his support for a "restoration of quiet order, and 
government in Georgia upon the basis of accepting and abiding by 
issues of war as proclaimed by the executive."22 h , v , Johnson and 
Charles J. Jenkins supported the presidential program by giving 
leadership to the constitutional convention in 1866. Ex-Govemor 
Brown was very active in attempting to persuade Georgians to take the 
amnesty oath and cooperate with the presidential program of 
reconstruction.23 Governor Jenkins seemed to have captured the general 
attitude found in Georgia in his message to the legislature on 
November 11, 1866: "Our interest lies in eschewing political excitement,
studiously avoiding all conflicts with the authorities unchosen by us, 
but placed over us, and employing our active energies in rebuilding our 
own wasted place and developing our neglected resources."2h The only 
notable leaders not heard during the years 1865 to 186? were Howell Cobb
2^Letter from Joshua Hill quoted in the Macon Telegraph,
February 6, 1866.
22ffyrta Lockett Avery, Ed. Recollections of Alexander H. Stephens 
(New York: No publisher, 1910), p. 203.
23l. W. Avery, The History of the State of Georgia (New York: 
Brown and Derby, l88l), p. 339.
2^Cited in Thonpson, op. cit., p. l6U.
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and Robert Toombs. Toombs vas not in the state and Cobb was actively 
engaged in making a living while paying little attention to politics.
The large popular vote favoring the new constitution indicated the 
state's willingness to return to the U n i o n .2^
The election of new state officials was held on November 1$,
1865. Joe Brown and Alexander Stephens refused the nomination for 
governor; so the state elected Charles J. Jenkins. No one was disfran­
chised in the election because of prior service in the Confederacy, 
thus few anti-secessionists were elected to office. The reason for 
electing candidates idio played prominent roles in the Confederacy was 
the desire to provide more able leaders, not to antagonize the North. 
Georgia's desire to cooperate with the North can be seen in her 
unanimous support of a pro-IMionist as governor.2^
The United States Congress reconvened in December, 1865, and 
remained in session until March, 1866. Northern congressmen led by 
Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner did not recognize the newly 
organized state governments of the South and refused to seat the 
recently elected congressmen. Congress refused to recognize the new 
governments for numerous reasons. In the first place the congressional 
action was a result of the normal swing of power from the executive 
branch to Congress. During the war years the president had assumed 
more and more power, and now Congress was eager to regain the power 
they believed was rightfully theirs. A second reason centered around 
the North's distaste for the black codes passed by the Confederate states,
2^Ibid., p. 153.
2^ ibid., p. 153.
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The South viewed the Negroes as a domestic problem because of their 
refusal to work, the health hazards they posed in the cities, increasing 
thefts, threats of race riots, and forcing a prostrate section to 
provide needless charity. The Southern states passed these so-called 
black codes specifying Negro rights in an effort to avoid these 
numerous problems. The North probably misinterpreted the true intent 
of the black codes, viewing them, instead, as efforts on the part of 
the South to force the Negroes in subservient roles. The third reason 
was political in nature. The Republican Party was still young and 
believed it saw an opportunity for gaining strength in the South with 
the freed slaves and pro-Dhion whites' vote.
The major issue in the congressional elections in 1866 narrowed 
down to what branch of government would determine reconstruction. 
Congress carried the fight to the people and appealed to the voters' 
emotions in an effort to overthrow President Johnson's plan of 
reconstruction. The Radicals won the election by a large majority, 
securing the necessary two-thirds vote to veto the presidential program.
Congress initiated its reconstruction program over the 
president’s veto on March 2, 1867, passing supplemental acts on March 23 
and on July 19, 186?.^ *^  The first act divided the South into five 
military districts, placing the army in control of each district for 
the South's protection. This act recognized no legal government in any 
Confederate state and would recognize the government as being legal only 
when the state wrote constitutions acceptable to Congress, disfranchised
27Henry Savage, Jr., Seeds of Time (New York: Henry Holt and
Con^any, 1959), p. 1U8.
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a number of rebels, gave the Negroes the right to vote, and ratified
pD
the Fourteenth Amendment.^" The second act instructed the commanding 
general to register the qualified voters by requiring them to take a 
complicated oath. The registration was to be completed before 
September, 1867; than an election for a constitutional convention should 
be held. The newly-drafted constitution had to be ratified in an 
election in which at least one-half of all registered voters 
participated. The new constitution must then be submitted to the 
United States Congress for final approval.The third act gave 
registration boards absolute power to deny voting privilege to any 
person.^®
While Congress was writing the new reconstruction program, the 
people in Georgia were engaged in deciding how they would react to the 
new bills. The crisis gave rise to three schools of thought: one group
favored accepting the proposed measure and advised the state to meet 
Congress half-way; a second group vigorously denounced acquiescence; 
and the third group remained neutral for a time, adopting a wait-and- 
see attitude.
Joe Brown was the chief spokesman for the group favoring 
acquiescence to the congressional program. Brovm returned from
®^Thorapson, op. cit., p. 171.
29lbid.
^®Coulter wrote that although the law specifically disfranchised 
all people that had ever held a civil office during the Confederate mile, 
the act enabled the registration board to disfranchise any person.
^^Hill, op. cit., pi 267.
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Washington in February, 1867, where he had discussed the problem of 
reconstruction with men from a number of states. After obtaining what 
seemed to have been a clear perception of the national mood, he published 
a letter expressing his views on the situation. In the letter he 
expressed the belief that the election of 1866 demonstrated that the 
Radicals were supported by the general public in the North. The 
election results indicated that the North was enraged over the South*s 
rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment and now demanded universal 
suffrage. The Radical Party, by virtue of its two-thirds' control of 
Congres^was determined to punish the South for its past actions. The 
extreme Radical Republicans did not have a majority in Congress at the 
time of Brown's visit and the Moderate Republicans desired a quick 
settlement. However, should the South continue rejecting the present 
legislation, the Radicals would gain sufficient strength to pass even 
harsher acts. He believed the real issue was not a question of 
granting the Negroes suffrage, already an established fact; the real 
issue involved who the South would select to gpvem the states— capable 
whites or Radical Republicans? He advised the governor to reconvene 
the legislature, call a convention to revise the constitution permitting 
Negro suffrage, and provide for an early election to select legislators 
who would approve the Fourteenth Amendment.^^
A majority of whites in Georgia opposed the congressional plan 
of reconstruction and initiated two programs to defeat the plan. The 
first program took the form of a court action. On April 10, 1867, 
Governor Jenkins attempted to take the case before the Supreme Court to
^^A letter from Governor Brown to the people. Atlanta Daily New 
Era, February 26, 1667.
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get the bills declared unconstitutionalThe second program aimed at 
rallying the citizens to defeat the bills at the polls. The leading 
figure in the second program was Ben Hill, a long-time political foe 
of Joe Brown. Hill first protested the congressional plan in his Davis 
Hall speech in the summer of 1867. In the speech Hill denounced the 
Radicals, declared the Military Acts unconstitutional, and advised the 
people to vote against any convention or constitution approving the 
congressional p r o g r a m . The major part of Hill's fight against the 
congressional plan was carried on in a series of newspaper articles 
entitled "Notes on the Situation.He argued that obedience by the
state to the federal constitution and recognition of the federal
«■
government were the only requirements that Georgia had to meet to 
return to the Union. Georgia had met these requirements when the state 
approved President Johnson's reconstruction plan and was now protected 
by the federal constitution. The very fact that the North had forced 
the Southern states to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment was a recognition 
that the South was in the Union. The congressional plan was therefore 
unconstitutional, and he was prepared to try any case opposing the plan 
before the Supreme Court free of charge.3^"
Hill's arguments were popular with Georgians since they were 
unwilling to submit to Negro rule, and they believed this type of
33niii, op/ cit., p. 271.
3^Cited in ibid.
published twenty-two letters in the Augusta Daily Chronicle 
and Sentinel between June 19 and August 1, 1867. These letters are also 
in "Brown's Scrapbooks." Hereafter this source will be cited as "Notes."
3%L11, op. cit., p. 272.
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government would occur under the congressional plan. The South had 
lived with the Negroes for years and believed the former slaves lacked 
the necessary knowledge and experience to govern well. The South 
further opposed the program because they did not believe the Negroes had 
the potential for leaming.^^ The whites, therefore, adopted the 
philosophy that the South would be better off living under military 
rule than submitting to rule by the Negroes and Radicals.38 Their 
philosophy was summed up by a writer who expressed the thought in a 
Georgian newspaper, "Better send no one to Congress than such that 
would misrepresent us. We would rather risk ten military governors 
than one Brownlow."^^
In the first election under the reconstruction acts the people 
were required first to approve a constitutional convention, and then 
vote for delegates if the convention was held. In Georgia the decision 
to hold a convention carried by 102,283 votes out of a total of 106,UlO 
polled votes.kO a number of citizens opposed to reconstruction refused 
to vote.
The 169 delegates elected to the convention were primarily 
scalawags, or native whites.^ The leaders in the convention were
3?The South's belief that the congressional plan would bring 
rule by a race unprepared and without ability to learn became a major 
issue in all their speeches.
38Thompson, op. cit., p. 173.
39pederal Union (Milledgeville, Georgia), March $, 1867.
UOThompson, op. cit., p. I89.
^^Ibid. In the convention 37 members were Negroes, 9 were 
carpetbaggers, and 12 were conservative whites.
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pro-Union in sympathy, but still wrote a constitution very favorable 
to Georgia* Thompson attributes Joe Brown as being the influential 
force behind the more moderate constitution.^^
General Meade ordered the election of state officers and the 
ratification of the constitution to be held on April 20 and to continue 
for four days. The Republicans selected Rufus B. Bullock as their 
candidate for governor, and the Democrats nominated John B. Gordon. 
Bullock was elected by a seven thousand vote majority, while the 
constitution was ratified by an eighteen thousand vote majority. The 
vote for the state legislature was very close with the senate going 
Republican, while the Democrats won the house.
The new legislature immediately elected two Ikiited States 
Senators to represent Georgia. The Republican Party nominated Joe 
Brovm and Foster Blodgett, while the Democrats supported Alexander 
Stephens and H. V. Miller. The early balloting made it evident that 
Brown would defeat Stephens for office. The Democrats and Moderate 
Republicans united to elect Joshua Hill by a vote of 110 to 9ii for 
Brown, and elected Miller over Blodgett for the short term by a vote 
of 120 to 72.^^ Shortly after the election Governor Bullock appointed 
Joe Brown to the State Supreme Court.
k^Ibld., p. 197-198.
^^In the Senate there were 17 Radical Republicans, 10 Moderate 
Republicans, and 17 Democrats. In the House there were 75 Radical 
Republicans, 9 Moderate Republicans, and 88 Democrats. Bullock carried 
most of the counties where a majority of the registered voters were 
Negroes, although Gordon carried 15 counties in which the Negro vote 
outnumbered the whites.
Ub^ I. W. Avery, op. cit., p. 398.
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The newly formed legislature made a costly error when it ousted 
twenty-five colored representatives and two Negro senators from its 
body. Charles Sumner of Massachusetts introduced a bill into the 
United States Senate in December, 1868, calling for Georgia to be 
replaced under reconstruction. Governor Bullock appeared before Congress 
on December 7, 1868, and testified that Georgia had not complied with 
the reconstruction laws.^^ Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment in 
January, 1869, requiring ratification by all the Southern states. The 
Georgia legislature rejected the amendment on March 10, 1869, and 
adjourned March 18,
In 1869, Congress passed a new bill requiring state legislators 
to take an oath that they had not participated in the rebellion after 
holding an office, or that they had been relieved of their office by 
Congress. The new law further denied the states the right to pass laws 
excluding membership in Congress on the grounds of race or color. The 
states were also required to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment before they 
could.be represented in Washington.
In January, 18?0, the State Attorney General ruled that all 
state officers in Georgia, regardless of positions, must take the new 
oath.^7 The new test oath enabled Bullock to gain control of the 
legislature for the Republican Party. Georgia experienced its most 
severe taste of reconstruction under this new rule. On July 1$, I87O,
^^Ibid., p. U08.
^^ i d ., p. h2h. 
k^Ibid.
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President Grant signed the act admitting Georgia back into the Union. 
Once returned to the Union, the Democrats shortly regained control of 
the state government.
An Evaluation of Brown's Rhetoric, 186$-1872 
Brown’s Speech of Resignation 
Background to Brown's Address. On April 30, 1865, the people 
of Georgia were relieved when the news was announced that the Civil War 
had ended. A majority of Southerners would have willingly returned to 
the Ihion months before Lee surrendered if they could have been assured 
the states would receive honorable treatment.^® Now that the war was 
over, Georgians were willing to devote their energies to rebuilding 
their lives and state and forget their past differences with the North. 
Not only did no intelligent Georgian consider continuing the war with 
the Union, they generally assumed that the state would be immediately 
allowed to resume its former place in the federal government.
Governor Brown announced that the state legislature would 
convene on May 22, 1865, to take whatever action was necessary to rejoin 
the Union. Brown was arrested on May 11, 1865, by the military forces 
and sent to Washington, and the legislature was not permitted to meet. 
Brown returned home in about a week, but was not permitted to resume his 
duties as governor. President Andrew Johnson appointed James Johnson 
provisional governor on June 17, 1865, and Brown resigned June 29. Since 
the state legislature had not been permitted to convene, he presented
k®I. W. Avery, op. cit., p. 365.
^^Ezell, op. cit., p. 39.
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his resignation address in the form of a letter that was published in 
most of the states' newspapers.
Summary of Brown's Ideas. Brown introduced his address by 
reviewing the events which culminated in the war between the states.
He pointed out that the war was over and that superior Northern 
forces had brought about a total defeat of the South. Since the South 
had determined that the sectional differences must be resolved by war, 
defeat left the South with no recourse but to submit to the terms 
dictated by the North. These demands were that the slaves should be 
freed and the Confederate states must rewrite constitutions which 
complied with the requirements dictated by President Johnson's program 
of reconstruction.
Brown reminded the people that revolutions often result in 
sweeping away long-established usages, demolishing theories, and changing 
institutions. He then advised the people to adopt a practical point of 
view and accept the fortunes of war. This practical approach meant 
freeing the slaves and making the required changes in the constitution. 
The state should then organize a new labor system and act in good faith 
toward the North, thus working to restore peace and prosperity to the 
nation. He amplified this advice by reporting that he had freed his 
slaves and had given them their fair share of the crops, or given such 
wages that might be agredd upon for future labor.
The final part of the address was devoted to the role the 
individual citizen should play in the new government. Brown reminded 
the people that the voters would select the future state leaders; 
therefore all qualified citizens should take an active part in
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selecting the most capable men to guarantee that the state's welfare 
would be secure. Any man unwilling to support the constitution under 
which he lived should seek a home and protection elsewhere.
Analysis of Brown's Invention. Avery seems accurately to have 
described Brown's objective in the resignation address in the following 
summation, "Brown desired to facilitate the reorganization of the state's 
government and remove any impediment that he might personally interpose 
to the solution of reconstruction."^0
Brown first expressed ideas designed to facilitate the 
organization of the new government. He then tried to remove any 
barrier that he personally might play in blocking the reorganization 
of that government. Finally he returned to his original theme that 
Georgians must do ail they can to gain readmittance for their state 
into the Union.
Although Brown attempted to accomplish two goals in the address, 
his primary purpose was to encourage the citizens to reorganize the 
government so that it could be readmitted into the Union. One major 
idea becomes paramount in the address: Georgia had no recourse but to 
meet the demands imposed by the North.Three arguments are advanced 
to establish this major thought. The first argument centers around the 
idea that the South must accept the consequences for decreeing that the
W. Avery, op. cit., p. 339*
1^%. W. Avery contends that Brown was a practical man willing to 
face up to the facts. Brown believed that Georgia had no recourse except 
to submit to the victor's terms. He faced up to this reality and advised 
the people to take this action. It should be noted that he did not 
advise the people to do more than the North required. Ibid., p. 339«
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war would be the final arbiter of the sectional differences. The 
North was the victor and now the South had to resign itself to accept 
the victor’s demands. The second argument suggests that the only 
logical thing left for the South is to be practical and make the best 
of what is offered. The third argument claims that by enabling the 
state to rejoin the Union, the people would receive the advantages of 
rule, economic prosperity, and peace.
Two thoughts describe the ideas Brown advanced to remove any 
reasons the people might employ in using him as the basis for slowing 
the reorganizational effort. The first was devoted to e:q>laining why 
he could not actively engage in regaining the state’s autonomy. He 
explained that since his citizenship had not been restored, he could not 
actively participate in the political reorganization. The second 
was devoted to the fact that he was taking all action permitted to 
him. This action included freeing his slaves and atteiqpting to 
adapt to a new labor system. It not only amplified his willingness 
to cooperate with the North, but also suggested a possible solution 
to the state’s labor problem.
Evaluation of Brown’s Invention. Avery implied that the 
resignation address was appropriate for the times and ençloyed excellent 
rhetoric when he wrote, "Brown’s address clearly revealed his awareness 
of the vital issues and his sensitivity to the people’s mood."^^ An 
examination of the address tends to convince the reader that there is 
much validity in Avery’s observation.
^^Ibid., p. 3U0.
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In 1866, Georgia was faced with the two-fold task of rebuilding 
her economy and restoring her political government. Before the state’s 
autonomy could be restored, slaves must be freed and the requirements 
dictated by President Johnson's reconstruction acts must be included in 
a new state constitution. The economic recovery necessitated the 
formation of a labor program to replace slavery. The restoration of 
the state’s autonomy necessitated taking the amnesty oath, making 
necessary changes in the state constitution ratifying the changes, and 
supporting the new government. Brown’s address was almost entirely 
devoted to these economic and political needs.
Brown emphasized the action that was needed to resolve the 
economic problems at two different points in his address. The first 
action was the need to solve the labor problem. Here he-pointed out 
that the slaves must be freed and a new labor program adopted for the 
state. At this point in his address he offered no specific solution, 
but emphasized that this action must be taken to indicate the state was 
keeping faith with the North’s demands, as well as for reasons of 
security. The second time he mentioned the problem he hinted, 
intentionally or unintentionally, at a possible solution when he 
discussed the action he was taking after he freed his slaves: to give
his freed slaves a share of the crops or give them money for the work 
they contracted to do. The Northern Freedman's Bureau later introduced 
this plan as the means for resolving the labor plight of the South.
The major part of Brown's address was devoted to his ideas 
explaining the need for gaining local autonomy for the state. These 
ideas were expressed in a three-step argumentative pattern: First, he
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advanced the argument that the South had no choice but to meet the 
North's demands and thus regain local autonomy. Secondly, he argued 
the value the state would gain in taking the required action immediately. 
Third, he denounced the people unwilling to accept the responsibility 
demanded by their governments. Thus, Brown demonstrated the appropriate­
ness of his invention by treating the two major problems faced by the 
state.
Brown's invention was also appropriate because of its 
psychological impact. Historians explain that the people's morale was 
very low. Georgia had lost a war and the people faced the seemingly 
hopeless task of rebuilding a badly damaged economy. Brown's address 
contained ideas that served to give the people hope. He made no attempt 
to lessen the seriousness of the problem, yet inqplied that the 
problems would be solved. Since the people had- complete faith in 
Brown at this point in history, his promise that peace and prosperity 
would be restored to the nation should have given them a psychological 
lift.
Furthermore, Brown's address exemplified his ability to adapt 
the ideas to the people. Recognized earlier by writers for his ability 
to probe the people's mind and adapt to their mood. Brown's task was 
relatively siBçle in 1866, The people were united in their desire for 
peace and prosperity and for a return to the Union. Since the people 
were of one mind. Brown did not face the task of appeasing divergent 
factions. He had merely to adapt his ideas to fit the universal mood 
and obtain maximum effort from the people. Inactivity was the major 
barrier to the political reorganization and Brown's appeal must be
109
aimed at an apathy in Georgia with its origin in indifference and 
suspicion. The political indifference was due to the people's effort 
to rebuild their econony, while suspicion was the natura]. phenomenon 
always present among a defeated people.
Brown's ideas were adapted both to the indifference and the 
suspicion existing in Georgia. The appeal to indifference was excellent, 
while the appeal to suspicion was at least adequate. Little argument 
could be presented to deny that Georgia had no recourse but submit, and 
the people were willing to accept this thesis in 1866. Since the people 
felt they would be allowed to resume their place in the Union, • there 
seemed to be little reason to fear political reorganisation. Appealing 
to reason he sought to overcome indifference by arguing that the people 
could benefit economically as well as politically only if the proper 
leaders were selected. Therefore, the people must forego indifference 
by participating in the coming election to assure the selection of the 
state's most capable leaders.
Georgia's suspicion toward the North originated in hatred, 
naturally resulting from the war and sectional propaganda. Although the 
hatred was to become more intense as harsher demands were made on the 
South, a feeling of uncertainty concerning the state's future existed 
in 1866. Brown's rhetoric would perhaps have been stronger if he had 
dealt specifically with this problem, yet he adapted to the audience 
Indirectly. The first recognition was in his warning that revolutions 
introduce changes in established institutions. The second acknowledge­
ment came when he assured the state that acceptance of the changes would 
result in peace and prosperity for both sections. Thus the problem was
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brought into the open and assurance was given that the future would be 
secure.
In judging the effectiveness of Brown's rhetoric in the 
resignation address, a critic can only speculate on its effect upon the 
people. The state did fulfill Johnson's requirements for regaining 
admittance into the Union, and Thompson gives Brown credit for 
contributing to this effect.Further, records indicate that nearly 
all the people qualified to take the amnesty oath voted.^^ Brown's 
popularity is further attested to by the people's request that he accept 
the nomination of governor Yet when one recalls that most of the 
state's other political leaders shared Brown's view, the critic can 
conclude only that his address contributed in some measure to the 
final results.
Brown's "Replies to the Notes on the Situation"
Background to the "Replies." In April, 1866, President Johnson 
proclaimed that peace had been restored and the insurrection was at an 
end. The Southern insurrection was indeed over, but the battle waged 
against the South had not ended but was to be resumed on political 
grounds of malice and hate.
The federal Congress, led bjt the Radical leaders, Stevens and 
Sumner, refused to recognize the presidential proclamation and did not 
seat the newly-elected Southern congressmen. Congress then required 
the Southern states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment before they could
^^Thompson, op. cit., p. I6l.
^^Ibid., pp. 1U8-1U9.
% i d . ,  p. 153.
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gain recognition. The amendment made Negroes citizens, reduced 
representation in proportion to the number of citizens refused voting 
privileges, and disfranchised all Southern citizens who had held office 
before the war and had fought with the Confederacy. The Civil Rights 
Bill was then passed over the President's veto on April 9, 1866.
Georgia immediately rejected the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
state's Joint legislative Committee, formed to study the Northern 
proposal, made the following report:
1. If Georgia is not a state composing a part of the 
Federal Government, known as the government of the United States, 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States are not 
properly before this body.
2. If Georgia is a state, conqiosing a part of the 
Federal Government, known as the government of the United States, 
then these amendments are not proposed according to the require­
ments of the Federal Constitution, and are proposed in such a 
manner as to forbid the legislature from discussing the merits 
of the amendments without an iaqplied surrender of the rights of 
the state.
{Therefore) Resolved, that the legislature of Georgia 
declines to ratify the proposed amendment, adding^a fourteenth 
article to the Constitution of the United States.^
The Senate voted unanimously in favor of the report, and the House passed
it with only two dissenting votes. Similar action was taken throughout
the South as other Southern states likewise rejected the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Congress responded to the Southern states' rejection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment hy taking the political dispute to the people in 
the congressional elections in the fall of 1866. The voters in the
56Cited in I. W. Avery, op. cit., p. 3 9^,
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North responded by giving the Radicals an overWielr^g victory. Congress 
acted upon the mandate by passing the three acts containing the Radicals' 
program of reconstruction for the South.^7
The reaction to these new bills was extreme in Georgia. There 
was no middle-ground as the state found itself divided into two camps, 
with a small group favoring acceptance of the program and a majority 
bitterly attacking the acts.^® The leading spokesman for the minority 
viewpoint was Joe Brown while the majority spokesman was Ben Hill, and 
his objections were presented in a series of newspaper articles, 
published in the newspapers throughout the state under the title, "Notes 
on the Situation.
Hill's "Notes on the Situation." Ben Hill attempted to accom­
plish two things in his letters: to present his objections to the
Sherman Bills and to refute the argument Joe Brown advanced favoring 
acquiescence to the reconstruction program.
Ben Hill argued that the people should not support the 
Radicals' reconstruction program because he believed it violated the 
federal constitution. He argued from the premise that Georgia had 
fulfilled her obligation as a defeated power by taking that action 
the original peace treaty specified, and thus the state was legally
S7gupra., pp. 9410. The three acts passed by the Radical 
Congress are referred to as the Radicals* Reconstruction Program, Ihe 
Sherman Bills, and the Military Acts.
W. Avery, op. cit., p. 360.
^^Hill's "Notes on the Situation," consisted of twenty-two 
letters published in the Augusta Dai^ Chronicle and Sentinel between 
June 19, and August 1, 1857% These letters can also be found in 
"Brown's Scrapbooks."
60restored to the U n i o n , H e  stated in the "Notes” that "whatever 
others may do, you will support the Constitution and oppose whatever 
is contrary thereto--for mark this: Whatever else people and rulers
may do, they cannot support or preserve the government by violating 
the fundamental l a w . H e  proceeded to explain in the "Notes," as 
well as in his speeches, that Congress could take no action unless it 
was authorized by the constitution. For in America the only power 
given to the government, state and federal, was written in the 
constitution.^^ Reasoning from this position, he argued that the f&litary 
Bills and Negro suffrage were not made in accordance with the 
constitution. If the Bills were to be justified, they must be 
justified by circumstances, conditions, or authority outside of the 
constitution. He further condemned the Radicals because they had 
violated the original peace treaty between the North and South, The 
Southern states had already been restored to the Union and Congress 
acting outside the constitution disallowed the restoration act. He 
then attacked.the North's demand that the Southern states' new 
constitutions must grant suffrage to the Negroes. The first attack
^®Ben Hill admitted in his seventh letter in the "Notes" that 
there had been no formal treaty at the end of the war. That the states 
must then look to the divergent views that brought on the war. The only 
difference was that the states could not secede. Georgia, and the South 
accepted this fact when they surrendered, and with this recognition, 
were legally again in the Union governed by the constitution,
^^"Notes," op, cit.
”^Some of the speeches Ben Hill delivered advancing these ideas 
included his "Brush Arbor Speech," his "Davis Hall Speech," a speech 
delivered in Atlanta, March 10, 1868, and a speech delivered in Atlanta, 
June 18, 1867.
Hit
vas that this demand was unconstitutional since the states and not the 
Union had the authority to determine suffrage qualifications. Suffrage 
was not a right but a trust. It was society's right to determine to 
whom this trust should be given, and society's obligation to withhold 
this trust from the ignorant. The second attack was directed to the 
South's emotions. He reasoned that even if the Negroes were granted 
suffrage, this was no reason to disfranchise the whites. The Radicals' 
real motive was to add the ten Southern states to their party. Ben Hill 
reasoned that the Iftiited States Congress recognized the states as being 
legal governments when it required ratification by the states. Congress 
thus contradicted its own basic philosophy when it atten^ted to dictate 
the laws that the states must adopt. He concluded that the bills were 
unconstitutional and could never be legally established if the Southern 
states resisted them.
Ben Hill directed his rebuttal primarily to Brown's argument 
that the Southern states had been so thoroughly defeated they were 
helpless to resist the acts, and that continued refusal to accept 
Northern terms would only bring harsher acts. All of Hill's arguments 
in the "Notes” were based on the idea that the Radicals' reconstruction 
program was unconstitutional. In earlier speeches Hill had argued that 
the Supreme Court would rule the Sherman Bills unconstitutional. After 
the Court refused to act on the cases Mississippi and Georgia brought 
against the bills, he argued that this refusal simply justified the 
ultra-states'-right doctrine of South Carolina. He concluded that 
although the courts would not hear cases introduced by the states, the 
individuals would be able to take their cases before the courts. 
Therefore, he called on the people to resist the acts.
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A Summary of Brown’s Ideas. Brovn introduced the thesis that 
the Sherman Bills were a political issue and must be treated as such.
He admitted that his position supporting the states-rights theory prior 
to the war must seem inconsistent with his present plea to support the 
Union. However, the South's position as a conquered people differed 
significantly from the autonomous position it held before the war.
When the South withdrew from the Union, it had accepted the role as an 
independent nation and in the war that followed was defeated by a 
foreign power. The argument concerning the state's right to secede 
had been settled by the sword, and, consequently, the South now had no 
rights until the North admitted the defeated states back into the Union. 
The North had dictated by a two-thirds vote of Congress that it 
wanted to determine the terms under which the Southern states would 
be readmitted into the Union. The South had exhausted its means during 
the war and was left with no alternative but submission. However much 
the South deplored the acts, it had to accept the stern realities that 
the Confederacy was a defeated nation subject to the will of the 
conquerors.63
Brown then attempted to refute the arguments Ben Hill advanced 
in the "Notes." Hill had been vd-lling to adopt the 13th Amendment idiich 
forced the South to relinquish property without compensation, and was 
further willing to write a new state constitution. Hill now argued 
that the Congressional program calling for changes in the state's 
constitution, ratification of the lUth Amendment, and granting suffrage
^^Joe E. Brown, "Replies to B. H. Hill's Notes on the Situation," 
"Brown's Scrapbooks." Brown published seven letters in reply to Hill's 
"Notes." In the future this source will be referred to as "Replies."
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to the Negroes was unconstitutional. Brown claimed that the congressional 
program, supported by the people, was no more unconstitutional than 
President Johnson's program which Hill had defended. The amnesty oath 
had not restored the seceded states to the Union, nor had it given the 
people the right to resist congressional acts. Rather, the oath 
required each individual to obey congressional acts until they had been 
altered or the courts had ruled the acts unconstitutional. Since the 
courts had refused to rule the Military Bills unconstitutional, the 
citizens were bound to obey the laws.
Brown explained that the trend in all free governments was 
toward universal manhood suffrage. The question of whether universal 
manhood suffrage would work was a moot point. The real point was that 
this suffrage had been granted to the Negroes in the South, the army was 
there to enforce it, and the South had no alternative but to accept the 
act. The North now viewed the South's willingness to support the bill 
as a test of the Southerner's loyalty to the Union. Lack of cooperation 
would simply mean that new laws would be passed disfranchising a larger 
number of whites. At least nine-tenths of the whites in Georgia would 
be permitted to vote as soon as the state supported the Radicals' 
reconstruction program. Whereas if the state rejected the program, no 
more than one-tenth of the white population would be granted voting 
privileges. The leaders in Georgia opposing the Sherman Bills seemed 
to be acting under a selfish desire to protect their interests at the 
people's expense. These same leaders had been willing to support an 
earlier program that did them no harm, but now fought a similar program 
that, only temporarily, cost them the right to vote. The Sherman Bills 
as they were now worded, offered the states a better government than
• 117
were enjoyed by the states admitted to the Union during the war. The 
state of Tennessee, as one example, granted suffrage to less than one- 
seventh of the white population. The people of Georgia must be made to 
realize that Congress would not adjourn until the state was readmitted 
under some program, and the longer the state delayed, the harsher the 
terms would be. Georgia must adopt the Radicals' program for the 
people's welfare, and for the sake of the Ikiion.
Analysis of Brown's Invention. A majority of the old-line Whigs 
and white Democrats in Georgia opposed the Radicals' reconstruction 
program.^^ Their opposition was based, in the main, on their opinion 
that the program violated the constitution. Ben Hill was accepted as 
their leading spokesman and his ideas provided the arguments they relied 
upon. Hill used the South's fear of Negro rule as the motivating 
force to rally support to their side. This fear was further augmented 
with the appeal to the state's suspicion and hatred of the North.
Hill's appeal to this suspicion and hate is revealed in such statements 
as "the threat of rule by force," "the wicked rulers in the North," 
and "the North's desire to incite a racial war."^^ The same opposition 
and hate for the Radicals' reconstruction program was also directed 
toward Joe Brown and particularly his effort to get the bills accepted 
by the state.Thus, Brown faced a large citizenry opposed to him as 
well as to his stand for reorganizing the state. ,
^^Haywood J. Pearce, Jr., Benjamin H. Hill— Secession and Recon­
struction (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 19ÈÜ), p. 152.
^^Hill, "Notes," op. cit.
^^earce, op. cit., p. 1^2.
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Brown advanced his cause by contrasting a "let's be practical" 
approach to the legalistic arguments advanced by Ben Hill. The "let's 
be practical" approach advanced arguments from the premise that the new 
acts were passed with the belief the South should be punished more 
harshly and was purely a political issue. Brown attençted to realize 
his objective in a three-step analysis. First, he attempted to weaken 
Hill's persuasion by attacking the leader's reliability. Brown reviewed 
Hill's records attempting to establish that he had a past history of 
inconsistency. Further, Hill now advocated his present stand for 
personal fear that the program would deny him his political rights. 
Secondly, Brown attacked Hill's reasoning attempting to prove the 
fallacy of these arguments. Thirdly, Brown advanced arguments designed 
to establish the advantages of adopting the Radicals* plan by explaining 
the benefits the state would receive.
Brown made little effort to appeal to the people's emotions. 
Rather, his attack is an attençt to establish certain truths and then 
reason from them to an obvious conclusion. The emotional appeal is 
implicit in the idea that the state would have better government and 
the people would recover economically much more quickly if they adopt 
the Radicals' plan.
Evaluation of Brown's Invention. Brown's invention can be 
evaluated rhetorically by examining the three contentions he proposed 
in the "Replies": to destroy Hill's ethos, to refute Hill's arguments,
and to motivate the state to adopt the Military Bills.
The first letter in Brown's "Replies" effectively attacked 
Hill's record of inconsistency. No speaker can hope to achieve
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maximum effectiveness after his ethos has been weakened vdien the 
audience questions his reliability because of past inconsistencies. 
Brown's argument concerning Ben Hill's inconsistencies were a matter 
of record and known to be true by the people. Brown's reference to 
these past inconsistencies must be judged as excellent rhetoric as 
Brown attempted to weaken his opponent's reliability.^7 Brown was 
also aware that Hill had not enjoyed popular support with the Democrats 
and other Georgian citizens at the end of the War. Hill's attack upon 
the people for failing to assume their responsibilities, plus his 
attack upon the state for desiring a restored peace, had antagonized 
the people.Brown's reminder of Ben Hill's former stand must be 
accepted as an approach that could possibly weaken Hill's effectiveness.
Brown's first argument should further be judged appropriate. 
Brown's own persuasive effectiveness was weakened when he defended the 
unpopular Sherman Bills. If he could establish that Hill was 
inconsistent, thus weakening his persuasive effectiveness, then Brown's 
own position should be strengthened. VJhile attacking Ben Hill in the 
first argument. Brown wisely avoided any ideas that were critical 
of the rank and file.
The reader might justly question Brown's ethics in his attack 
against Hill. Although Brown was not guilty of misquoting Hill, he 
might be criticized for failing to present the complete picture. One 
exançle concerned Hill's inconsistency in his voting record on the
% b i d ., pp. 33-112.
^®Pearce describes Hill as being one of the most hated men in 
Georgia by the end of the war. Ibid., pp. 100 and 108.
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conscription bill passed by the Confederacy. Brown reported correctly 
that Hill opposed the bill at first, then later supported the bill 
after he and Davis became close friends. Hill admitted he opposed the 
bill at first, but only because he believed it to be too harsh.
Brown's second argument was designed to refute Hill's argument 
favoring the rejection of the Sherman Bills. Brown employed some 
excellent refutation here. He emphasized the fact that Hill reasoned 
from a legal view and attacked the arguments for their lack of 
practicability. Brown made no effort to deny that the lûlitary Acts 
were in fact unconstitutional, but argued rather than the Bills were 
no less legal than the programs Johnson offered and which Hill had 
supported. Brown then advanced the argument that the issue had ceased 
to be a legal question and at the people's demand had become political. 
Brown's refutation rested on the premise that Congress, and now the 
courts, would be the final arbiter. Hill had raised ten objections to 
the Military Bills and Pearce, one of Ben Hill's biographer's, credits 
Brown with answering all ten objections.7^
Any weakness in Brown's rhetoric would result from omission, 
rather than from some weakness in the invention he employed. Brown 
chose to take what he called a practical businessman's view of the 
status quo and not allow his emotions to destroy his objectivity. Both 
foe and friend credits him with achieving this objective in his
^^Ibid.. p. 7U.
T^hese ten que
and Sentinel, August I4., 1867. Also see Pearce, opi cit., p. 155.
stions are listed in the Augusta Daily Cteonicle
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refutation,The Daily New Era described Brown's refutation in the 
following manner: "He treats the questions with a practical common-
sense. His ideas are clear and pointed, and his logic is solid and
unanswerable72
Ben Hill claimed that Brown refused to treat the issues, choosing 
instead to write his biography.73 This claim was made also, by a 
reporter in one of the state's n e w s p a p e r s .7h This charge seems quite 
unjust since Brown does attenpt to refute the arguments Hill advanced 
in the "Notes." The argument that Brown omitted certain ideas that 
might have made his rhetoric more effective is far more justifiable.
Brown never admits, nor denies. Hill's charge that the Republicans 
supported the Military Bills merely to gain membership for its party.
Here Brown seems to have missed an opportunity to strengthen his 
persuasiveness. If Brown is as wise as accredited by his critics, 
then surely he recognized the truth in Hill's claim. Brown's stand 
could hardly be weakened, and might well have been strengthened, by 
admitting this fact. On a later occasion Brown did present information 
which seemed to prove that the Republicans could not hope to gain any
7^Samuel Bard wrote that Brown's logic was solid and unanswer­
able in the Atlanta Daily New Era, April 27, 1867. Pearce wrote 
that it was easy to recognize the practical wisdom that Brown expressed, 
Pearce op. cit., p. 152. A foe reported in the Daily Atlanta 
Intelligencer, I^ ay 7, 1869, that Brown had been wise.
7^Atlanta Daily New Era, April 2h, 1867.
7^Cited in the Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, August 1,
1867.
7^Ibid., August U, 1867.
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sizeable membership if the state would act to approve the program.75 
On the contrary, the Republicans could gain membership by 
obtaining justification for disfranchising additional whites. Brown 
argued further that the state could not hope to better itself under 
military rule since the North was determined to return Georgia to the 
Union before Congress adjourned.
Ethically, Brown had little justification for charging that 
Ben Hill opposed the act because its passage would cost him his vote. 
Although Hill did not actively plead for the presidential program of 
reconstruction, he did write President Johnson stating that he supported 
the measure. Yet under the presidential program Hill knew he would have 
no vote. Thus, Brown’s charge seems illogical.
Brown's third argument, that the state would benefit by adopting 
the Radicals' reconstruction program, seemed to be very appropriate. 
Georgia's major need in 186? was to rebuild a destroyed economy.
Owners had suffered real property loss when the slaves were freed: the
labor system had been destroyed; real estate had declined in value; and 
considerable physical property had been destroyed by war, or had 
depreciated in value for want of repair.Brown's arguments for 
adopting the Radicals' program were not oniy logical, but contained 
excellent emotional appeal by assuring the people that quick adoption
7^The Republicans believed most of their strength would come 
from the Negro voter. In a speech in 1868 Brown cites statistics that 
proves the whites have a large majority over the Negroes even after all 
whites under the Radicals' plan have been disfranchised, Atlanta Daily 
Era, January 11, 1868.
^^obert Fielder, A Sketch of the life and Times and Speeches 
of Joseph E. Brown (Springfield, Massachusetts: N.P., 1ÜÜ3), pp. Ii60-U6l.
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would bring prosperity fqr the farmers, business for the merchants, 
employment for the mechanics, bread for the poor, and à return of 
capital to develop the state.
Referring to history. Brown was able to establish a logical 
premise that past revolutions had resulted in changing institutions.
The argument that the people must act as practical businessmen and 
willingly accept changes that must be made, communicated logically an 
idea the people understood. The argument that rapid adoption of the 
Military Acts would mean firfancial security provided adequate emotional 
appeal.
Any attempt to draw the final conclusions concerning Brown's 
rhetoric in the "Replies" introduces many problems. Hill's and Brown's 
rhetoric from 1867 to I869 is difficult to compare. Although both 
speakers call for a decision of policy, their different approach to the 
problem necessitates a value judgment. Hill justly claimed that the 
Radicals' reconstruction program was unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court's decision in Texas v. White in 1871 supported Hill's p r e m i s e .77 
Further, there was little true clash in arguments since they reasoned 
from different premises. Therefore the conclusions the critic draws 
concerning the effectiveness of Brown's rhetoric must be offered with 
reservation.
The Radical program was adopted and established in 1867, but 
there is no proof that Brown's rhetoric accomplished this feat. There
77%e Supreme Court case of Texas versus White ruled the states 
were never out of the Iftiion, therefore the North had no right to force 
the amendments upon the South. This decision supported Hill's claim of 
unconstitutionality.
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were mr y Georgians supporting the Military Acts before Brown published 
his "Replies." Further, many people in Georgia opposed to the Acts 
were isfranchised, while many others eligible voters refused to cast 
a ballot. Yet Brown must have had some persuasive effect since the 
leaders favoring the Military Acts looked to him for advice. Brown 
ia also given credit for the moderate document written at the state 
constitutional convention in 1867.78 His influence is further evident 
in two additional ways: Hir first task was to persuade the people in
Cherokee County to vote for the proposed constitution. Cherokee County 
not only voted for the constitution, but twelve of the white Democratic 
counties in Northwest and Northeast Georgia supported the proposed 
constitution.79 % e  second action indicating Brown's effectiveness was 
in the number of people that followed him back into the Democratic 
Party.8^ In 1868 he had attended the Republican National Convention 
and supported Grant for the presidency. He returned to the Democratic 
Party in 1871 when he supported and voted for the Democratic nominee to 
replace Bullock as.governor of the state.
The question is often posed, idiy did Brown return to the 
Democratic Party in 1871? Was he a politician merely changing positions 
to remain on top, or was he a statesman with a belief that was eventually 
accepted by his state? He had been a leader in the secession movement
7%ill, op. cit., p. 267. Fielder stressed the fact that Brown 
was one of the few leaders in Georgia who supported the reconstruction 
program. Fielder, op. cit., pp. U36-U37.
79Thompson, op. cit., pp. 20U-205.
®°Hill, op. cit., p. 290.
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in i860, he was the leader of the group favoring Radical reconstruction 
in Georgia in 1867, and then he supported the Democratic Party when they 
won their first state election following the adoption of the Radicals' 
reconstruction program.
This question is still unsolved after almost one hundred years. 
Critics still cannot agree concerning Brown's real motives. To support 
the claim that Brown was a politician, most antagonists argue either 
that he supported the reconstruction programs to protect his life or 
that he was a shrewd politician who could always come out on top.
No one can deny that Brown probably committed treason when as 
governor, he had ordered the federal fort. Port Pulaski, seized. Nor 
did anyone know what action the North would take against the key Confed­
erate leaders, Tet there is no tangible proof that Brown was a coward. 
When Brown was insulted by Toombs, he did not hesitate to challenge his 
foe to a duel. Although friends were able to prevent the fight. Brown 
had made a will and was practicing with a gun. Further, in I868 Brown 
addressed the Republican Convention and expressed his belief that the 
South must approve the Military Acts, but he warned the Convention he 
would oppose additional steps. During the heat of the campaign over the 
Radicals' reconstruction acts. Brown received numerous threats on his life 
if he appeared to make speeches. Against the advice of his friends, the 
former governor refused to miss a speech. In light of all these facts, 
to conclude that Brown was a coward seems rather difficult.
All Georgians admit Brown was a shrewd politician. But that 
he was always a winner does not make him crooked, nor does it deny 
that he may have been a statesman. That he supported President
126
Johnson's reconstruction program, then after the Radicals' congressional 
victory in 1666, supported the Military Bills as a Republican, only to 
return to the Democratic Party In 1871, does not necessarily indicate 
inconsistency. In no speech or letter from 186$ to 18?0 did Brown 
depart from his original stand* He argued in 186$ that Georgia was 
defeated and must accept the terms of the victor. The quicker the 
state approved the North's demands, but no more, the sooner qualified 
leadership would be restored to the state and the return of state 
prosperity assured. This so-called practical approach was the basis 
of his ideas voiced in his speeches in 1866, his "Replies" in 1867, 
and his speeches for ratification in 1868. Pearce concludes that Brown 
did not change stands but that the Democratic Platform in 1872 
recommended the same ideas for their platform that Brown had defended 
in 1867.81
That the Democratic platform in 1872 was similar to the 
position Brown advocated in 1867 does not make Brown all wise, nor make 
Ben Hill all wrong. Rather, it only proves that reconstruction was a 
political issue and was resolved with ballots rather than by the courts. 
The Supreme Court's decision, written on Texas versus White in 1869, 
established that Hill was correct in his belief that the states were 
never out of the Union. Yet the troops were not withdrawn from the 
South until after I876, and the states were able to remove the Radicals 
from their governments only by ballots, and not through the courts..
81Pearce, op. cit., p. i$2*
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Conclusion
The following observation can be drawn concerning Brown's 
rhetoric between 186$ and 1872. His contention that reconstruction 
would be resolved politically and not legally proved to be correct.
His invention, except for possible omissions, was logical, adapted to 
the audience, and must be judged excellent. Louise B1 Hill offered the 
following evaluation concerning the effectiveness of his rhetoric in 
this period: Brown was responsible for the moderate constitution Georgia
adopted; and he solidified the opposition and made possible an aggressive 
Conservative Party which through its protest and pleas helped to inform 
the nation of the true state of affairs in the South, and at the polls 
in 1870 gained control of the state government.®^
®^Hill, op. cit., pp. 276 and 323.
CHAPTER V 
BROWN'S RHETORIC OF RESTORATION 
Introduction
The Democratic Party in Georgia won the election in both 
houses in 18?0, forcing the radical Republican Bullock to resign as 
governor and flee the state to avoid impeachment.^ In the special 
election held in December, 18?1, the Democratic candidate, James M. 
Smith, was elected governor.2 Georgia thus became the fourth Con­
federate state to break the Radicals' control and the first state in 
which the Democrats were able to gain a clear, permanent victory.3 
Joe E. Brown had broken with the Bullock regime sometime in 
1870. The specific date is not known, but, as graft increased within 
the state government, the split between Brown and Bullock became more 
and more apparent.^ Eventually, Brown resigned his position as Chief 
Justice of the State Supreme Court and became active in the fight
^Henry Savage, Jr., Seeds of Time (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1959), p. 177.
2e . Merton Coulter, Georgia, A Short History (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 19U7), p. 3W. In future 
reference this source will be cited as Georgia.
3e . Merton Coulter, % e  South Di^ng Reconstruction 1865-1877 
(Louisiana State University Press, 19h7), p. 350. In future reference 
this source will be cited as The South.
^Savage, op.. cit., p. I66,
128
129
against the Radicals in the state government. Brown advised his friends 
that the similarity that now existed in the platform proposed by both 
the Democrats and the more liberal Republicans warranted a fusion of 
the two parties,5 The support Brown gave Smith assured the Democratic 
candidate's victory as governor in the special election of 1871.^ The 
Democrats rewarded Brown by selecting him as one of the men to accompany 
the newly-elected governor to the rostrum for the inaugural ceremony. 7 
Brown's political return, however, did not guarantee him the acceptance 
of certain people within the state Democratic Party,
Brown did not have an active political role from 1870 to 1880, 
preferring instead to devote his energy to building a private fortune,® 
Woodward wrote that between 1870 and 1880, Brown became one of the 
leading industrialists in the state. He was president of the Western 
and Atlantic Railroads, the Southern Railway and Steamship Company, and 
the Dade Coal Company, 9 Fielder wrote that after Brown represented the 
Democratic Party in Florida during the Hayes-Tilden presidential election 
dispute, he limited his political activities to m  occasional letter in
5a letter from Brown to John I, Hall on September 13, 1872.
"Brown's Scrapbooks," Pearce explains that the Democratic Platform in 1872 
was virtually the same stand that Brown had argued in 1867, Haywood J. 
Pearce Jr., Benjamin Hill, Secession and Reconstruction (Chicago:
University of CMcago Press, 192bJ, p, Ï52,
^Louise B, Hill, Joseph E, Brown and the Confederacy (Chapel 
Hill: IMiversity of North Carolina Press, 1939), p, 305,
7lbid«, pp, 209 and 323.
®Robert Fielder, A Sketch of the Life and Times and Speeches of 
Joseph E, Brown (Springfield, MassT: N,f^ ,, l8ü3), p. 305.
9c, Vann Woodward, Orig^s of the South. 1877-1913 (Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State University ft*ess, 1951), p, 15,
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the newspapers attempting to correct the existing misconceptions 
concerning his coarse during reconstruction.^®
Senator John B. Gordon resigned from the senate in I880, just 
three weeks before the congressional session ended. Governor Colquitt 
persuaded Brown to accept the vacated post for the rest of the session. 
This appointment incited the charges of fraud, deal, and trade-out 
against Brown, Gordon, and Colquitt. Brown reacted to the charge by- 
announcing his candidacy for the vacated seat to be filled by the state 
legislature in the fall of I88O.
The major issue in the election was again the relationsl^p 
between the state and the Onion. The arguments concerned Brown ' s 
activities and the position he took during Radical reconstruction. 
Historians describe the issue as centering on the question of vdiether 
Brown had remained consistent in I88O with the ideas he expressed in 
1867, or had he been "the chameleon of Georgia politics"? The arguments 
were the same as those introduced by Ben Hill during the late i860’s. • 
The questions asked then, and now, by historians, include, "Wl^ did 
Brown espouse the cause of the Radicals? What influence did he exert? 
Why did he return to the Democratic P a r t y ? T h e s e  questions can 
perhaps be answered in part by studying Brown’s rhetoric in his two 
most famous speeches delivered in this period. These were the speeches 
delivered in the %ited States Senate on the bill to pension soldiers 
of the Mexican and Indian Wars, and his election-eve speech delivered
iPPielder, op. cit., p. $20.
^Hill, op. cit., p. 321.
-.Oin the De Gives Opera H o u s e ,
The Political Context, 1872-1880 
In 1872 an element in the Democratic Party, generally referred 
to as the Bourbons, controlled Georgia's political affairs. The name 
Bourbons refers to the French nobility and carries the implication of 
obstinate adherence to the old loyalties and abhorrence for the new. 
Woodward wrote that this name placed upon the Georgian rulers was 
indeed unfortunate since no state deserved the epithet l e s s .^3 Coulter 
described the rulers' program as embracing a philosophy that the South 
should build towns, develop mines, and construct factories and that the 
state should industrialize and do all those things that made the North 
rich and powerful.^ Woodward referred to the new rulers in Georgia 
as the Redeemers rather than the Bourbons.Redemption, he argued, 
was neither a return to an old system nor the restoration of an old 
ruling class. It was, rather, a new phase of a revolutionary process 
whereby leadership had been taken away from the planters and had been 
given to a group holding an industrial, capitalistic outlook. A mark 
of the redemption government were the achievements in retrenching 
officials' salaries and lowering taxes.
^^The speech delivered in the senate was his first speech before 
that body, presented June 12, I88O. This speech and the election-eve 
speech are both found in "Brown's Scrapbooks."
^^oodward, op. cit., p. lU. 
^Coulter, Georgia, p. 383. 
^^foodward, op. cit., p. lU.
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Redemption governments often describe themselves as the 
"rule of the taxpayer," frankly constituting themselves as 
champions of the property owners against propertyless and alleged 
untaxed. . • masses. . . .  Cheapness. . . ., even niggardliness, 
under this tutelage became widely accepted as the criterion of 
good government.
Salaries of state officials were slashed drastically, 
sometimes to absturdly low amounts.
Achievements in retrenchment and low taxes later 
constituted a mainstay in the defense of the redenrotion 
government's record.^"
The change in political leadership and philosophy in Georgia had 
been bom out of evolution and necessity. The trend in shifting political 
control dated back to 1857 when Brown, representing the common man, 
became the first non-aristocratic governor of the state. Thompson wrote 
that the initial shift was implicit in the deep-lying social changes at 
work. With the shifting influence of social change came also the 
shifting of sectional lines of leadership.Thus, the shift in 
political leadership and philosophy was bom in part out of social 
evolution.
The changes in political leadership and philosophy were also 
motivated by necessity. The reconstruction acts disqualified leaders 
in the Democratic Party and forced leadership upon men who had not 
actively participated in secession and the Confederacy. These new 
leaders came from the growing ranks of business and professional men.^®
The economic needs and background of these men forced into political
^^ i d .
^^Mildred G. Thompson, "Reconstruction in Georgia," Studies in 
History, Economics and Public Law (New York: Columbia IMiversity Press,
1915j, IXIV, 119.
^^ Ibid., p. 118.
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leadership nedessitated the change in political philosophy,1“
Chapter Four described how Joe Brown had lent his support to 
the change in political leadership and philosophy. He had supported 
the Republican reconstruction acts as the most expedient means for 
returning state leadership to the most capable men. However, he 
supported the new political and economic philosophy out of a growing 
belief that the South must industrialize to increase her economic 
strength to match the North,^®
From 1865 to 1872, the state Democratic Party had undergone a 
shift in political and economic philosophy. Pearce wrote that by 
1872, the Democrats in Georgia had adopted an attitude toward the 
North and restoration that was very similar to the attitude held by 
the Republicans and.liberal Democrats in 1867.^1 As the change in the 
Democratic Party became apparent. Brown wrote a letter to his followers 
advising them to support the Democratic candidates in the state election 
of 1871, The letter was dated September 13, 1871, and, in part, his 
reasoning was as follows:
The Democratic Party of the Uhion after five years of 
unprofitable, and to the people of the South, costly opposition, 
now accepts the 13th, Hith, and 15th amendments. In a word, 
they have assembled in solemn conviction, and have, as the phrase 
usually goes, "accepted the situation, without reservation or 
qualification."
l^ Ibid.
^®Brown advocated the economic changes supported by Southern 
industrialists in his speeches from 1865 on.
^%aywood J. Pearce, op, cit., p. l52.
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Since the action has been taken by the Democratic Party 
the only difference which exists between them and the liberal 
Republicans is a difference of names.
The numerous letters published by conservative Democrats in 
state newspapers during the early 1870's illustrate their acceptance 
of the radical reconstruction program. , In one Such letter the writer 
stated that while he did not support Brown, if the new political 
philosophy was right, then Brown had been right all along. Another 
citizen wrote that if the Democratic Party rejected Brown’s views, 
the party was fast becoming a minority group.23 The Democrats not 
only accepted this new view, but an active cançaign was conducted to 
sell Brown and his earlier activities to the people. In l87b a novel»
Ca Ira, was written by William D. Trammell. In the novel the ex-governor 
was portrayed by one of the characters. Louise B. Hill wrote that the 
novel was written to encourage sympathy for the former g o vernor..
Brown was further championed by the Atlanta Constitution, especially 
after Henry W. Grady became the editor. Hill does not believe the cam­
paign was too successful, and thus the stigma Brown carried for his 
activity during reconstruction was not removed until the election of 1880,25 
Politically and socially, Georgia suffered far less than did 
iHMiy other states during reconstruction, Thompson wrote that Georgia 
had recovered very easily from the financial abuse and mis-management
22i, w. Avery, The History of the State of Georgia (New York: 
Brown and Derby, 1881), p, 6Ô1,
^^AU the letters can be found in "Brown’s Scrapbooks,"
2^Hill, op, cit,, p, 303.
25lbid., p. 291.
135
that existed during the two years the Radical government was in control. 
Georgia was therefore less hard-pressed financially following 
reconstruction•
Following the fusion of the Democrats and liberal Republicans 
in Georgia, most of the political power fell into the hands of three 
men known as the "Bourbon Triumvirate." These three men who began to 
dictate political affairs in the state after 1872 were John B. Gordon, 
Alfred H. Colquitt, and Joe E. Brown. Each man brought a strong 
following into the new coalition with Gordon representing the Confederate 
veterans; Colquitt representing the Cotton Belt; and Brown representing 
the yeoman farmers, the industrialists, and professional p e o p l e .27
Agrarian radicalism began sweeping the Midwest during tiie 1870's 
taking form in the Granger and (hreenback movements. These movements 
protested the Radical Republicans* program of protective tariffs, 
railroad subsidies, banking privileges, and monetary arrangements. As 
each Southern state regained its freedom, effort was made to introduce 
the agrarian movement into that area.
Throughout the South, numerous people bolted the Redeemers *
Party and gave their loyalties to the agrarian m o v e m e n t .  28 % e  
agrarian movement made gains in only a few Southern states prior to 
l880. The major gains were made in Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas. The first revolt against the
^^Mildred C. Thompson, op. cit., p. 339,
^^Woodward, op. cit., pp. lli-17.
^^Ibid., p. 85.
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Redeemers in Georgia was made in 1 8 7 U  and then again in 1 8 7 8 .  A 
strong Redeemer congressional district in North Georgia was won by a 
rebellious candidate, William Felton^ in 1 8 7 U ,  and a second district 
was won by Emory L. Speer in 1 8 7 8 .  The victory in these districts was 
not so much a gain for the agrarian reformers as it was a protest 
against the Redeemers' dictatorial policies.A series of investi­
gations in 1878 into Governor Colquitt's administration forced the 
resignation of the state treasurer, the comptroller general, and the 
commissioner of agriculture. The investigation revealed scandals in 
the convict lease system involving highly-placed Redeemer officials.^® 
The first real chance for the state to lodge protest votes against the 
Redeemers came in the form of the election of I88O.
Three weeks before the Ihiited States congressional session 
ended in I88O, Senator John B. Gordon resigned his position. He 
explained that a job he had accepted forced his resignation in order 
immediately to assume his new duties. Governor Colquitt persuaded 
Joe Brown to accept the interim appointment.31 Brown's appointment 
was immediately followed by the opposition.'@ charge of c o l l u s i o n .32 
The charge affirmed that Senator Gordon would be appointed president 
of the state road as his reward for resigning, and that Brown would 
gain his desired post in the Senate. The purpose behind these moves.
2 9 i b i d . ,  p .  79.
3®Coulter, Georgia, p. 38U .
33-Ibid.
32pielder, op. cit., p. 523<
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the opposition charged, was to assure Brown's powerful support in 
Colquitt's struggle to regain the governor's chair in i860.
No proof was ever offered to establish a factual basis for the 
claimed collusion. While one cannot conclusively prove the charges 
false, strong evidence indicates that no deal was ever made. First,
Gordon did not become president of the state road. Secondly, Brown 
was already known as a strong Colquitt supporter, and Colquitt had 
written letters attempting to persuade Gordon not to resign. Thirdly, 
that Gordon had several immediate expenses and certainly needed more 
money than he could make as Senator was generally known. The published 
letters from Colonel T. E. Hogg and H. Victor Newcomb urging Gordon to 
make a quick decision concerning the job they offered him gave credence 
to the argument that no collusion existed. Finally, a newspaper unfriendly 
to Colquitt claimed to have the proof that the charge was false,
Senator Brown was sworn into his new office on May 26, 1880,
While Congress remained in session only three additional weeks. Brown 
was able to gain the Senate's respect. During these three weeks he 
made many speeches, establishing a reputation as an excellent debater, 
and aided Georgia's interest in three important bills.
Brown returned home at the close of the congressional session 
and announced his candidacy for re-election. General Alexander R.
Lawton was nominated to oppose Brown in the campaign. The major issue
these facts are stated in various sources presented in 
“Brown's Scrapbooks.”
^^Fielder, op. cit., p. 526.
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centered around Brown's appointment and re-election to the Senate.
Many congressional candidates ran their canqaaigns on a platform 
favoring or opposing Brown for the Senate.The election was an 
overwhelming victory for Colquitt and Brown. Colquitt won his race 
for governor with a two-thirds majority while Brown enjoyed an even 
larger victory.^^ After the election, the Inquirer Sun, a bitter 
Joe Brown foe, reported that Brown was then the most powerful 
political figure in the state.
An Analysis of Brown's Rhetoric, 1872-1080 
Brown's Address on the Pension Bill 
Background of the Speech. The charge of collusion was never 
established. One writer suggested that Gordon had resigned early to 
give his replacement an opportunity to become familiar with the 
procedure in the Senate.^® If this theory were true. Brown took full 
advantage of the opportunity to study the Senate and participate in its 
work during the three remaining weeks that Congress was in session. 
Brown made three major addresses during the same number of weeks and 
won for himself the recognized position as a leading debater in that 
assembly.^^
^^Inquirer Sun (Columbus, Georgia), November 17, i860.
^^Ayery, op. cit., p. 601.
^^Inquirer Sun, November 17, 1880.
^^letters to the editor in "Brown's Scrapbooks."
^^Fielder, op. cit., p. 52U. See also Avery, op. cit., p. 56$.
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Woodward wrote that Hayes had persuaded the Republican Party 
to drop the "bloody shirt" argument from the platform in 1876.^®
Wendell Phillips and William L. Garrison theorized that the poor 
showing made by the party in that election could be contributed in 
the main to the loss of emotional appeal. The party apparently 
listened with favor to their theory and re-introduced the argument 
in 1878.^1
Legislation was introduced in l880 to pension the Mexican and 
Indian Wars' veterans. Senator Ingalls, from Kansas, introduced an 
amendment excluding from the bill any veteran who fought with the Con­
federacy. Senator James G. Blaine introduced an additional amendment 
awarding the pension only to those veterans who were poverty-stricken.^^ 
In the ensuing debates Senator Richard Coke from Texas charged that 
the amendments were unjust. Senator Roscoe Conklin then chided the 
Southern Senators, reminding them that they were seated under peculiar 
circumstances and their title to seats in the Senate might be questioned. 
Following Senator Conklin's speech. Brown made his "Pension Bill" speech 
opposing the two amendments offered for the bill. The galleries were 
crowded with visitors who came to hear the man who had been willing to 
fight his former friends to establish reconstruction in Georgia, a man 
who was now willing to face the best debaters the Republicans could offer
^^Woodward, op. cit., p. 1*9.
^^ Ibid.
1*2Avery, op. cit., p. 365.
^3Joe E. Brown, "Speech on the Mexican War Pension Bill," 
"Brown's Scrapbooks."
as he presented his maiden speech.**^  This was the audience that Brown 
had to face as he began his speech.
A Summary of Brown's Ideas. Brown opened his address by- 
reviewing the only two pension bills Congress had ever passed. These 
two laws had granted pensions to the veterans of the Revolutionary War 
and the War of 1812. The veterans* financial condition had not been an 
issue in either of the earlier laws. Rather, the pensions had been 
granted equally to all soldiers regardless of wealth. The present 
legislation also proposed to grant pensions to Mexican War and 
Indian V7ar veterans with no specification concerning the veterans* 
financial status. However, two amendments had now been offered to 
the bill, proposing that only the poor would receive pensions and that 
soldiers who had served in the Confederacy would be excluded.
Brown argued that the proposed amendments would only serve to 
defeat the bill. He therefore called for the defeat of the amendments 
for two reasons: First, the amendment proposing pensions only to the
poor veterans was inconsistent with past legislation. This amendment 
made lack of wealth the major reason for reward, rather than honoring 
the services the soldiers had performed for their flag. Brown reasoned 
that the pensions should reward service, not the inability to make a 
living. Secondly, the other amendment was unjust because it punished 
soldiers for defending their beliefs. The South had supported legis­
lation pensioning Union soldiers crippled in the Civil War. The South
^Avery, op. cit., pp. ^65-566. Avery wrote that the ablest 
Republicans Senators were in their seats for Brown*s speech and were 
constantly in-berrupting to ask questions, attempting to trip up the 
new senator.
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could further understand the North’s reluctance ever to grant pensions 
to Confederate soldiers for their service in the Civil War. He could 
not, however, accept the logic which refused pensions to the MexLoan 
and Indian War veterans simply because they fought in another war.
Brown contended the Civil War had been fought over the sectional 
differences: the legal and moral right of slavery and the state’s
right to withdraw from the Itaion. The North had originally introduced 
slavery into the United States, but the slaveholders had sold their 
property to the South when they discovered the labor was not profitable 
in their section. The Northern slaveholders used the money they had 
gained from the sale of their slaves to build many of their large 
industrial plants. Once slavery had proved profitable in the South, 
the North decided that slavery was bad and should be made illegal.
This action would force Southern slaveholders to free their slaves with 
no remuneration for their losses. Southerners believed they had the 
right to maintain slavery and the right to withdraw from the Ifaion to 
protect their property if this action became necessary. The Confederate 
soldiers had fought to defend their beliefs in the Civil War, just as 
they had fought for their beliefs in the Mexican and Indian Wars. It 
was unjust to punish these veterans now for simply defending their 
beliefs.
Brown then directed his attention to the problems existing 
between the North and South in 1880. He admitted that he had been one 
of the people who believed the states had the right to secede from the 
Union in i860. The sections had taken their differences before the 
highest tribunal, war, and the North had won its case. The war had
11x2
once and forever ruled that slavery was illegal and that the states 
could not secede from the IMion. The South had lost its case and now 
accepted the decision and would never again dispute the fact.
Brown argued that the North had mistreated the South. The 
North had fought a war attempting to establish the fact that the South 
was still in the Union. Following the war the North no longer 
recognized this goal, then arguing that the Southern states had no 
legal rights. The South had accepted the North’s new decision and 
submitted to the new conditions required for peace. When Congress 
rejected Johnson’s program and introduced still different terms for 
peace, many Southerners argued that the new action was illegal and 
unjust. Brown admitted that he had believed that the congressional 
program was unjust, but realized that the North’s new requirements 
would stand and therefore he had defended the new bills. He believed 
that the Southern states would benefit more by accepting the new acts 
and reconstructing their governments and economies than waiting for 
harsher terms to be introduced. The South had met the new demands 
and now their place in the Union was a matter of right and not of grace.
The air in the Senate Chamber still rang with the Northern 
insinuations that the Negro was mistreated in an attempt to prove the 
South was not acting in good faith with the social dictates of the 
war. Many uninformed citizens reported intense racial unrest in the 
South, Brown took Georgia as an exançîle of where the two races were 
working side-by-side in harmony. He felt compelled to reveal that the 
Northern idea of the race situation was inaccurate. He endeavored, 
through great detail, to show where the needs of the Negro, especially
1U3
in education, had been met equitably. He outlined the educational plans 
for the Negro, plans that had been mutually agreed upon.
Brown refuted the Northern argument that the slaves would revolt 
and make the war one of short duration. He argued that while the slaves 
could have acted as a fifth column to defeat even Lee, they did not and 
thus the Northern beliefs that slavery was all that held the Negro to 
the South was incorrect. Brown stated that while the Southern soldier 
was on the field of battle, the South depended on the Negro to provide 
needed agricultural produce. He explained that the Negroes did not 
fail their masters and that the Northerners who believed the Negroes 
were mistreated were wrong. Only the malign interests of the carpet- 
batters had changed this feeling of good-will and then only tenporarily.
The South had returned to the Ifeion in good faith and would so 
act. The question concerning the right to secede was forever settled. 
Brown assured the people that the North would never have reason to 
question the earnestness and loyalty the South would show in defending 
the Ifeiion. But the loyalty that must be demonstrated to the Iftiion by 
both sides necessitated the burial of the "bloody shirt” argument 
forever. The two sections had to unite for prosperity, peace, 
happiness, and fraternal relations: "This seems to me to be a
consummation devoutly to be wished by the patriotic people of all 
parts of the U n i o n .
Analysis of Brown's Invention. Brown attempted to accomplish 
two objectives in the Mexican War Pension Bill Speech: First, he
Brown, "Speech on the l&xican War Pension Bill," loc. cit.
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desired to defeat the proposed amendments and gain passage for the 
bill. Secondly, he desired to describe the Southerners' attitude 
toward the Union and thus to destroy any further effective use of the 
"bloody shirt" argument.
Brown attempted to defeat the proposed amendments through two 
arguments: The first argument advanced the thesis that pensions
should reward service rendered and not financial need. He referred 
to history to establish this thesis, recalling former pension bills 
passed by Congress.^^ The only two bills that Ctongress had passed had 
awarded veterans' pensions without regard to wealth or rank. The 
second argument sought to establish that the North would be unfair 
if it denied the Southern Mexican and Indian War veterans a pension 
simply because they had defended the South. Brown admitted that the 
North should not reward Southern soldiers for service rendered the 
South during the Civil War, but he emphasized that past service should 
not be ignored because of recent action.
Brown's second objective was to persuade the North that the 
South had completed reconstruction and was now loyal to the tftiion. 
Sectionalism must be destroyed and a feeling of union must exist for 
national prosperity to be fully realized. He attempted to gain this 
objective by admitting the South was guilty in taking actions that 
brought on the Civil War. After admitting this guilt, he then chided 
the North to accept its own guilt. He argued that while the North was 
not as responsible as the South for the war, she must accept guilt for
^^Only two pension bills had been passed prior to this times a 
bill for the Revolutionary War veteran and a pension for the veterans 
who participated in the War of 1812.
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the injustices she had perpetrated upon the South during reconstruction. 
He then argued that the South had exhibited a desire to return to the 
Union when it met all the demands made by the North. Having met these 
demands, the South was re-admitted to the Union by right and not by 
grace. Now both sides must discontinue thinking in terms of 
sectionalism, and work together for a stronger Union.
The objectives Brov.m desired to realize in this speech, as 
interpreted above, may be disputed. Historians may argue that Brown's 
objectives were for personal gain and for eventual vindication for his 
action during reconstruction. No evidence is available to deny or 
establish these claims. The three speeches Brown gave in the interim 
term indicate that his purpose was certainly not con^letely selfish.
His effort to obtain the pension for qualified Confederate soldiers 
could possibly aid his political cause. Subsequent speeches to gain 
money for rivers and harbors could hardly weaken him in the state.
Yet, he devoted much more time in his speeches establishing the loyalty 
of the South, an effort not designed to gain him votes in Georgia, 
than obtaining these personal gains. Certainly, Georgians would not 
likely smile while he admitted the South was guilty for starting the 
war. Furthermore, probably few new Southern friends could be won by 
reviewing the course he had followed during reconstruction that had 
invited their passions during those years. He was probably more 
interested in aiding the South than in furthering Joe Brown's cause.
Even the benefits he gained in the Senate would prove as valuable to
1 nthe state as to him.^' The River and Harbor Bill benefited Southern 
rather than Northern Georgia, and the third speech aided the entire 
state as it prevented loss of congressional representation for Georgia.
An Evaluation of Brown's Invention. Avery wrote that Brown’s 
speech on the Mexican War Pension Bill stamped him "as a master of 
debate, an original thinker, and a positive actor in the National 
Council."^® Fielder wrote that the Pension Bill Speech "placed Brown 
among the recognized leaders of debate.These two views describe 
Brown's inventive strength as being his ability to perceive the key 
issue and then to win the point with clear, strong, and logical 
reasoning.
A speaker needed little talent to perceive that the conflict 
over the amendments to the Mexican War Pension Bill rested in the 
North's desire to keep the sectional conflict alive. This desire was 
rather evident when anyone recalled that no former pension bill had 
rewarded veterans on any grounds but for service rendered. Now two 
amendments were proposed with the e^ rpress purpose of denying the bonus 
to any soldier who had aided the Confederacy. Senator Blaine left little 
to the imagination when he reminded the Senator from Texas that the 
South held their present seats only by grace from the North. The
After Brown finished his speech on the River and Harbor Bill 
Senator Blaine commented that Brown had presented a strong case for 
passage of the bill. Ifaoxville Tribune, June l8, I88O. Senators 
Thurman and Davis praised him for a great speech, Avery, op. cit., p. 565«
^®Avery, op. cit., p. 565.
^^Fielder, op. cit., p. 52U.
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Republican's return to the "bloody shirt" argument in l8?8 made 
sectional conflict evident.
The North's attempt to maintain sectional conflict was prompted 
by her desire to retain the support of the West. Many Republicans 
believed that the South and the West were natural allies and that the 
East could retain support from the West only through the cement of 
emotional moral issues.^0 The Republicans' return to the "bloody 
shirt" argument in 18?8 and the Senate's failure to give a logical 
reason for excluding the Confederate soldier from the Mexican War 
Pension Bill would seem to indicate that this was the North's desire.
Perhaps little praise can be awarded Brown for his ability to 
perceive the issues in this debate, but he may well be praised for the 
use he made of this perception in making his address rhetorically 
strong and logically clear.
The rhetorical strength of Brown's address rests in his ethos 
and his adaptation to the audience. Brown was well known throughout 
the North as the former governor of Georgia \Aio had braved the wrath 
of his party to support reconstruction. The Boston Post reported that 
the most rabid Southern "haters in the North could find little fault 
with Joe Brown."5^  The Enquirer reported that the people in the North 
looked upon Brown as the one Southern governor who always took counsel 
of his own judgment and was strong enough to sustain himself in his
^^Toodward, op. cit., p. U9.
^^Boston Post, June 21, 1880.
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position.52 Additional compliments had been given to Browi by the
Providence Journal, The Kansas City Times, and the Knoxville Tribune.
Thus, Brown had a sympathetic audience that would listen to his ideas
with more objectivity than was afforded to most Southern congressmen.
Brown did not rely upon the friendly attitude of the North to 
gain him rapport, but attempted to utilize his invention in such a 
manner as to gain the greatest effectiveness from his arguments. No 
Northerner could reject Brown’s fairness when he admitted the South 
must accept its guilt for the responsibility of starting the Civil War.
Brown could expect an audience more willing to listen to the 
charge that the North must also accept guilt after he had first charged 
the South. Once the point had been established that both sections were 
responsible for present sectional differences, he was in a position to 
argue that both areas must work together to obtain the unity needed for 
real Union. The strength of Brown’s invention in this address was 
attested to by a Boston Post reporter who wrote that the North could 
take little issue with Brown’s arguments.
Brown employed a clear reasoning pattern in his address before 
the Senate. V/hen Brown takes past history to establish that Congress 
has never considered anything but the veteran’s service in all past 
pension bills, the rationale for the sudden change in the basis for 
rewarding the veteran becomes difficult to explain. His reference to 
the North’s return to the "bloody shirt" argument and Blaine’s charge
Cincinnati Enquirer, June 21, i860.
^^Boston Post, June 21, i860.
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that the South owed Its seats to Northern grace offers two excellent
t
exanq}les of the soundness of his logic# The strength of Brown's logic 
can be seen in still another way. During the course of his address he 
was repeatedly interrupted by a few Northern senators. Senator I. Q. C. 
Lamar made the following observation concerning Brown's debate:
In his speech on Mexican pensions, he was assaulted at 
once by Blaine, Conklin, and Ingalls — three ugly customers, I 
can tell you, for an old senator to meet, much less a new one.
But Mr. Brown never lost his balance. He met them square, 
calmly, and with such force and frankness that Conklin, as he 
sat down said: "I am convinced the senator is discussing this
question with fairness and candor.
Thus, Brown's logic was strong enough to withstand the strong attack of
Republican antagonists.
Brown's address cannot be credited with defeating the proposed 
amendment; this causal relationship cannot be proved. The effectiveness 
of the address, however, does allow certain conclusions to be made.
After the speech, Avery's claim that Brown was a master of debate was 
admitted by friend and foe.55 Although doubtless Brovm did not 
forever remove sectional distrust. Fielder does point out that the 
Republicans never again employed the "bloo^. shirt" argument after this 
address.56 Ben Hill, Brown's old foe, offered one of the most glowing 
compliments when he wrote that "Senator Brown's speech in the Senate 
On the pension question should be made a campaign document for the
^^Atlanta Constitution, June 30, 1880.
^^laine praised the speech as an excellent address; see Avery, 
op. cit., p. 56$. The Daily Times (Columbus, Georgia), June 27, 1880, 
a paper that for years opposed Brown, described the speech as the best 
it had ever read on the subject.
^^ielder, op. cit., p. $2$.
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Democratic Party all over the Union. It will dispell delusions, refute 
slanders, establish converts, and make voters everywhere.
Brown’s Pre-Election Address
Background of the Address. Brown’s appointment for the interim 
term as Senator from Georgia was the major issue in the state election 
in 1880, Avery wrote that Brown had established his ability to serve 
as senator, but the advisability of his appointment had to be resolved 
in the state election.Brown accepted the challenge on this issue 
and returned to Georgia to conduct his campaign.
Thomas A. Norwood was nominated to oppose Colquitt for governor 
and General Lawton was selected to oppose Brown for the senate seat.
The Albany News reported that the most active political contest in the 
history of Georgia would be waged over the members to be selected for 
the state legislature; "The division of sentiment concerning Senator 
Brown waxes warm, and the Brown and anti-Brown forces will decide his 
strength at the polls. The question each legislative candidate must 
answer is, ’will you vote for Joe Brown as Senator?
Brown's platform in the election was a defense of the "new 
South." This platform was described as including final acceptance of 
the constitutional amendments, reconstruction, internal improvements 
administered by the federal government, encouraging and protecting home 
manufacturing, free public education for all races, the right of the
Cited in the Atlanta Constitution, June 30, I88O.
^®Avery, op. cit., p. 601.
^^Albany News (Albany, Georgia), July 10, I88O,
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members of the colored race to hold office, and to allow social 
questions the time to resolve themselves.^^ Brown's Fourth of July 
speech re-emphasized that these ideas constituted his position. In 
that address Brown stressed that the South had to forget its bitterness 
and clasp hands with the North "across the chasm of the ’bloody shirt 
He argued that the South must forget the old ways and support internal 
improvements to be acconplished with federal funds. The South should 
copy the free public educational program of the Northeast and guarantee 
it to all races.
Robert Toombs voiced the anti-Brown philosophy, insisting that 
the reconstruction program had been null and void. Toombs argued that 
Brown’s position did not represent the people’s sentiment, that the 
state did not want federal appropriations. Toomb’s speech expressed 
the sentiment General Lawton voiced throughout the campaign.
Colquitt was elected governor over Norwood by a 5U,3U5 majority 
vote. Two days before the legislature assembled to select a senator, 
Lawton made a speech attacking Brown and calling for his own election 
to the Senate. The following evening Brown appeared in De Gives Opera 
House to plead his case. John Temple, a newspaper correspondent, 
sketched the following setting for Brown’s election-eve speech;
I sat in the Opera House the other night and watched a 
scene of unusual interest. A crowded house —  the beauty and 
the chivalry of Georgia’s capitol fairly glittering in the blaze 
of gas light; an eager, brilliant throng, throbbing in sympathy
^^Cincinnati Gazette, November 25, I88O. 
^^Atlanta Constitution, July 7, I88O. 
-^Ibid., November 13, I88O.
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with the occasion, or thrilling with the pain of an unavailing 
regret. The stirring strains of music from a band of Iftiion 
soldiers, a brief demonstration as the prominent figures in the 
General Assembly filed in and took seats upon the stage, and then 
a pause, a hush, and a burst of passionate applause as a grey- 
bearded and attenuated man walked awkwardly in.°3
A Summary of Brown's Ideas. Brown introduced his address by 
explaining the necessity for giving this speech. Lawton had made a 
speech the day before in which he bitterly attacked Brown's record and 
Brown believed the people felt he should answer that attack. Lawton's 
attack covered Brown's political stand in 1868, his disloyalty in 
supporting the Radicals' reconstruction plan, his alleged thwarting of 
the Confederate cause during the war, and the charge that he no longer 
represented the will of the people.
Brown denied that he had deserted the Democratic Party when he 
voted for Grant in 1868. On the contrary, the Democratic platform in 
1863 no longer supported the Jeffersonian stand. History, he argued, 
would show that Grant was closer to the original Democratic philosophy 
than was the new platform the Democrats had introduced. Further, the 
people should be reminded that prior to 1868 Grant had alwayy supported 
the Democratic ticket. The people should further remember that Grant 
had reported to Johnson that the South had accepted defeat and was 
again loyal to the Union. Yet, in 1868 General Frank P. Blair had 
written a letter which won him the nomination of vice president on the 
Democratic ticket, a letter containing advice, if followed, could only 
lead to additional bloodshed within the IMion.
63Cited in Avery, op. cit., p. 602.
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Brown argued that the position he advised during reconstruction 
was wise and just. He re-emphasized his old argument that the South 
was forced to accept the Radicals' program or be prepared for harsher 
terms. Ready acceptance of reconstruction by the states brought more 
favorable terms and control of state government by loyal Southerners.
He then read a letter written by General lee advising the state to 
follow this course.
Brown denied committing any act that thwarted the success of 
the Confederate government. In fact, Georgia, under his rule, had 
furnished more money, soldiers, and supplies than had any state in the 
South. True, he had opposed President Davis in certain programs, but 
only in those programs that endangered the state's rights. Further, the 
people should remember that Lawton's strong supporters, Alexander H. 
Stephens and Robert Toombs, had supported him in each of his disputes 
with President Jefferson Davis.
Brown then denied the charge he no longer represented the will 
of the people. He reminded the people that the major issue in the 
campaign had been his appointment to the Senate. In the first place 
Governor Colquitt's victory indicated the people in the state favored 
Brown and his policies. Secondly, in the counties where legislative 
candidates had run on a pro or anti-Brown campaign. Brown's supporters 
had won by a larger vote than had Colquitt. These two points proved 
that the people no longer leaned toward the old, but looked to the future.
Brown believed there were many reasons why he should be elected 
to the Senate. He advanced what he termed a forward-looking program 
designed to aid agriculture, to develop the mineral wealth in the state.
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to bring in more industries, to make harbors and rivers navigable, and 
to provide free education for both races. The people must remember 
that the North had won the war because it had enjoyed superior wealth 
and resources. The South must no longer depend on an inferior 
agricultural program, but rather must educate, industrialize, and 
develop a "new South."
Brown argued that when he was governor he had not represented 
a section, but the entire state. He assured the people that he would 
continue to provide this type of representation if he were elected to 
the Senate. Brown turned to his record during the three weeks he 
served in the Senate to prove he had represented the people. During 
those three weeks he had proposed legislative acts that were of more 
benefit to Southern Georgia than to his native northern section.
Brown concluded the address by reading a telegram he had just 
received from one of the most respected men in the state, Henry R. 
Jackson. Jackson wrote that he had warned Brown that supporting the 
Radicals* reconstruction program would be coi iiitting political suicide. 
Brown, he reported, had replied that the security of the people and 
the state meant more to him than a political future. Brown then had 
taken what he knew to be an unpopular stand in his attençt to make
the future of his state more secure.
An Analysis of Brown's Invention. The election issues in the 
political campaign in Georgia in i860 centered around Colquitt's 
appointment of Brown to replace Gordon in the interim term as senator. 
The voters were not only to select the man to be governor for another
two years, but to elect a legislature that would name the man to be
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senator from Georgia. Brown’s election-eve speech in the De Gives 
Opera House climaxed his attempt to regain the favor in which 
Georgians had once held him. Brown hoped to achieve three goals in 
the election-eve speech: answer the attack Lawton made the evening
before, defend the stand he had taken during reconstruction, and 
present the platform he would support if he were elected to the Senate.
Louise B. Hill wrote that voters were equally divided in the 
election of l880.&b Certainly Brown could not be assured that the 
victory was his until the final votes had been cast by the state 
legislature.
Brown, therefore, faced the task of establishing ethos with 
his audience to assure himself a fair hearing. He strived to accomplish 
this feat by explaining the need for this findl address. He took the 
position that Lawton had forced him to speak by attacking Brown's 
record the evening before. Brown also attempted to strengthen his 
position by pointing out that Lawton had attacked his character and 
record during the years of reconstruction, thus opening old wounds 
the people preferred to forget. The final effort to establish ethos 
rested in his attempt to weaken Lawton's position by reminding the 
people that the opponents' campaign had been conducted on the reasons 
why Brown should not be elected, rather than describing a constructive 
program the state could expect if Lawton were elected.
The major part of Brown's election-eve speech was devoted to 
attempting to realize the three objectives he desired to acconç)lish in
^^Hill, op. cit., p. 318. .
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the speech, Brown's organization was very similar to a long second 
affirmative rebuttal, Lawton's attack upon Brown's character and 
action during reconstruction offered Brown a chance to devote most of 
his attention to refuting the charges made against him. The final 
phase of the speech was devoted to advancing the constructive 
arguments that had received little mention by his opponents, the 
program Brown proposed to support if he were elected to the Senate,
An Evaluation of Brown's Rhetoric, The Chronicle, a newspaper 
that for years had opposed Brown, described the election-eve speech as 
a clear, entertaining, convincing talk, perhaps the best speech Brown 
had ever made,^^ A Pike County reporter wrote that it was the greatest 
speech ever delivered in Georgia,The accuracy of the reporters in 
these compliments can be tested by evaluating the rhetorical excellence, 
the social utility, and the effectiveness of the speech.
The rhetorical excellence in Brown's invention is very evident 
in his election-eve address, Louise B, Hill concedes that this address 
revealed Brown's uncanny understanding of the peoples' attitudes and his 
ability to reach his listeners without resorting to demagoguery which 
would have alienated m a n y , ^7 Brown realized that many in the audience 
were probably antagonistic toward him; he thus immediately attempted 
to establish a common ground. He explained that he had not planned to 
speak but felt that the people would want him to answer Lawton's attack
Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, November 19, 1880,
^^Pike County News (Zebulon, Georgia), November 20, l880, 
op. cit,, p. 319.
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on his character and record. His approach not only strengthened his 
own position, but weakened Lawton’s stand by commenting on the fact 
that Georgia voters would have preferred to see the program his foe 
supported. Brown further aided his ethos by complimenting the fairness 
and desire of the audience to forget the past, preferring instead to 
look to the future. Throughout his refutation. Brown provided a 
rationale for the past action taken by the people, never once forcing 
them to assume a defensive attitude. Brown’s position was strengthened 
by a letter he read from General Lee, dated in 1867, calling for the 
South to accept the Radicals' reconstruction program.
The rhetorical excellence of this speech can be seen, secondly, 
through Brown’s ability to weaken his opponentSs case. This Brown 
accomplished subtly without attacking Lawton’s character. First, he 
questioned Lawton’s wisdom in opening old wounds by insisting on 
recalling the bitter days of reconstruction, when the people would 
much prefer to know the program he would support if elected senator,^® 
Brown completed his case by recalling Lawton's past defense of large 
coJTJorations at the expense of the people.
Brown's rhetorical excellence was further aided by the strong 
logical support he gave to arguments answering Lawton's attacks. For 
example, to Lawton's charge that Brown had thwarted the cause of the 
Confederacy, Brown presents a good defense of his actions by offering 
evidence that Georgia, under his rule, had contributed more men and
^^Atlanta Constitution pointed out on June 2, 1880, that the 
Democratic Party had been seriously weakened for the last four years by 
the number of members joining independent parties searching for a more 
constructive program that would allow the state to advance economically.
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money to the Confederacy than had any other state. He admitted that 
he had differed with Davis, but only on points that he felt threatened 
a loss to Georgia of her rights. He then turned the argument on Lawton 
by reminding listeners that Robert Toombs, Lawton's chief supporter, 
and the ever-popular Alexander Stephens had actively supported Brown in 
each of his disputes with the Confederacy. Lawton's attack that Brown 
had been wrong when Brown pointed to the neighboring states which had 
rejected the Radicals' program and had suffered much more than Georgia.
Avery wrote that Brown had ignored obsolete issues, choosing
rather to advance a bold, progressive enunciation of public sentiment
Brown's ability to perceive important issues, plus his willingness to
discuss those issues in this address, gave his invention social utility.
The issues in the election were clearly drawn. Robert Toombs outlined the
issues as including Brown's ability to serve in the Senate, his past
record during the reconstruction acts, and the constitutionality of the
70Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. ' Brown was not only willing, but 
probably welcomed the opportunity to discuss these issues to vindicate 
himself. Brown introduced a fourth issue, the course Georgia should 
follow in the future. This fourth issue centered around the question of 
whether Georgia should remain the agricultural state she had been before 
the war, or whether as proposed by the Redeemers, she should develop 
industry, raw materials, and minerals, as well as agriculture. Brown
^^Avery, op. cit., p. 602.
*^ ®Cited in speech as reported in the Atlanta Constitution, 
November 13, 1880.
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argued all four issues in his address, as well as advocating public 
education and the other programs supported in the "new South" movement.
Lawton’s chances for election were probably harmed as much by 
his own campaign as by Brown's speeches. Evidence has already been 
presented to indicate the people were no longer interested in the old 
argument of the validity of the reconstruction program, their interest 
was directed more to improving their own fortunes and the future of the 
state. He was probably further hurt by devoting most of his arguments 
to attacking Brown and failing to offer a program he would follow if 
elected to the Senate, Louise B. Hill concluded that the election 
would probably be very close with the final decision resting with the 
Negro vote.71 Lawton not only attacked a man who supported a program 
designed to aid the Negro race, but further failed to match Brown's 
promise to strive to provide for their equality in politics and in 
education, Louise B. Hill further concluded that the Negro vote was 
probably the difference in the election.7^
Brown's election to the Senate was no doubt aided by the 
support he gained from Colquitt and Gordon's followers. Avery hints 
at this conclusion when he described both men as holding a tremendous 
following over the state. He wrote that each of the men had enjoyed 
victories by large majorities.7^
A large part of Brown's success in his victory in l880 must 
certainly be attributed to his election-eve speech. Vft*iters testify
7lHill, op. cit., p. 318. 
72ibid.
73Avery, op. cit., p. 563.
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that a change of public opinion occurred during the course of the 
speech. Antagonism toward Brown was demonstrated early in the speech 
when members in the audience shouted that this was “Brown talk."
During the progress of the speech more and more people joined in the 
applause, and bouquets were showered from time to time upon the 
stage.Just how much of a part the election-eve speech played in 
aiding Brown's victory can never be known; however, certain writers 
may Offer some insight: Louise B. Hill wrote that Lawton left the
Opera House that night knowing he had lost the election.7^ Fielder 
believed the speech served as the turning point in Brown's career,
The Pike County News described it as the finest and most sensible 
political speech made in Georgia since the war.7?
Conclusion
Ionise B, Hill wrote that "the stigma of Brown's career in 
reconstruction may be said to have continued until the year 1880, when, 
upon receiving the highest political honor within the power of the 
state to bestow, he could feel himself completely vindicated.^® The 
Columbus Inquirer Sun, a paper that had fought Brown since the time of 
reconstruction, indicated the same conclusion when it wrote, "Much as 
Brown is disliked in this section, were he running in this county
^^ Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, November 19, 1880.
7^Hill, op. cit., p. 319.
^^Fielder, op. cit., p. 529.
^^Pike County News (Zebulon, Georgia), November 20, 1880.
"^ H^ill, op. cit., p. 291.
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against Colquitt or Gordon he would win by a larger majority than
Norwood did over Colquitt.History seemed to have made prophets
of all three writers. Four years later Brown was re-elected to the
80Senate without opposition. He continued to serve in the Senate until
ill-health forced him to retire in I89I. Even after retirement Brown
remained a political power within Georgia without peer until his death
81
on November 30, l89h.
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Inquirer Sun (Columbus, Georgia), November 17, I88O. 
®°Hm, op. cit., p. 321.
®^Fielder, op. cit., p. $92.
CHAPTER VI 
BROWN'S RHETORIC IN RETROSPECT 
Introduction
This study postulated that a knowledge of Brown's rhetoric 
might prove beneficial to students of history and public address. 
Historians have long disputed Brown's motives during secession, 
reconstruction, and restoration in Georgia and the South. An 
evaluation of his rhetorical invention might provide new insight into 
his motives and hence make a modest contribution to Southern history. 
In Chapter One, Vfrage was cited as claiming that the public address 
field needs information describing the ideas, skills, and careers 
of our public speakers. If this idea is valid, then this analysis of 
Brown's speaking may be useful in the field of public address.
The proposed objectives for this study were to describe the 
ideas presented by Joseph Emerson Brown in a representative selection 
of his rhetoric during the years 1857 through 1880 and to evaluate 
the invention he employed in that rhetoric. An effort is made in this 
chapter to synthesize the rhetoric Brown employed in secession, recon­
struction, and restoration. To accomplish this goal Brown's ideas are 
summarized and his invention is evaluated in this chapter.
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A Description of Brown's Ideas 
The Importance of Brown's Ideas 
Although in i860 the Southern states believed that they had 
the right to secede and that they should secede, some historians suggest 
the states did not take this action until Georgia indicated she would 
support the secession effort. North Carolina's governor Vance explained 
that North Carolina did not vote for secession until she was sure Georgia 
would secede.1 Avery wrote that no Southern state played a more vital 
role in secession and reconstruction than did Georgia.^ A Cincinnati 
paper wrote in I867 that the refusal of Georgia to join the rebellion 
would have done more than that of any other state to discourage 
secession. In like manner, Georgia's acceptance of the terras of 
reconstruction offered by Congress would be a signal for the acquies­
cence of all, and would have contributed to the pacification of the 
whole country.^ Since Georgia played such a vital role during this 
period of history, the man that was recognized as the leading voice in 
Georgia would also play a vital role in history. That man was Joe 
Brown. In Georgia, there were men whose importance equaled Joe Brown 
during secession, reconstruction, and restoration, but no man equaled 
his importance in all three periods. Toombs and Stephens were very 
influential during secession, but neither man played a vital role in 
the other periods. Ben Hill was an influential voice in Georgia during
1Cited in Louise B. Hill, Joseph E. Brown and the Confederacy 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), p. 36.
2l. W. Avery, The History of the State of Georgia (New York: 
Brown and Derby, I88I), p. U.
^Cincinnati Commercial, March 27, I867.
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reconstruction, but was not as influential in restoration or secession. 
Avery concluded that no phase of Brown’s activity during these three 
periods could be omitted without leaving a blank page in the history of 
Georgia.^ Thompson concluded that of all the men active in Georgia from 
the years 1857 through i860, Joe Brown must be considered the most 
powerful of them all.^ No man could be this important to a state unless 
his ideas frequently mirrored the will of the people.
The ideas Bro:n advanced during the years of secession were 
reflections of the popular will. During reconstruction Brown no longer 
spoke for the Democratic Party when he pleaded for his state to acquiesce 
to the Radicals' program. However, he did speak for a number of people 
who believed the South would benefit by accepting reconstruction.
During the restoration of home-rule. Brown became one of the members 
conçrising the ruling "triumvirate” and was believed to be the most 
powerful of the figures in Georgia's political arena.^
Historians cannot agree upon the reasons that motivated Brown 
to follow the course he pursued. Coulter concluded that Brown supported 
the Radicals' reconstruction program because he believed cooperation 
with the Radicals was his quickest and easiest road to success.?
Louise B. Hill wrote that Brown was an opportunist seeking favor with 
the ruling powers. She further charged that he interfered with the
^Avery, op. cit., p. 5.
^Mildred C. Thompson, "Reconstruction in Georgia," Studies in 
History, Economics and Public Law (New York: Columbia University Press,
1915), LXIV, 286.
inquirer Sun (Columbus, Georgia), November 17, i860.
?E. Merton Coulter, The South Dur^g Reconstruction 1865-1877 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University t^ess, 19U?), p. 12U.
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success of the Confederacy, and then implied that he supported the 
Radicals’ program for reasons of personal safety.8 Other historians' 
argue that Brown returned to the Democratic Party in I87O only after 
he believed it was returning to power.9 However, many historians 
including Thompson, Avery, and Fielder reject these charges and 
conclude that Brown was motivated to follow the course he believed 
would best serve the interest of the state. A review of Brown’s 
ideas may provide new insights into this historical dispute,
A Review of Brown’s Ideas
Brown’s Ideas During Secession. The conflict that ended with 
.the Union divided centered around two questions: could slavery be
carried into the territories, and did the state or federal government 
have the authority to resolve this conflict? Brown’s attitude toward 
these problems varied from the position of resolving the conflict within 
the Union in 1850 to participating actively in the campaign designed to 
persuade Georgia to secede from the Union in i860.
In 1850, Brown believed that slavery was legal and it had 
proven to be a desirable system for the non-slaveholders, as well as 
the owners.10 Brown bitterly denounced the Wilmot Proviso in a speech 
delivered on February 1, 18$0, when he defended the justice of slavery 
and argued that the constitution gave Congress no right to abolish
®Hill, op. cit., pp. 259-260.
^These historians included Dodd, Freeman, Eckenrode, and Hay.
lOjohn Samuel Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1963), pp. 10-11.
11slavery in the territories.^^ VJhen the Compromise of l850 was offered, 
Brovm joined the majority in his state in pledging their loyalty to the 
Georgia Platform and to the Compromise.
In 1857, Brown voiced approval of the KansasyNebraska Act wliich 
he believed supported the principles contained in the Georgia Platform. 
He joined the many Democrats who upheld Buchanan's action, arguing 
that l^ alker was responsible for the trouble in Kansas. He praised the 
Supreme Court for its fair decision in the Dred Scott case that the 
federal government had no right to interfere with slavery in the 
territories.
Brown did not actively participate in the sectional dispute 
until i860 when the threat of a Republican victory made many in the 
South fear for their rights. In 1857, Brown asked only that Georgia 
be guaranteed the preservation of her inherent rights. At that time he 
assured the people that he would take whatever action might be needed 
to preserve those rights. In 1859, he recognized that a growing threat 
to the South expressed itself in the increasing membership in the 
Republican Party. He believed that a unified Democratic Party was the 
means for combating this new threat to Southern rights. At this time 
he expressed his love for the Union, but admitted he loved his state 
more. He advised the people to stay loyal to the Union, but if strife 
came Georgia had no choice but to withdraw from the Union.
As time passed, a Republican victory seemed almost a certainty 
in i860. The threat of a Republican victory, the John Brown raid, the
^Ulrich B. Phillips, "Georgia and State Rights," Annual Report 
of the American Historical Association, II (I9OI), 181.
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passage of anti-fugitive slave laws in the North, and the split in the 
National Democrat Party all contributed to Brown's stand favoring 
secession. His new belief was summarized in the opening remarks of 
his special message to Congress in i860: "In ny opinion, the constitu­
tional rights of the people have been violated by some of the 
non-slaveholding states to an extent which would justify Georgia's 
adopting any measure against such offending states, which in its 
judgment, may be necessary for the restoration and future protection 
of all its r i g h t s ."12 He believed the North and South had formed the 
Union under a constitution which obligated each state to protect the 
ri^ts of other states. The Northern states had broken this contract 
with the passage of their anti-fugitive slave laws and their attempt 
to make slavery illegal. He called for a state convention to determine 
if the state should secede, and for the passage of any acts necessary 
for protecting the state's inherent rights.
Brown's Ideas During Reconstruction. Brown's attitude toward 
reconstruction was expressed by his actions rather than by any ideas 
he expressed following the end of the war. Most people in the South 
believed that the war freed the slaves and established that the 
national government was a federation instead of a confederation. They, 
therefore, believed the state needed only to accept the terms of 
surrénder, reorganize its government, and resume its former position 
in the Union.1^  Joe Brown, acting under this belief, called the state
Incited in Allen D. Candler, The Co^ederate Records of the 
State of Georgia (Atlanta: State Printing Office, 1909), I, 20.
^^Ezell, op. cit., p. 39.
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legislature to assemble to take all necessary actions to regain 
admittance into the Union. Brown was arrested before the legislature 
assembled and was taken to Washington B.C. He was released in about a 
week, returned to Georgia, and resigned his office as governor. In his 
resignation address he reviewed the sectional differences that the 
South thought could be resolved only by war. Now that the South had 
lost the war, it had no recourse but to accept the terms dictated by 
the victorious North. These demands were that the slaves be freed and 
that the states rewrite their constitutions to include the points 
dictated by President Johnson. Brown warned the people that war often 
destroyed the long-accepted institutions of the defeated nation. The 
state must take a practical approach and accept the losses as the 
fortunes of war. The state should accept these changes, act in good 
faith toward the North, and begin rebuilding her economy. He reminded 
the people that the voters would select the leaders to rebuild the 
state; thus each eligible person must participate in the election to 
guarantee that the ablest men were elected.
The presidential program of reconstruction was rejected by the 
United States Congresf, which in turn passed their own version of a 
reconstruction program in the Sherman Bills, ’.flien the states were 
forced to determine the course they would follow in 1867, Brown 
advised Georgia to accept the Radicals ' demands. He admitted the 
Sherman Bills were the result of a political dispute and must be treated 
as such. The state had seceded from the Union, and had gone to war to 
defend her course of action, had lost that war, and now had no recourse
I.
but to abide by the terms of the' victor. Congress, by a vote of the 
people, had won the right to dictate the terras under which Georgia
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could return to the Union. He believed Georgia would realize fewer 
problems and enjoy faster recovery if she would immediately meet the 
terms dictated by the Radicals. Re-admitted to the Union, the state 
could be governed by the most capable leaders in the state and her 
recovery would be better assured. Brown reminded the people that 
reconstruction was a political issue and predicted the courts would 
not interfere. On the other hand, the longer the state rejected the 
Union's terms, the harsher those terms would become. Georgia could 
not depend on remaining under inferior military rule because Congress 
would not adjourn until its terras were met. The state had no choice 
to make concerning acceptance of rejection of equal rights for the 
Negroes; this was already an established act. Georgia did not need to 
worry about Negro rule since the whites had a majority vote. Georgia's 
major concern was being subjected to harsh rule if the people rejected 
the congressional program.
Brown's Ideas During Restoration. Georgia did adopt the 
Radicals' reconstruction program and was re-admitted in the Union in 
1868. In 1870 the Republicans lost control of the state and the 
government was returned to the Democrats in 1871. From 1820 to I88O 
Brown did not participate actively in politics and was still hated by 
many in the state. He was appointed United States Senator in I88O by 
Governor Colquitt when Senator Gordon resigned his post. Brown decided 
to run for re-election in the special election of I88O and perhaps 
vindicate himself for the course he pursued during reconstruction.
Brown made a speech on the Mexican War Pension Bill in the 
Senate in I88O, a speech designed to let the North know the South's
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attitude toward the Union. The Republicans were still appealing to 
the people’s emotions and perpetuating the strife still existing 
between the sections with the "bloody shirt" argument. Brown 
admitted that the South had been guilty of inciting the war. However, 
the South had acted under the belief that it had the legal right to 
secede from the Union, and Brown admitted he had shared this belief. 
The Civil War was therefore fought over the legality of slavery, and 
the states’ right to withdraw from the Union. When the South lost 
the war the states accepted their defeat and made those necessary 
changes dictated by the North in order to gain re-admittance into the 
Union. Thus, in I88O, the Southern states were in the Union legally, 
and not by grace.
Brown then insisted that the North must now admit its guilt 
in mistreating the South. The North had insisted it was fighting the 
war to establish that the states could not on their own volition 
withdraw from the Uni"*n. Yet, at the end of the war, the North forced 
the South to make specific changes before the states could be 
re-admitted into a union they had never left. The North had further
been unfair in the false picture it had painted, knowingly or
unknowingly, concerning the relationship between the Negroes and whites 
in the South. He argued that the North had used false information to
picture rebellion between the two races to gain additional votes. Yet
the two races worked side-by-side on the most cordial relationship in 
Georgia. He admitted the races did not attend the same school, but 
this was by common agreement, and Georgia appropriated equal money to 
guarantee equal educational opportunity for both races.
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Brown also presented a number of speeches in i860 for the 
benefit of the people in Georgia. His objectives in these addresses 
were to defend the course he followed during reconstruction, and to 
advance the program he desired the state to adopt in 1080.
Brown denied he deserted the Democratic Party in 1867; rather 
the Party had deserted its original stand. Brown argued that he had 
advised a wise and just program during reconstruction: that the issue
was political and not leg&l, that if Georgia had not adopted the 
Radicals' program, her future would have been harmed far more than it 
had been. He then denied Lawton's charge that he failed to represent 
the beliefs of the people. The people's support of his program could 
be withessed in the election results in l380. His appointment to the 
Senate was the major issue in the election and the people had responded 
by casting more votes for the congressional candidates who openly 
supported him than were cast for Governor Colquitt.
Brown proposed a program designed to aid agriculture, to 
develop the existing natural resources in the state, to encourage 
expanding industry, to make the rivers and harbors navigable, and to 
provide free education for both races.^ The Gazette described the 
ideas as being those of a "new South," at least "a new South where 
her people rise up and follow the lead of such men as Senator Brown.
speech by Brown cited in the Atlanta Constitution, JuLy 7,
1880.
l^Cincinnati Gazette, November 25, 1880.
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Brown's Motives for His Ideas 
Two charges were made concerning Brown's motives that directly 
relate to this study. Critics claim that Brown's action after 186$ 
was taken (l) because of political expediency and (2) because of fear. 
Although these charges must be accepted or rejected speculatively since 
no one can look into Brown's mind, inference from some of the available 
evidence denies the charges..
If Brown's actions during reconstruction were motivated by 
political expediency, time failed to force the kinds of changes in 
position one expects from political opportunists. Brown's positions 
on major issues remained unchanged from l86$ to 1880. His arguments 
in the l880 election-eve speech concerning the reasons the South needed 
to adopt the Radicals' reconstruction did not differ from the arguments 
he advanced in his resignation speech in 186$. In his resignation 
address in l86$. Brown argued that the South must accept the dictates 
of the North. Reconstruction was a political question, he stated, and 
Georgia would benefit by accepting the victor's terms and thus returning 
the most capable leaders in the state to positions of authority to 
enable the state to recover more quickly. These were the same arguments 
he defended in the election-eve speech in 1880. Throughout, Brown 
argued from the premise that the question was political and the state 
could expect no aid from the courts, while Ben Hill argued that the 
acts were unconstitutional and the people should defeat the acts 
through the courts.
Just as evidence does not prove Brown supported the Radicals' 
program for political gain. Brown's apologists cannot establish for
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certain that he advocated this program only to benefit the state.
Yet some events suggest he may have been acting for what he believed 
to be good for his state. First, Brown was offered the position of 
governor by the state after President Johnson re-admitted Georgia 
into the Union in 1866. Brown refused the position and gave as his 
reason he feared his election would offend the North and embarrass 
the President.Secondly, Henry R. Jackson wrote that he warned 
Brown that it would mean committing political suicide to support the 
Radicals' reconstruction program. Brown had replied that the state 
meant more to him than his political future, and then proceeded to . 
support the acts. Thirdly, Alexander Stephens wrote a letter stating 
that although he disagreed with Brown's course during reconstruction, 
there was never a doubt in his mind that Brown followed this course 
because he believed it would be the wisest course for the state.17 
Even Coulter, who had claimed that Brown acted for political reason, 
admitted Brown was either one of the wisest men of his times or the 
best guesser. Coulter wrote, "Seeing far ahead, he concluded that 
worse would come if the state did not accept the bitter dose."l® 
Fourthly, Brown joined the Democratic Party in 1870 because it 
advanced the same platform he had defended not because he desired to 
join the bandwagon. One former critic wrote, "If the Democratic Party
is right then Brown has been right all along. We have taken
l^Thompson, op. cit., p. 1$0.
17cited in the Atlanta Constitution, May 18, 1880.
l^ E. Merton Coulter, Georgia, A Short History (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 19^7), p. 265.
. 17U
Joe Brown's platform and adopted it as our own, and with effrontry say 
that Joe Brown has come back to the party."^ 9 Brown advised his 
followers in 1871 to support the Democratic nominee for governor. He 
reasoned that since the Democratic Platform was so similar to what his 
followers believed, there seemed little reason to remain divided.20
The second charge made against Brown was that he supported 
reconstruction out of fear. Louise B. Hill cited a "distinguished 
jurist" or Georgia as having a letter dated February 28, 1928, from a 
writer who said General Carswell told him that Brown, in his presence, 
"expressed the fear that he might be prosecuted for treason, and that 
he threw himself on a bed and wept."21
Again, no conclusion can be drawn that proves with certainty 
whether fear motivated Brown's course in secession, but several of 
Brown's past actions bespeak a courage idiich seriously questions the 
reliability of such a claim. Louise B. Hill cited a second letter, 
this time from Brown to Stephens, in which Brown expressed that he 
was prepared to meet his fate with calmness.^^ A second instance 
occurred during reconstruction. Brown's life was threatened numerous 
times when he appeared to speak before groups, and despite the warning 
of his friends he never once failed to make these speaking engagments.
19Albany News (Albany, Georgia), June 3, 1880. See'also Haywood 
J. Pearce, Jr., Benjamin H. Hill: Secession and Reconstruction (Chicago:
University of Chicago ^ess, 1928), p. 152.
2%eekly Seaport Appeal (Brunswick, Georgia), September 28, 1872.
2lHill, op. cit., p. 2$1.
22lbid.
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A third example exemplifying courage was his near-duel with Toombs* 
Toombs challenged Brown to a duel and the challenge was accepted.
Brown went about the business of removing his letter from the Baptist 
Church, made out his will, and was reported to be taking target 
practice with a pistol. Only last minute intervention by common 
friends avoided the duel and possible tragedy. Fourth, as Fielder 
points out. Brown advocated meeting the specific demands made by the 
federal government, but in no speech, letter, or other form of 
communication did he once suggest that the South should go one step 
further. In fact, at the National Republican Convention in 1868, in 
the presence of the military, and in the face of Republican domination, 
he protested that the United States Congress must not make further 
demands and that he would refuse to call for the state to go beyond 
the actual requirements of the conquering power.23 in light of these 
four examples it becomes a little difficult to accept the thesis that 
Brown acted out of fear.^b
Conclusion
A critical evaluation of Brown's published letters, newspaper 
articles, and speeches reveal the following basic beliefs. Brown 
believed in states rights and their inherent right to withdraw 
from the Union. Although he accepted the ruling forced by the Civil
23Robert Fielder, A Sketch of the Life and Times and Speeches 
of Joseph E. Brown (Springfield, Massachusetts: N.P., 1883), pp. U26-U28.
2^In an interview in 1890, General Lawton said Brown would have 
fought Toombs. He concluded the interview with the statement "Brown is 
a brave man, and it is by no means safe to count on his being anything 
else." The Advertiser (îfontgomery, Alabama), October 26, I89O.
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War, he admitted under question during the Mexican War Pension Bill 
speech that he still believed the South, in i860, legally had the right 
to secede. Following the Civil War, he accepted the outcome and the 
belief that the state's right of secession had been completely overthrown. 
Further, the South had suffered complete defeat and now was left with no 
recourse but submission. He believed that the sooner the states 
accepted the North's requirements, the sooner they would return to the 
Union, the less they would be forced to suffer.
A critical examination of historical journals, books, letters, 
speeches, and newspapers fail to substantiate the charges that Brown 
acted out of political expediency or out of fear. Brovm was a 
politician and probably acted at times for selfish ends, but he was 
also willing to stand for beliefs that could cost him his political 
future. Brown's foes admitted that no charge of dishonesty or lack of 
ability could be placed against his record. Brown was not all saint 
nor all sinner; perhaps one can only conclude that Brown was practical.
He was able to arrive at conclusions with discernment; having committed 
himself to a stand, he was then willing and able to defend that stand 
against all odds and opposition.
An Evaluation of Brown's Invention 
Wilson and Arnold define invention as including selecting the 
subject, proof, and reinforcement of ideas. They believe a good 
subject should be timely; significant for the speaker and the audience; 
and appropriate for the speaker, audience, and the o c c a s i o n . Proof,
2^John F. Wilson and Carroll C. Arnold, Public Speaking as a 
Liberal Art (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 196U), p. 126.
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they write, includes the speaker's logic, his relationship to the 
audience, and his emotional appeal to the audience.Reinforcement 
of ideas includes information inserted primarily to clarify, to 
detail, or to reinforce the speaker's ideas.^7 These three components 
served as the guides for evaluating Brown's invention in the body of 
this paper, and will continue to guide the concluding evaluation. ** 
An Evaluation of Brown's Subjects.
Brown was not forced to hunt for the subjects to treat in 
his rhetoric from 18$7 through l880j the times made the subjects.
The major problem in Georgia from 1857 through i860 was what stand 
should the state take on questions concerning the sectional conflict? 
What relationship did the state have to the Union? Was the threat to 
the security of the South sufficient to warrant secession? What course 
should the state follow if secession became necessary? To choose to 
consider these questions at that time required little oratorical 
insight; yet Brown displayed discriminating judgment in adapting these 
topics to the time and thus making his addresses appropriate for his 
audiences. Brown's feeling of goodwill for the Union in 1857 was 
replaced in the 1859 inaugural address by an expressed growing concern 
for the state's rights resulting in part from the raid on Harper's 
Ferry. Brown's reference to the state's membership in the Confederacy 
rather than in the Union, his warning of.danger from the sectional 
Republican Party intimated the growing sectionalism found throughout
^^ Ibid., pp. 128-150.
^7ibid., p. 151.
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not only Georgia but the South. The ideas expressed in his special 
message in i860 indicated that sectionalism had matured and secession 
was no longer a mere threat but an act that might soon be realized. 
Brown's mood and treatment of ideas had changed from the desire for 
moderation and justice in the nation's councils, expressed in 1857, to 
the prayer in i860 that Southern leaders be directed to protect states' 
rights and preserve the peoples' liberties. Thus, Brown pictured 
the growth of sectionalism and reflected the popular mood in the South 
in his rhetoric of secession.
Brown was praised for his awareness of vital issues and 
sensitivity to the people's mood in his rhetoric of reconstruction.^® 
The major oroblem facing Georgia from 1865 to 1872 was what action 
should be taken concerning the various programs of reconstruction. 
Southern states uniformly responded favorably to President Johnson's 
reconstruction program in 1866, but differed over a course to follow 
when faced with the Radicals' program in 1867. A study of Brown's 
rhetoric during this period revealed his awareness of the key issues 
and his adaption to the people's mood. Since Georgia favored President 
Johnson's program, the major problems in 1866 were concerned with 
rebuilding the state's economy and restoring its government. Brown 
addressed himself to these problems before 1857 with major emphasis 
placed on the economic rather than the political issues.^9 Georgia 
was divided over the Radicals' reconstruction program disagreeing as
Avery, op. cit., p. 3L0.
^°Thompson, op. cit., p. U2.
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to whether it should be adopted or contested before the United States 
Supreme Court, Brown's remarks after 186? were not only directed 
primarily to political issues, but were presented on a "let's be 
practical" approach, designed to avoid antagonizing the opposing 
listeners.
Brown faced two problems in i860; (l) gaining a fair hearing
for the South in national councils, and (2) regaining the popular 
support he originally held in Georgia. The Republicans had resumed 
using the "bloody shirt" argument in national elections in 1878.
The "bloody shirt" appeal was designed to fuel a continued distrust 
and hate in the North for the South. The major objective of the 
Republicans was to weaken the Democratic Party but their course 
was also proving harmful to Southern recovery. Brown's address in 
the United States Senate on the Mexican War Pension Bill was not only 
aimed at defeating the proposed amendments but was also directed 
toward destroying further effective use of the "bloody shirt." The 
major part of his address was devoted to the latter task, reasoning 
that if the fear and mistrust could be destroyed, the Radicals' could 
not muster the strength needed to pass unjust legislation. Perhaps 
Brown does not warrant special praise for his discernment of vital 
issues at this time, as these facts were also apparent to many 
Southerners, but his invention was again devoted to ideas vital to 
the times and to his audience. The task of regaining lost popularity 
was treated in his election-eve speech. This speech has been described 
by many writers as Brown's greatest rhetorical effort. The antagonism 
felt for Brown was a carry over from the animosity that developed
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toward his support of the Radicals’ reconstruction program. Brown's 
remarks were directed to defending his motives during reconstruction, 
to presenting information which established that such men as Lee 
supported this stand, and to the fact that history had proven his 
course to be right. Again Brown treated those ideas vital to his 
purpose, audience, occasion, and the time. Thus, Brown's invention 
was rhetorically sound in his sélection of subjects.
An Evaluation of Brown's Proof
If the speaker is to employ good invention his ideas must 
be logical, relate to the speaker and the audience, and appeal 
emotionally to the audience. Many writers express the thesis that 
this was a primary strength of Brown's rhetoric.
With few exceptions, writers praise Brown's logic. The 
Homing News noted that Brown's straightforward logic, as opposed 
to rhetorical frills, was the thing that made him so popular in the 
United States Senate.The Daily Press remarked that Brotm's speech 
on the Sherman Bills was "courteous, logical and convincing.The 
New York World, the Daily Examiner, the Columbus Daily Times, and the 
Kansas City Star are just a few of the papers that offer editorial 
comments praising Brown's invention. All of these papers agree upon 
one description: he always addressed himself to the reason and ^
intellect of the audience. Senator Lamar might fairly sum up the 
point when he noted that Brown's speech on the Mexican War Pension Bill
^^Savannah Homing News, July 7, i860.
^^Augusta Daily Press, April 28, 1867.
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showed '^ direct and incomparable common sense.
Brown was well-knoim for his ability to adapt to the audience. 
Whether talking to his supporters in i860, or his antagonists in I867, 
Brown avoided any wording that might anger his listeners. The report 
that audience?, although disagreeing in 1867, would listen with no 
interruptions for hours, indicates the ethos he ably established.33 
The shift of opinion that occurred in the audience during the 
election-eve speech is another example of Brown's strong ethos. One 
of the greatest tributes paid Brown for this strength was made by 
Louise B. Hill when she wrote, "Brown developed to an uncanny degree 
the ability to sense the popular mind, probe its depth, and with 
the precision of a chemist, gauge its reaction."3U
Many writers imply that Brown did not appeal to the emotions.
The Daily Press wrote that Brown's speech in Augusta was dispassionate,3^ 
the Daily Examiner saw no emotional pleas in Brown's address at St. 
Andrew's Hall,^^ and the Chronicle makes no reference to any emotional 
plea used in the election-eve speech.37 Yet, emotional appeals were 
known to, and employed by. Brown. The Augusta speech praised the
32cited in the Atlanta Constitution, June 30, I88O.
33Augusta Daily Press, April 28, I867, and the Daily Examiner 
(Atlanta). The date Tor the Daily Examiner is not known but can be found 
in "Brown's Scrapbooks."
3Unill, op. cit., p. U8.
3^Augusta Daily Press, April 28, I867.
3&Daily Examiner (Atlanta), August lii, 18^7.
37Augusta Daily Chronicle and Sentinel, November 19, I88O.
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people's fairness, pleaded for their use of a practical approach, 
threatened the danger of harsher times, and promised them peace and 
security. Brown's speeches during secession were loaded with symbols 
such as "black Republicans," "ambitious leader," and "loss of equal 
rights." The failure of many critics to recognize this trait is 
difficult to understand. The journalists might have desired to picture 
Brown as a logician only, or they could have thought of emotional 
appeal as containing language that Fielder described as "fiction 
and f a n c y , T h e  latter description seems more plausible, or, at 
least, agrees with the theory suggested by Louise B, Hill, She wrote 
that in the election-eve speech Brown's knowledge and understanding 
of the psychology of the masses enabled him to employ emotional 
appeals that, when used by others, would have alienated many,39 
An Evaluation of Brown's Amplification 
Amplification was described earlier in tliis chapter as infor­
mation used to clarify, to detail, or to reinforce the speaker's ideas. 
The words clarity and strength are terms universally employed by critics 
in their description of Brown's rhetoric. The clarity and strength 
in Brown's rhetorical efforts can be traced in part to his use of 
amplification, or to the information used to clarify and reinforce. 
Fielder summarized these qualities when he wrote that Brown's ideas 
are always clear, and he makes use of "the most exhaustive arguments,"^^
^^Fielder, op, cit,, p. 69. 
3?Hill, op. cit,, p. 319, 
^^Fielder, op, cit,, p, 93.
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Brown normally employed description wording and comparison and contrast 
to gain greater clarity, and used examples and analogies to reinforce 
his ideas.
Brown's descriptive phrasing in the 1859 inaugural address of 
"prompted by ambitious leaders," "sacrifice their country," and "black 
Republicans" clearly pictured a selfish sectional party dedicated to 
denying individual rights. This was not an argument that logically 
proved a point, but it was phrasing that carried a clear and passionate 
appeal to a biased Southern people. In this same inaugural address 
he used his phrasing to establish a common ground with his listeners. 
Georgia was not united behind the Democratic Party in 1859, and Brown 
used such phrases as "treacherous," "unfaithful" leaders to describe 
the reason for party disunity. His description enabled party members 
to rationalize their past differences while still allowing them to 
again unite behind the party without loss of face.
Brown's rhetorical clarity was further aided by the use of 
comparison and contrast. In his resignation address in 1866 he made 
use of comparison and contrast to clarify the problems and to suggest 
possible solutions for these problems. The major problems in 1866 
centered around the disposition of the slaves and the need for a new 
labor force. Brown explained the problem in his speech and then 
described the course he followed as the basis for suggesting a possible 
solution to these needs. He explained he was solving his own labor 
shortage by giving his freed slaves a share of the crops or money for 
the work they contracted to do. In 186? he used an analogy in the 
"Replies" with his "let's be practical" approach. His audience was
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very familar with the need to adapt to changing financial conditionsj 
thus the analogy was drawn to clarify the need to adapt to changing 
political conditions. His "Replies" were further strengthened with the 
presentation of facts showing the number of legal Negro voters in 
Georgia as contrasted by the superior number of qualified whites 
who could assure the state of "white" rule.
One example of Brown's use of reinforcement was his reference 
to past history in 1866 to strengthen the plea that each citizen must 
accept his responsibility. Brown reminded the people that revolutions 
had always introduced changes in established institutions. History 
further revealed that ready acceptance by the people to these changes 
resulted in quick and efficient recovery. Perhaps Brown's most 
effective use of reinforcement was in his Mexican War Pension Bill 
address. In this speech Brown turned to past legislation to establish 
that all previous bills had been passfed without regard to personal' 
wealth or needs. This exanrole served to refute the opposition's 
argument and also to provide Brown with a premise to expose the 
Radicals' true intent.
Conclusion
Chapter Two cited several writers who concluded that Brown 
was not a great orator as Stephens, Cobb, Toombs, or Hill; but as a 
debater he was the inferior to none and the superior to most. In 
1880 the New York Times observed that Brown was the ablest speaker 
in the United States Congress from the South; "He is as good a 
lawyer as Edmunds, and knows more of commerce than almost any man in 
Congress. His judgment is never at fault. The National Democratic
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Party vri.ll do well to get Brovm to run its affairs for the next four 
y e a r s ."hi Brown was an excellent debater* a persuasive speaker.
His persuasiveness derived primarily from his selection of appropriate 
subjects and issues, his excellent use of proof, and his proficient 
use of amplification. Brown's strength as a speaker seems to rest 
in his effective use of invention.
Conclusion
The objectives of the present study included an analysis of
Brown's ideas and an evaluation of his rhetorical invention. Achieving
these goals was intended to contribute to the history of ideas in the
South and to the history of Southern public address.
In describing the various ideas Brown advanced concerning
secession, reconstruction, and restoration, this study has presented
the ideas of the people he represented during the three periods. In
analyzing ideas expressed by a very influential Southern leader from
1857 through i860, this study has characterized a philosophy existing
in Georgia and the South through these twenty-three years. Finally,
this study has considered the controversy concerning Brovm's motives
for his actions during reconstruction. Was Brovm motivated primarily
by fear, by expediency, or by an urge to advocate what he believed to
/
be the wisest course for his state? The investigation did not produce 
a conclusive answer to this question, but suggested that insufficient 
evidence has been offered to warrant the charges that fear and political 
ambition primarily motivated Brovm's actions.
^%ew York Times, November 25, 1880.
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Before summarizing the final evaluation of Brown's rhetorical 
skill, it might be well to review observations made in this study- 
describing his speaking skills. History does not reveal the extent 
of his formal rhetorical training, although it is believed that he 
did some debating while attending an academy in South Carolina. His 
vocal delivery, while nasal in quality, was clear and distinct and 
he spoke with a slow deliberate rate. His gestures were awkward and 
few in number, generally following a pattern of dropping one hand into 
the palm of the other, letting the other hand fall and rise on the 
speaker's stand in pump-like motion. He could and did prepare his 
speeches extemporaneously or by manuscript. While critics never 
described him as having the oratorical skill of Cobb, Ben Hill, or 
ToombsJ as a debater he was inferior to none. It was in debate and 
with his invention that he made his mark rhetorically. Hewas always 
able to select the key issues, although the subject had already been 
dictated by circumstances. Numerous sources conclude that his 
objectivity, his thoroughness in research, his reasoning ability, and 
his understanding and ability, to adapt to his listeners made for very 
strong proof. His use of phrasing, or comparison and contrast, and 
of reinforcement made for excellent use of amplification. Brown can 
be described as an influential spealœr for an important state during 
a critical period in history. He certainly deserved recognition in 
the study of history of American public address.
One question does continue to plague this writer at the end 
of this investigation. Avery wrote that the history of Georgia would 
contain great blanks if a description of Brown's activity were omitted.
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Thompson has described Brown as the most influential man in Georgia 
between the years 1857 and 1880. Fielder enlarges the scope of 
Thompson's observation to include not only Georgia, but the South.
These writers, and others, attribute great power and influence to 
Brown during these yearsj yet, with few exception, historians have 
accorded Brown little emphasis. If Brown was as powerful and as 
influential as contemporary writers indicate, why has he been virtually 
ignored by later historians and by students of public address?
The explanation might be a result of either oversight or 
lack of objective research. Certainly a man vho was a Democratic 
leader in secession, a man who after the war was a Republican leader 
during reconstruction, and a men who then became a Democratic leader 
during restoration of home rule, could easily be dismissed as an 
opportunist. Brown's record could easily motivate historians to 
dismiss him without additional investigation. Further, Brown was 
not actively engaged in politics after reconstruction until 1880, and 
his period of service for the next twelve years did not place him 
in controversial issues requiring additional research. Thus, he 
could easily have been ignored by innocent oversight.
The second explanation m ^  be a lack of historical objectivity. 
I'fost Southern history has been written by Southerners, or by historians 
that use the Southern writers as primary sources. Southern historians 
may have looked upon Brown as a traitor or as an opportunist, and with 
bias dismissed him as a key figure in the history of the South. Louise 
B. Hill serves as one example of a historian who obviously has a bias 
against Brown. While a second historian, E. Merton Coulter, may not
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be biased, he at least is guilty of dismissing Brown with insufficient 
proof to warrant his claims.
In summary, investigation reveals that Brown served as an 
influential leader in Georgia and the South through secession, 
reconstruction, and restoration. His rhetoric described a popular 
philosophy that was prevalent in Georgia and the South from 1657 to 
1880. Yet, while he alone was the only man to serve as a. leader in 
Georgia in all three periods, he has remained almost obscured by 
historians. The reason for this omission remains a myster, a 
mystery, regardless of the reason, that justifies further study and 
investigation.
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